How this document has been cited

—the Supreme Court held that the right to privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."
The Court recognized that "regulation limiting...[fundamental] rights may be justified only by a `compelling state interest'... and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake. "
—the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of certain aspects of personal privacy included a guarantee that a woman could decide whether to terminate her pregnancy without unjustified state interference.
Prior to the adoption of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, the United States Supreme Court recognized that one aspect of the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is "a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy."
- in State in Interest of AC, 1994 and 156 similar citations
—that a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy results in a legally operative harm for purposes of the necessity defense
- in Cyr v. State, 1994 and 58 similar citations
The court in Roe held; "if the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother".
- in STATE, IN THE INTEREST OF AWS, 1980 and 244 similar citations
A complaint based on a single past incident, containing allegations of unspecified, speculative threats of uncertain harm that might occur at some indefinite time in the future, cannot support respondents' standing to maintain this action.
- in Gilligan v. Morgan, 1973 and 32 similar citations
Here, Plaintiffs claim that the right to pursue their chosen, lawful occupation is a fundamental right but have not cited any case law—and the Court has not found any—supporting this argument.
- in Crossley v. California, 2020 and 32 similar citations
But it has been applied where the named plaintiff does have a personal stake at the outset of the lawsuit, and where the claim may arise again with respect to that plaintiff; the litigation then may continue notwithstanding the named plaintiff's current lack of a personal stake.
- in United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 1980 and 43 similar citations
—because at that point the fetus "presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb,"
- in In re TW, 1989 and 128 similar citations

Cited by

545 P. 3d 892 - Ariz: Supreme Court 2024
331 F. Supp. 2d 805 - Dist. Court, D. Nebraska 2004
625 NW 2d 444 - Mich: Court of Appeals 2001
872 P. 2d 591 - Cal: Supreme Court 1994
962 F. 2d 1366 - Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit 1992
744 F. Supp. 1323 - Dist. Court, ED Pennsylvania 1990
541 A. 2d 347 - Pa: Supreme Court 1988
841 F. 2d 1358 - Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit 1988
651 F. 2d 1198 - Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit 1981