Wittgenstein's Pragmatism
R Haack�- American Philosophical Quarterly, 1982 - JSTOR
R Haack
American Philosophical Quarterly, 1982•JSTORTT HOUGH Wittgenstein would never have-** described himself as a pragmatist, those
familiar with the work of Peirce, James, Dewey, Mead, Schiller and Ramsey can hardly fail to
see many pragmatist strands in his later work. And linking Wittgenstein with the pragmatist
tradition gives a useful perspective from which to approach both the interpretation and the
evaluation of his work.
familiar with the work of Peirce, James, Dewey, Mead, Schiller and Ramsey can hardly fail to
see many pragmatist strands in his later work. And linking Wittgenstein with the pragmatist
tradition gives a useful perspective from which to approach both the interpretation and the
evaluation of his work.
TT HOUGH Wittgenstein would never have-** described himself as a pragmatist, those familiar with the work of Peirce, James, Dewey, Mead, Schiller and Ramsey can hardly fail to see many pragmatist strands in his later work. And linking Wittgenstein with the pragmatist tradition gives a useful perspective from which to approach both the interpretation and the evaluation of his work.
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