TAKEDOWN: THE THIRD INFANTRY DIVISION’S 21 DAY ASSAULT ON BAGHDAD
BY JIM LACEY
NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS, 288 PAGES, $29.95
DO you know the name of the brilliant American commander who actually won the war to overthrow Saddam Hussein? It wasn’t the blowhard Gen. Tommy Franks. Nor was it commander of V Corps Gen. William Wallace or 3rd Infantry Division commander Gen. Buford Blount
It was a mere colonel named David Perkins.
In the spring of 2003, with a brigade of fewer than 1,000 combat troops, Perkins conquered Baghdad weeks ahead of the Coalition schedule.
Not only was the famous final “Thunder Run” his plan, but he also conceived it and carried it out without approval from his commanding generals.
Indeed, Perkins had already sent his tanks into the heart of Baghdad to capture the presidential palace when his plan was officially disapproved. Once his soldiers had fought off massive attacks by Iraqi infantry to resupply troops at the captured palace with gas and ammunition, the main combat phase of the war was essentially over. This was before the Marines arrived in Baghdad, before other divisions were in place for the anticipated block-by-block urban struggle, indeed before anyone in Iraq or Washington expected.
That it was a colonel who conceived and carried out this audacious plan says a great deal about the modern, decentralized U.S. Army and the extraordinary autonomy it offers combat commanders.
Perkins’ success in this battle, and the Third Infantry Division’s (3ID) other successes on the way to Baghdad, also overturned conventional military wisdom about the use of armor in urban areas. If you have the right tanks, the right tactics and extremely well-trained soldiers, you won’t necessarily end up sending your men into a fiery trap, as the Russians did in Grozny.
Unfortunately, the brilliance of Perkins’ campaign, along with other commanders, waged by 3ID has never penetrated public consciousness. At the time, the media claimed that U.S. forces were bogged down amid unexpectedly stiff Iraqi resistance. Since then, it has become gospel that the Coalition armies faced virtually no resistance from crumbing or non-existent Iraqi forces.
Both notions are rubbish, as Jim Lacey ably demonstrates in “Takedown,” his short history of 3ID’s leading role in the invasion of Iraq.
The truth is that the spearpoint of the American invasion force – especially the 3ID – was in fierce, nearly constant (if unequal) combat for 21 days, from the crossing of the Iraqi border to the capture of the Iraqi capital. During those three weeks, the 3ID fought off thousands of determined, even suicidal, Saddam fedayeen militiamen. It also shattered (with the help of allied air power) five whole divisions of Iraqi Army regulars and Republican Guards. Their blackened vehicles littered the fertile land between the country’s two rivers.
The book’s great virtue is how it details just how fierce that fighting could be, with tank commanders (including Perkins himself) actually firing their pistols at swarming fedayeen attackers in scenes straight out of the Russian front. The book also provides a valuable service at a time of public naiveté about Middle Eastern warfare, by documenting the massive extent of Iraqi violations of the laws of war.
The Saddam fedayeen and Baath Party militia, to whom Saddam left the defense of most of the country south of Baghdad, used ambulances as troop transports, attacked while wearing civilian clothes, opened fire from mosques and forced women and children to act as human shields.
Given these many breaches of the Geneva Conventions, it was remarkable there weren’t more distressing incidences of civilian casualties.
The book also includes some fresh information from the Iraqi side. Lacey discloses, for example, that Saddam had thousands of copies of the film “Blackhawk Down” distributed to Republican Guards (ironically, it was also the most popular film among G.I.s) because he was convinced that the key to shattering American resolve was to drag U.S. forces into bloody urban combat.
Unfortunately, “Takedown” is not the comprehensive history this campaign or the 3ID deserves. Lacey suffers from “Bob Woodward syndrome” – he gives good press to all those who talk to him. Though this was indeed “a colonel’s war,” not all of 3ID’s battalion commanders were stars – at least one of the lieutenant colonels Lacey cites as superlative was a notoriously unpopular and indecisive officer whose apparent successes were entirely thanks to the captains in charge of his companies.
It also would have done no disservice to the 3ID’s skill and leadership to take more note of how good fortune and surprising Iraqi errors helped in the 3ID’s victory. In particular, Lacey doesn’t explain why Iraqi forces failed to make good use of the Russian- and French-made wire-guided anti-tank missiles in their arsenal.
That said, I couldn’t put “Takedown” down. Lacey clarifies the shape of a campaign that was confusing in the extreme if you were on the ground. And it powerfully illustrates just how impressive – how professional, brave and compassionate – these American soldiers were and are.
Jonathan Foreman was embedded with the 3rd Infantry during the drive to Baghdad.