Having begun to turn the corner in the fight against ISIS earlier this year, it’s safe to say that we have now secured significant momentum in dissolving the terrorist group’s “state” project.
Although more victories have been won in Iraq, Syria too has witnessed ISIS lose a great deal more territory than it has won since mid-2014. It would seem therefore, that we have much to celebrate.
However, fighting the scourge of ISIS is about more than territorial gains. ISIS’s dramatic recovery in Iraq and expansion in Syria was a symptom of a far more significant threat: the catastrophic breakdown of societies and governance.
Nowhere has this been clearer than in Syria, where a ruthless dictator has torn his country apart and contributed to creating a seething sectarian cauldron in which extremists have thrived. Turning tactical gains into durable strategic victories means securing a more representative and stable alternative for societies currently under ISIS control.
ISIS falsely claims to represent Sunni Islam and has imposed its rule upon significant swathes of predominantly Sunni Arab Syria. Until now however, the anti-ISIS coalition has focused on using Kurdish-dominated YPG forces to expel ISIS from Syria’s Kurdish-dominated northeast. This has unquestionably been a success.
Today, the battle is shifting to Arab-majority areas, which necessitates an evolution in strategy. Consequently, the ongoing attack on ISIS’s last remaining border town with Turkey in Manbij is led by Sunni Arabs.
However, YPG commanders continue to dominate decision-making. Moreover, Manbij’s opposition municipal council, which was forced into exile when ISIS took over in 2014, looks to have been ignored in stabilization planning and is set to be replaced by a new US-backed structure. Such mistakes could potentially derail the long-term value of a hard-fought capture of Manbij.
More broadly, the counter-ISIS strategy must urgently acknowledge the role that existing mainstream opposition groups will need to play in assuming at least a shared responsibility for protecting Sunni Arab-populated territory captured from ISIS.
These groups first turned their guns on ISIS in late 2013 and forced the jihadist group out of a combined four-and-a-half provinces in 10 weeks in early-2014 — an extraordinary feat when compared to the rate of success of the US-led coalition.
While far from perfect, these opposition groups have much deeper roots in these territories than much of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces.
Work must be undertaken now to ensure that at minimum, the SDF and mainstream opposition factions are able to develop a shared or mutually acceptable day-after scenario for the many disenfranchised and repressed communities we look set to liberate from ISIS in the coming weeks and months.
Failing to do so means nothing more than giving extremists a second chance.
Charles Lister is a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute and author of “The Syrian Jihad.”