From an evolutionary and therefore survival standpoint, absolutely. It's usually conveyed this way. From a survival standpoint, it is better to think the rustle in the bush is a lion and not a breeze and be wrong, then to think it is a breeze when it is a lion and be wrong. One gets you eaten! This idea that we quickly fall into interpreting complex events, ones that are potentially life threatening, comes from evolutionary psychology which is philosophical if one naturalizes one's epistemology (SEP). Today, the phrase (hyperactive) agency detection is often used to describe this.

This notion of the intentional stance has lots of empirical support. Consider when you see a face instead of the front end of a car. This is known as pareidolia. It's part of a broader spectrum of phenomena of cognitive biases and instances of apophenia. We, as human beings, are wired to actively structure our senses into types of experiences, a fact that became a major philosophical issue when the logical positivists tried to argue that observations were objective experiences. They ran into theory laddenness of observation, or the idea that what we perceive is colored by who we are and what we already believe. Wilfred Sellers (IEP) and others have put forth strong arguments that our spontaneous experience is in many ways normed before we become consciously aware, something he addresses with his Myth of the Given.

From an evolutionary and therefore survival standpoint, absolutely. It's usually conveyed this way. From a survival standpoint, it is better to think the rustle in the bush is a lion and not a breeze and be wrong, then to think it is a breeze when it is a lion and be wrong. One gets you eaten! This idea that we quickly fall into interpreting complex events, ones that are potentially life threatening, comes from evolutionary psychology which is philosophical if one naturalizes one's epistemology (SEP). Today, the phrase (hyperactive) agency detection is often used to describe this. The famous philosopher Daniel Dennett calls this in his book of the same name the intentional stance. The WP article quotes Dennett from his book:

This notion of the intentional stance has lots of empirical support. Consider when you see a face instead of the front end of a car. This is known as pareidolia. It's part of a broader spectrum of phenomena of cognitive biases and instances of apophenia. We, as human beings, are wired to actively structure our senses into types of experiences, a fact that became a major philosophical issue when the logical positivists tried to argue that observations were objective experiences. They ran into theory ladenness of observation, or the idea that what we perceive is colored by who we are and what we already believe. Wilfred Sellers (IEP) and others have put forth strong arguments that our spontaneous experience is in many ways normed before we become consciously aware, something he addresses with his Myth of the Given.

You ask:

Are agent explanations better than non agent explanations?

and

Is this because of psychology or this because of a valid philosophical instinct? In this sense, are agent explanations “better” in some sense than non agent ones?

From an evolutionary and therefore survival standpoint, absolutely. It's usually conveyed this way. From a survival standpoint, it is better to think the rustle in the bush is a lion and not a breeze and be wrong, then to think it is a breeze when it is a lion and be wrong. One gets you eaten! This idea that we quickly fall into interpreting complex events, ones that are potentially life threatening, comes from evolutionary psychology which is philosophical if one naturalizes one's epistemology (SEP). Today, the phrase (hyperactive) agency detection is often used to describe this.

Here is how it works: first you decide to treat the object whose behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent; then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have, given its place in the world and its purpose. Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on the same considerations, and finally you predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs. A little practical reasoning from the chosen set of beliefs and desires will in most instances yield a decision about what the agent ought to do; that is what you predict the agent will do. — Daniel Dennett, The Intentional Stance

This notion of the intentional stance has lots of empirical support. Consider when you see a face instead of the front end of a car. This is known as pareidolia. It's part of a broader spectrum of phenomena of cognitive biases and instances of apophenia. We, as human beings, are wired to actively structure our senses into types of experiences, a fact that became a major philosophical issue when the logical positivists tried to argue that observations were objective experiences. They ran into theory laddenness of observation, or the idea that what we perceive is colored by who we are and what we already believe. Wilfred Sellers (IEP) and others have put forth strong arguments that our spontaneous experience is in many ways normed before we become consciously aware, something he addresses with his Myth of the Given.

This then spills over into philosophy of religion, because it forms the basis of the idea that God or gods or supernatural beings as well as the religions that organize around them may be by-products of evolution, psychological spandrels of the mind. There is, in the philosophy, the "standard model" of the By-Product Thesis, that is of active philosophical interest. For instance, consider the article Religion as an Evolutionary Byproduct: A Critique of the Standard Model (UoC Press Journals). If you set aside the technical details of the debate, what you have is the fundamental idea that perceiving the universe as being managed or controlled by an agent allows people to socialize in a specific way with many benefits. Even regular prayer to God, for believers, improves health outcomes. Not to mention how religions tend to encourage in-group support.

So, yes, from an evolutionary standpoint, modeling phenomena with agency where none literally exists has a number of biological, psychological and sociological advantages. That such a thinking might not be as accurate as scientific theories is of little relevance if the benefits are many. Ultimately, a lot of psychological research focuses around this intersection of agency, belief, and outcomes.

You ask:

Are agent explanations better than non agent explanations?

and

Is this because of psychology or this because of a valid philosophical instinct? In this sense, are agent explanations “better” in some sense than non agent ones?

From an evolutionary and therefore survival standpoint, absolutely. It's usually conveyed this way. From a survival standpoint, it is better to think the rustle in the bush is a lion and not a breeze and be wrong, then to think it is a breeze when it is a lion and be wrong. One gets you eaten! This idea that we quickly fall into interpreting complex events, ones that are potentially life threatening, comes from evolutionary psychology which is philosophical if one naturalizes one's epistemology (SEP). Today, the phrase (hyperactive) agency detection is often used to describe this.

Here is how it works: first you decide to treat the object whose behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent; then you figure out what beliefs that agent ought to have, given its place in the world and its purpose. Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on the same considerations, and finally you predict that this rational agent will act to further its goals in the light of its beliefs. A little practical reasoning from the chosen set of beliefs and desires will in most instances yield a decision about what the agent ought to do; that is what you predict the agent will do. — Daniel Dennett, The Intentional Stance

This notion of the intentional stance has lots of empirical support. Consider when you see a face instead of the front end of a car. This is known as pareidolia. It's part of a broader spectrum of phenomena of cognitive biases and instances of apophenia. We, as human beings, are wired to actively structure our senses into types of experiences, a fact that became a major philosophical issue when the logical positivists tried to argue that observations were objective experiences. They ran into theory laddenness of observation, or the idea that what we perceive is colored by who we are and what we already believe. Wilfred Sellers (IEP) and others have put forth strong arguments that our spontaneous experience is in many ways normed before we become consciously aware, something he addresses with his Myth of the Given.

This then spills over into philosophy of religion, because it forms the basis of the idea that God or gods or supernatural beings as well as the religions that organize around them may be by-products of evolution, psychological spandrels of the mind. There is, in the philosophy, the "standard model" of the By-Product Thesis, that is of active philosophical interest. For instance, consider the article Religion as an Evolutionary Byproduct: A Critique of the Standard Model (UoC Press Journals). If you set aside the technical details of the debate, what you have is the fundamental idea that perceiving the universe as being managed or controlled by an agent allows people to socialize in a specific way with many benefits. Even regular prayer to God, for believers, improves health outcomes. Not to mention how religions tend to encourage in-group support.

So, yes, from an evolutionary standpoint, modeling phenomena with agency where none literally exists has a number of biological, psychological and sociological advantages. That such a thinking might not be as accurate as scientific theories is of little relevance if the benefits are many. Ultimately, a lot of psychological research focuses around this intersection of agency, belief, and outcomes, and forms the basis for debate within the philosophy of mind.