Agnieszka Slomka-Golebiowska

The relationship between women on boards and corporate environmental performance is puzzling because of the inconclusiveness of previous research. We study this association in light of the homophily and self-construct theories. Based on data on Italian FTSE-MIB companies from 2008 to 2017, we investigate how the significance of women directors in enhancing environmental performance varies with the nature of their nomination background. To understand the mechanisms… Pokaż więcej

The relationship between women on boards and corporate environmental performance is puzzling because of the inconclusiveness of previous research. We study this association in light of the homophily and self-construct theories. Based on data on Italian FTSE-MIB companies from 2008 to 2017, we investigate how the significance of women directors in enhancing environmental performance varies with the nature of their nomination background. To understand the mechanisms behind the role of women on boards in environmental performance, we differentiate women according to their nomination background (family vs. non-family). Our panel regression results document that, upon reaching a threshold of three women on boards (the so-called critical mass), family women directors affect negatively corporate environmental per-formance. Breaking down the environmental performance powered by subsequential companies' actions into (1) firm environmental technology use, (2) firm resource use efficiency, and (3) corporate emission reduction, we also provide evidence for the negative effect of family women directors. This may suggest that family women direc-tors do not reveal their communal characteristics; thus, they are not as sensitive to environmental issues as non-family women directors. Pokaż mniej

Boards of directors have recently become more attentive to their stakeholders' concerns, providing more transparent information and adopting more sustainable business strategies. This study investigates the influence of a critical mass of women on boards on the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure score and its three components separately. Using a sample of the FTSE-MIB listed companies in the 2005–2017 period, we show that reaching a critical mass of female board
members… Pokaż więcej

Boards of directors have recently become more attentive to their stakeholders' concerns, providing more transparent information and adopting more sustainable business strategies. This study investigates the influence of a critical mass of women on boards on the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure score and its three components separately. Using a sample of the FTSE-MIB listed companies in the 2005–2017 period, we show that reaching a critical mass of female board
members - going from one or two women to at least three - enhances the level of
ESG disclosure. The results also show that the critical mass of female board members
has a positive influence on every component of the ESG score, with the highest contribution of women reaching the governance score. These findings provide insights to shareholders and policymakers and suggest that a critical mass of female board members is particularly effective in improving transparency, and it can be seen as a mechanism to transit to stakeholder governance, fostering more sustainable behavior in firms. Pokaż mniej

The paper aims to investigate the impact of uniform board governance standards on the level of executive pay in banks with a controlling shareholder. Based on the sample of a hand-collected data on all executive pay of all public banks in Poland from 2005 to 2013, we find that board independence is negatively associated with executive compensation. In contrast to widely-held banks, independent directors in banks controlled by a blockholder provide restraint on the tendency to overcompensate… Pokaż więcej

The paper aims to investigate the impact of uniform board governance standards on the level of executive pay in banks with a controlling shareholder. Based on the sample of a hand-collected data on all executive pay of all public banks in Poland from 2005 to 2013, we find that board independence is negatively associated with executive compensation. In contrast to widely-held banks, independent directors in banks controlled by a blockholder provide restraint on the tendency to overcompensate. Thus, in concentrated ownership structure managerial power theory prevails over agency theory. However, the effect might be diluted as the number of board members increases. Pokaż mniej

Polityka wynagradzania kierownictwa banków jest jednym z najważniejszych mechanizmów ładu korporacyjnego, wpływającym na wyniki instytucji finansowej, a w konsekwencji na cały sektor bankowy. W publikacji przedstawiono uwarunkowania instytucjonalne projektowania, prowadzenia i egzekwowania tej polityki w Polsce oraz opisano, jak prowadzona jest ona w innych krajach Unii Europejskiej i Stanach Zjednoczonych.
Szczegółowo omówiono m.in.:
• wielkość i strukturę wynagrodzeń członków… Pokaż więcej

Polityka wynagradzania kierownictwa banków jest jednym z najważniejszych mechanizmów ładu korporacyjnego, wpływającym na wyniki instytucji finansowej, a w konsekwencji na cały sektor bankowy. W publikacji przedstawiono uwarunkowania instytucjonalne projektowania, prowadzenia i egzekwowania tej polityki w Polsce oraz opisano, jak prowadzona jest ona w innych krajach Unii Europejskiej i Stanach Zjednoczonych.
Szczegółowo omówiono m.in.:
• wielkość i strukturę wynagrodzeń członków zarządu,
• transparentność i jakość procesów związanych z prowadzeniem polityki wynagradzania,
• funkcjonowanie komitetu ds. wynagrodzeń, powoływanego w ramach rady nadzorczej do opracowywania i monitorowania polityki wynagradzania,
• długoterminowe programy motywacyjne w bankach.
Opisano, jak banki stosują się do przepisów prawnych i dobrych praktyk w dziedzinie wynagrodzeń oraz wskazano obszary problematyczne, wymagające działań naprawczych.
Publikacja przeznaczona jest dla członków rad nadzorczych oraz zarządów banków i spółek publicznych, pracowników agend rządowych zajmujących się rynkiem kapitałowym, firm doradczych, kancelarii prawnych, pracowników działów HR, a także studentów finansów, bankowości i prawa.

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This article seeks to ascertain the impact of remuneration committee independence on the level of
bank executive compensation in the context of the presence of a large blockholder. The recent postcrisis European Commission recommendation requiring banks to have independent
board members on their remuneration committees does not necessarily reduce the level of executive pay or make incentive contracts more efficient. The findings show that executives of banks with a controlling shareholder… Pokaż więcej

This article seeks to ascertain the impact of remuneration committee independence on the level of
bank executive compensation in the context of the presence of a large blockholder. The recent postcrisis European Commission recommendation requiring banks to have independent
board members on their remuneration committees does not necessarily reduce the level of executive pay or make incentive contracts more efficient. The findings show that executives of banks with a controlling shareholder and a greater number of independent board members on their remuneration committees are paid above the average. It shows that equity governance at banks come with inefficiency.

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