Suppose someone claimed that since a given type of event has never been believed when it didn’t really happen, if it is believed then we have very strong evidence that the event really happened.
Is this claim valid?
It seems to me that for the lack of belief in an event of this type that didn’t actually happen to count as evidence that if belief in this type of event exists then the event must have happened, we need to be provided with an explanation which identified a resistance to belief in events of this type forming if the event didn’t actually happen. Without any identified resistance, we may suggest that in fact there is no special resistance to belief in events of this type forming if the event didn’t actually happen, and the reason why belief in events of this type didn’t form if the event didn’t actually happen is that the type of event is too narrowly defined to expect belief in an event of that type to have formed if the event didn’t really happen.
Is my reasoning above correct?
I am also unsure whether there is some alternative explanation we could give for why belief in events of this type didn’t form if the event didn’t actually happen (other than suggesting that the type of event is too narrowly defined to expect belief in an event of that type to have formed if the event didn't really happen). Can you think of some alternative explanations?
EDIT: I should have said that I am only considering events that could theoretically happen, not impossible events. Thank you @ScottRowe for pointing this out, and sorry for the confusion.