Michigan Supreme Court Expands Employer Exposure to Public Policy Retaliation Claims

In Michigan, various state employment laws prohibit employers from retaliating against employees. But can an employee pursue a public policy retaliation claim against the employer in addition to a statutory retaliation claim?

On July 22, 2024, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that anti-retaliation provisions in two important workplace safety laws—the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”) and Michigan’s Occupational Safety and Health Act (“MIOSHA”)—do not preclude a plaintiff from also asserting a violation of public policy in court. Stegall v. Resource Technology Corp (Case No. 165450, decided July 22, 2024).

Cleveland Stegall, an IT specialist working at FCA through the staffing agency Resource Technology, complained internally about asbestos insulation issues at the assembly plant and threatened to file complaints with the government. He was subsequently terminated. Stegall sued both entities for wrongful discharge under OSHA and MIOSHA’s anti-retaliation provisions, as well as termination in violation of public policy.

At-will employees generally may be terminated for any reason (or no reason at all). But one exception to this rule is that certain terminations violate public policy and therefore create an actionable legal claim. This includes firings for “failure or refusal to violate a law” or exercising a right conferred by the Michigan Legislature.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals dismissed Stegall’s public policy claim because they concluded that the OSHA and MIOSHA laws already forbid retaliation. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. It reasoned that the remedies under OSHA and MIOSHA are insufficient, pointing to the truncated 30-day period to file a complaint with the relevant government agency, the discretion granted to the respective investigating agency, and the employee’s lack of control over what occurs after a complaint has been filed. See 29 U.S.C. §660(c)(2) and MCL 408.1065(2).

What does this case mean for employers? The Michigan Supreme Court’s decision provides another avenue for employees to pursue retaliation claims, particularly where the employee raises workplace safety concerns. It is unclear, however, whether courts will extend this ruling and allow employees to pursue public policy wrongful discharge claims if the employee is also seeking relief under another anti-retaliation statute.

The Economic Benefits of AI in Civil Defense Litigation

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into various industries has revolutionized the way we approach complex problems, and the field of civil defense litigation is no exception. As lawyers and legal professionals navigate the complex and often cumbersome landscape of civil defense, AI can offer a transformative assistance that not only enhances efficiency but also significantly reduces client costs. In this blog, we’ll explore the economic savings associated with employing AI in civil defense litigation.

Streamlining Document Review
One of the most labor-intensive and costly aspects of civil defense litigation is the review of vast amounts of discovery documents. Traditionally, lawyers and legal teams spend countless hours sifting through documents to identify and categorize relevant information, a process that is both time-consuming and costly. AI-powered tools, such as Large Language Models (LLM) can automate and expedite this process.

By using AI to assist in closed system document review, law firms can drastically cut down on the number of billable hours required for this task. AI assistance can quickly and accurately identify relevant documents, flagging pertinent information and reducing the risk of material oversight. This not only speeds up the review process and allows a legal team to concentrate on analysis rather than document digest and chronology, but significantly lowers the overall cost of litigation to the client.

By way of example – a case in which 50,000 medical treatment record and bills must be analyzed, put in chronology and reviewed for patient complaints, diagnosis, treatment, medial history and prescription medicine use, could literally take a legal team weeks to complete. With AI assistance the preliminary ground work such as document organization, chronologizing complaints and treatments and compiling prescription drug lists can be completed in a matter of minutes, allowing the lawyer to spend her time in verification, analysis and defense development and strategy, rather than information translation and time consuming data organization.

Enhanced Legal Research
Legal research is another growing area where AI can yield substantial economic benefits. Traditional legal research methods involve lawyers poring over case law, statutes, and legal precedents to find those cases that best fit the facts and legal issues at hand. This process can be incredibly time-intensive, driving up costs for clients. Closed AI-powered legal research platforms can rapidly analyze vast databases of verified legal precedent and information, providing attorneys with precise and relevant case law in a fraction of the time. Rather than conducting time consuming exhaustive searches for the right cases to analysis, a lawyer can now stream line the process with AI assistance by flagging on-point cases for verification, review, analysis and argument development.

The efficiency of AI-driven legal research can translate into significant cost savings for the client. Attorneys can now spend more time on argument development and drafting, rather than bogged down in manual research. For clients, this means lower legal fees and faster resolution of cases, both of which contribute to overall economic savings.

Predictive Analytics and Case Strategy
AI’s evolving ability to analyze legal historical data and identify patterns is particularly valuable in the realm of predictive analytics. In civil defense litigation, AI can be used to assist in predicting the likely outcomes of cases based on jurisdictionally specific verdicts and settlements, helping attorneys to formulate more effective strategies. By sharpening focus on probable outcomes, legal teams can make informed decisions about whether to settle a case or proceed to trial. Such predictive analytics allow clients to better manage their risk, thereby reducing the financial burden on defendants.

Automating Routine Tasks
Many routine tasks in civil defense litigation, such as preparation of document and pleading chronologies, scheduling, and case management, can now be automated using AI. Such automation reduces the need for manual intervention, allowing legal professionals to focus on more complex and value-added case tasks. By automating such routine tasks, law firms can operate more efficiently, reducing overhead costs and improving their bottom line. Clients benefit from quicker turnaround times and lower legal fees, resulting in overall economic savings.

Conclusion
The economic savings for clients associated with using AI in civil defense litigation can be substantial. From streamlining document review and enhancing legal research to automating routine tasks and reducing discovery costs, AI offers a powerful tool for improving efficiency and lowering case costs. As the legal industry continues to embrace technological advancements, the adoption of AI in civil defense litigation is poised to become a standard practice, benefiting both law firms and their clients economically. The future of civil defense litigation is undoubtedly intertwined with AI, promising a more cost-effective and efficient approach to resolving legal disputes.

Be Careful What You Write: What a Heavily Redacted Antitrust Complaint Teaches Us About Creating Problematic Documents in Transactions

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas to stop Tempur Sealy’s proposed acquisition of Mattress Firm. See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Tempur Sealy Int’l, Inc. and Mattress Firm Group Inc., Case No. 4:24-cv-02508 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 2, 2024). On the same day, the FTC also commenced an administrative proceeding in its own court to block the transaction. See In re Tempur Sealy Int’l, Inc. and Mattress Firm Group Inc., Docket No. 9433 (FTC Jul. 2, 2024). According to the complaints, Tempur Sealy is the world’s largest mattress supplier and Mattress Firm is the largest mattress retailer in the United States. Vertical mergers between manufacturers and retailers can often produce procompetitive benefits, but this transaction struck the FTC as anticompetitive. The FTC’s principal concern appears to be that Tempur Sealy would shut off its rivals’ access to Mattress Firm.

Supporting the FTC’s decision to sue, Federal Trade Commissioner Melissa Holyoak said, “Despite the increased likelihood of procompetitive effects from vertical mergers, they may still result in harm in some circumstances. Consistent with these well-established economic principles, I vote in favor of filing this complaint based upon the substantial evidence generated by staff’s thorough investigation, especially the parties’ own ordinary-course documents. I have reason to believe that the effect of Tempur Sealy’s acquisition of Mattress Firm ‘may be to substantially lessen competition.’” (Emphasis added).

What exactly was in these ordinary course documents that caused Holyoak to believe this merger violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act? The short answer is we don’t know. The complaints, which extensively quote some documents, are heavily redacted and the documents themselves, even in redacted form, are not attached to the complaints. Nor would we expect the documents to be attached, as they likely contain competitively sensitive information that ordinarily would not be on the public record. Rather than speculate about the documents themselves, let’s use the allegations in the FTC’s complaints as a tool to remind ourselves how documents are used in antitrust investigations and how lawyers and clients can work together to reduce the likelihood that potentially problematic documents are created.

  1. What’s an “ordinary course” document? As the name suggests, an ordinary course document is one that is created by the parties in the course of their ordinary business activities. It may be a routinely issued report, an email or text exchange by two employees, Slack messages, a slide deck, board minutes or any other form of written communication. Antitrust regulators routinely use these documents to gain insight into how the parties see themselves in relation to the competition, the rationale for a transaction, and how the parties view the likely competitive effects of a transaction. Often regulators will place more emphasis on communications from senior leadership in a corporation as those individuals may have greater knowledge of the transaction and have more authority to “speak” for an entity than lower-level employees. Regulators will use these documents not only to support their own theories and claims, but also to contradict the parties’ advocacy about the procompetitive aspects of a deal.
  2. How does the government obtain these ordinary course documents? In the case of the Tempur Sealy/Mattress Firm transaction and other high dollar value transactions, the parties were required to file Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) premerger notification forms. When an HSR filing is required, the parties must produce documents that discuss the transaction in relation to certain specific topics, such as competition, competitors, markets, and market shares. These documents are usually not ordinary course documents as they were created specifically for the deal but are nevertheless critical in the regulators’ review of potential competitive issues. Documents routinely produced in the HSR process, such as Confidential Information Memoranda (CIM) and Management Presentations, may contain statements that could create potential antitrust concerns. Clients should recognize that even the smallest of things in a CIM or Management Presentation have the potential to create big problems, as government regulators will read every page of what is submitted to them. For example, assume that an HSR filing contains a 100-page deck intended to serve as a Management Presentation, and one page of that deck contains a sentence that says: “We [seller] are the dominant player in our industry and we face minimal competition.” The rest of the deck might be completely innocuous, but depending on the circumstances, that one sentence has the potential to ignite regulators’ interest.Some transactions, such as Tempur Sealy/Mattress Firm, undergo a Second Request process after HSR is filed. A Second Request is an extensive subpoena requesting documents and data from the parties that goes far beyond the HSR process. The Second Request process is what likely turned up the “ordinary course” documents mentioned in Holyoak’s statement. This included text messages. See, e.g., Paragraph 108 of the federal complaint and Paragraph 99 of the administrative complaint. Judging from the amount of redacted material referenced in the complaints, the FTC appears to believe there are many documents that portray this transaction in an anticompetitive light.

    Clients should also be aware that the government’s authority to review and investigate transactions is not limited to only those transactions that require HSR filings; the government’s authority extends to any transaction that impacts competition in the United States. In addition to HSR filings, the government learns about deals through a variety of sources, such as press reports and third party complaints from customers or competitors. Accordingly, our views about document creation extend to all transactions, not just those requiring HSR premerger notification.

  3. Document creation in transactions is a team sport. That means lawyers and clients should work together as a team to minimize the creation of potentially harmful documents. The team should also include investment bankers and other advisors who are generating documents that analyze the transaction. In ideal circumstances, clients will involve experienced antitrust lawyers early on to understand: 1) whether the transaction potentially raises substantive antitrust concerns, such as when two direct competitors combine; 2) if the transaction will require HSR notification; and 3) whether or not HSR is required, what are the guardrails or best practices the client should observe. Recognizing that we don’t always operate in ideal circumstances and lawyers may only become involved after certain documents are created, lawyers should nevertheless remain vigilant about documents from the time they become involved in a deal. Coaching clients and their advisors about document creation best practices is always critically important.
  4. What are some best practices? Lawyers should proactively educate their clients on what to say (or not say) about the transaction and which words or phrases may be particularly susceptible to raising potential antitrust concerns. For example, words like “dominate” and “control” in relation to competition and competitors may create problems, as could market share statistics that overstate a seller’s prominence in a particular industry. Lawyers should also review drafts of documents such as CIMs, Management Presentations, and teasers to ensure that they are free of harmful verbiage.
  5. Expect statements to be misunderstood or taken out of context: Reading the Tempur Sealy/Mattress Firm complaints, two things are clear: 1) the government relied on portions of documents to support its allegations; and 2) the context of many of the quoted statements is unknown. It may be the case that some of the statements the FTC found important become less important when the entire document is reviewed and the context of the statement is made clear. Relatedly, there may be other documents not referenced in the complaints that indicate the transaction has procompetitive benefits. Allegations in a complaint are just that – allegations – and the evidence that emerges as the case progresses may or may not support those allegations. That being said, parties are wise to follow the best practices above. Similarly, they are also wise to avoid making exaggerated statements or statements intended to be humorous. These statements may be misunderstood by government regulators who do not know the specific industry or its players as well as clients do.
  6. Follow the general principle of “less is more” when it comes to document creation. Many transactions seem to move at lightning speed, but a moment of self-reflection can be very valuable. Ask yourself: do I need to write this, and if I do, what’s the best way to say it? Some organizations are more document-intensive than others, and there may be other reasons, unrelated to antitrust considerations, that require certain documentation. But in general, more documents are probably created than are truly necessary and more documents create the potential for more problems. Regardless, the key is to remember emails, texts, Slack messages, and slide decks may be read not only by their intended recipients but also by government antitrust regulators.

Ozempic Lawsuit Overview

Makers of Ozempic and other semaglutide drugs are facing hundreds of lawsuits throughout the United States. While intended for diabetes management and weight loss, research has linked the drug to increased risk of gastroparesis, stomach paralysis, pancreatitis and bowel obstruction.

Plaintiffs and their Ozempic lawsuit lawyers are seeking monetary compensation through products liability litigation. Victims are continuing to come forward. As of June 2024, cases are in preliminary stages, with new cases being added to multi-district litigation.

What Is the Ozempic Lawsuit About?

The Ozempic lawsuit is about whether the manufacturers of semaglutide drugs created and sold an unreasonably dangerous drug that hurt people. Plaintiffs say that the drugs created an unreasonable risk of gastrointestinal injury – a risk that the drug manufacturers knew about, and that they hid from the public.

What drugs are involved in the Ozempic weight loss lawsuit?

Ozempic might be the best known of the drugs involved in the weight loss lawsuits, but there are several drugs named in litigation. These drugs include:

● Ozempic
● Wegovy
● Rybelsus
● Trulicity
● Mounjaro

Ozempic, Wegovy and Rybelsus are manufactured by Danish pharmaceutical giant Novo Nordisk. Trulicity and Mounjaro are manufactured by Eli Lilly and Company.

Each individual case names the drug or drugs that the plaintiff took.

What are the issues in the Ozempic lawsuit?

There are three primary issues alleged in the Ozempic lawsuits:

1. Whether the drug companies knew or should have known that their semaglutide drugs could cause gastroparesis and other gastrointestinal issues.

2. Whether the drug companies adequately warned doctors and patients about the dangers of their products.

3. Whether the drug companies made false, misleading, or incomplete statements about safety as they marketed their products.

Overview of the Drug of Ozempic and How It Works

Danish pharmaceutical company Novo Nordisk developed the diabetes drug Ozempic. Its purpose is to treat type 2 diabetes.

How do Ozempic and related weight loss drugs work?

Ozempic is a glucagon-like peptide-1 (GLP-1) receptor agonist. The drug signals the body that it is not hungry and to stop eating. It is meant to act like the GLP-1 hormone.

When we eat, the body releases the GLP-1 hormone in the intestinal tract. The hormone signals the brain that it is full. When the hormone is present, a person may eat less or stop eating. In diabetes patients, the drugs trigger insulin production and reduce a hormone from the pancreas that increases blood sugar. The drug helps keep the person’s blood sugar level lower, managing their diabetes.

Over time, Novo Nordisk made and marketed three different semaglutide GLP-1 receptor agonist drugs:

● Ozempic – Injected with a pen, approved in 2017
● Rybelsus – Taken by pill, approved in 2019
● Wegovy – Targeted for weight loss patients, in a higher concentration than other forms of semaglutides, approved in 2021

With FDA approval, sales of these weight loss drugs soared. Medicare even began to cover the drug Wegovy in 2024, with some restrictions. There was such a demand for the products that there was a shortage in 2023.

Not a miracle drug after all

At first, manufacturers thought that they had created a miracle drug. The New England Journal of Medicine reported that people taking semaglutide drugs lost up to 15% of their body weight. Novo Nordisk aggressively marketed the drugs, including with consumer-direct marketing campaigns. Influencers on social media touted the benefits, and there were stories of celebrities who had found seemingly effortless success.

However, it soon became clear that there may be serious problems with the drugs. Doctors and researchers began learning that the drugs may cause higher rates of gastroparesis and other gastrointestinal issues. Victims say that when these drugs were marketed to them, they were unaware that they were placing themselves in serious danger.

What’s the problem with Ozempic?

Ozempic and other weight loss drugs may cause higher rates of gastroparesis. Gastroparesis is a medical condition of weakened stomach muscles and intestines. The condition can lead to other problems and complications because the person cannot move food through the body in a
timely manner.

What is gastroparesis?

Gastroparesis is delayed gastric emptying of the digestive tract, including the stomach, intestines and bowels. The person has weakened muscles in their stomach and intestines, so they’re not able to digest food at a reasonable pace. The condition can cause several problems
and complications, including:

● Stomach pain
● Vomiting, nausea, diarrhea
● Fatigue
● Vitamin, nutrition deficiencies
● Bloating
● Too many bacteria in the small intestine
● Obstructed intestine or bowel

Gastroparesis can cause discomfort. The condition can be dangerous and life-threatening. Diabetes can mask the symptoms of gastroparesis, making it harder to detect.

Ozempic Lawsuit Case Details

What type of case is the Ozempic lawsuit?

The Ozempic stomach paralysis lawsuit is a tort product liability case, which is not an Ozempic class action lawsuit. The claims have been consolidated into multidistrict litigation. People who were harmed by taking the drug are bringing civil claims, seeking compensation for their monetary damages, physical harm and suffering.

What is the Ozempic lawsuit case number?

The Ozempic gastrointestinal lawsuits are currently joined in Multi-District Litigation In Re: Glucagon-Like Peptide – 1 Receptor Agonists (GLP-1 RAS) Products Liability Litigation, MDL-3094. The cases are joined in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Each individual case that is part of the multi-district litigation proceeds retains its
own individual case number.

Note: Ozempic is also the subject of unrelated multi-district litigation regarding patents (MDL-3038). The cases have been consolidated in a Delaware court. The issues are unrelated to the issues in the defective drug products liability cases.

Who is the judge of the Ozempic multi-district litigation?

District Judge Gene E.K. Pratter was assigned to preside over the Ozempic multidistrict litigation. However, she passed away in May 2024. A new judge will be assigned to the case.

How many cases are a part of the Ozempic lawsuit?

As of June 2024, there are 101 cases pending in the Ozempic lawsuit multi-district litigation. New cases are being added periodically as victims come forward.

Multi-District Litigation – Cases Joined Together for Preliminary Proceedings

The Ozempic lawsuit started as separate lawsuits filed throughout the United States. At first, 18 cases were filed in 11 judicial districts. There were another 37 related cases in 15 districts.

Nine of the original plaintiffs believed that it would make more sense to build their cases together. They thought their cases were similar enough that they should work together for preliminary proceedings. They wanted to work together in discovery, preliminary motions, depositions and evidentiary rulings. On December 1, 2023, they filed a motion to transfer the cases from their respective courts.

On February 5, 2024, the courts agreed and ordered the cases combined for preliminary proceedings in multi-district litigation.

Not everyone wanted the transfer. Some plaintiffs thought that only claims against Novo Nordisk should be combined. The parties opposing MDL didn’t want multiple defendants combined.

However, the court transferred all claims involving similar allegations about GLP-1 RA drugs and whether they cause gastrointestinal issues. The court said that even though the two companies sold drugs with different molecular structures, complete overlap of issues is not required.

Current Status of the Ozempic Weight Loss Litigation

The Ozempic weight loss litigation is in the early stages. As of June 9, 2024, the court has issued four case management orders. These orders direct the parties to do certain things in preliminary proceedings.

Case management order no. 1 – February 15, 2024

● A statement that cases transferred to the court, and cases subsequently transferred to the court, will be subject to the court’s orders.
● Attorneys are directed to review the court’s policies and procedures.
● The court set the date, time and place for the first in-court case conference. The court set aside two hours of court time for the conference.
● Topics to be discussed included selecting plaintiff’s lead counsel, the responsibilities of lead counsel and allocation of tasks. The court said that pleadings, timing, future status conferences and other issues could be discussed.

Case management order no. 2 – February 16, 2024

● Waiving pro hac vice fees in the case.
● Requiring parties to submit the court’s pro hac vice form, if applicable.

Case management order no. 3 – April 23, 2024

● Appointing Liaison Counsel for Plaintiffs, and a mentor.
● Identifying and appointing counsel to the Plaintiff’s Committee.
● Authorizing Committee members to select additional counsel for the Committee, up to 25 total members.
● Allowing the Committee to create subcommittees.
● Ordering the Committee to propose conference dates.

Case management order no. 4 – April 24, 2024

● Requiring the parties to preserve potentially relevant evidence.
● Parties must keep documents, data and tangible things in their presence that are relevant to the claims and defenses in the case.
● Each party must take reasonable steps to avoid loss of the evidence. Auto-delete features must be disabled.
● Certain sources don’t need to be preserved, searched or produced from.
● Keeping evidence or information is not an agreement or concession that the material is relevant to litigation.

There have been other filings in the case. These filings are procedural, like asking the court for additional time to respond to the motion to transfer the cases to multi-district litigation and required proof of service documents.

The court held a status conference on March 14, 2024. Preliminary proceedings will continue, after which the court may schedule bellwether trials. These early trials inform the parties as to how cases may be decided if they go to trial.

Basis of a Claim

The decisions that people make about their medical care may impact the rest of their lives. The choices that people make about their healthcare should be informed.

A critical basis for the Ozempic lawsuit is the claim that the drug manufacturer failed to warn consumers about the risks of the drugs. Some claims allege that the warning label was too generic, listing minor symptoms but saying too little about gastrointestinal issues, and not
emphasizing the dangers enough.

Many patients saw the direct-to-consumer marketing campaigns, including $180.2 million spent to market the drug in 2022. Marketing efforts for Rybelsus were similarly robust in 2022, at $167.2 million spent. Much of the marketing budget was spent on national television ads.

The marketing worked, and sales climbed high that year. Novo Nordisk credited the marketing effort for its 36% revenue growth in North America in 2022.

Consumers say that with marketing efforts this strong, they had the right to complete information before taking Ozempic or another semaglutide drug.

U.S. products liability law and the Ozempic case

In the United States, drug manufacturers have a legal liability to make products that are reasonably safe. Product liability is the type of case that a victim may bring if they are harmed by a dangerous drug. One of the ways that a drug can be dangerous is if the public doesn’t have the information that they need about the risks and potential harm.

A claim may also be based on misleading statements in advertising. The lawsuits say that the drug manufacturer proclaimed the benefits of the drugs without emphasizing the potential risks. Plaintiffs say that the advertising campaigns were deficient enough that the drug companies
should be liable for damages.

Damages for Ozempic Lawsuit

The purpose of the Ozempic lawsuit is to compensate victims. A person who develops gastroparesis likely has significant losses due to medical expenses. They may have physical suffering.

Damages claimed may include economic and non-economic losses. Valuing damages is an important part of any case.

Proving an Ozempic Legal Claim

While you can file an Ozempic lawsuit, to succeed in an Ozempic lawsuit, a person must prove:

● They took Ozempic or a related drug.
● The drug was defective under legal standards.
● Because of taking the drug, the victim developed medical problems. There is causation between using the drug and the harm that occurred.
● Damages resulted to the victim including medical bills, other financial losses, physical pain, suffering and other damages.

Novo Nordisk is aggressively fighting claims. They have responded to the allegations and will be fighting the claims in the months to come. The parties will continue to discuss medical evidence and pursue their respective positions.

Justice for Ozempic Victims

Ozempic lawsuits are still in the early stages. New plaintiffs are continuing to join, and the cases are moving through preliminary proceedings. The court will schedule future dates as the parties develop their cases, pursue settlement and prepare for trial.

China’s Supreme People’s Court Releases Two Recent Patent-Related Typical Anti-Monopoly Cases

On June 24, 2024, China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC) released five recent typical anti-monopoly cases, two of which relate to patents. The SPC stated that the cases were released so that Courts can “correctly apply the revised Anti-Monopoly Law and accurately understand the new judicial interpretation of anti-monopoly civil litigation issued today, fairly and efficiently hear monopoly cases, ensure the correct implementation of the Anti-Monopoly Law, and maintain fair competition in the market.”

Explanations from the SPC regarding the two cases follows:

Case No.:【案号】(2020)最高法知民终1140号

[Basic facts of the case] Yang XX Pharmaceutical Group Co., Ltd. and its subsidiaries (collectively referred to as Yang) are the manufacturers of the anti-allergic drug desloratadine citrate tablets with the trade name “Beixue.” Hefei Yi XX Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. owns the relevant patents for desloratadine citrate. The company and its subsidiaries and affiliated companies (collectively referred to as Yi) are the only suppliers of the desloratadine citrate API required for the production of “Beixue”. In addition to producing desloratadine citrate API, Yi also produces desloratadine citrate hard capsules. Yi and Yang are both the supply and demand parties of the desloratadine citrate API involved in the case, and are also competitors in desloratadine citrate preparations. Yang believed that Yi used its dominant position in the market of desloratadine citrate API to restrict Yang to only purchase the API involved in the case from it, significantly raised the price of the API involved in the case, and threatened to stop supplying the API involved in the case to force Yang to accept other commercial arrangements unrelated to the API transaction involved, causing huge losses to Yang and therefore constituting an abuse of market dominance. Yang requested that Yi stop abusing its market dominance and compensate Yang for losses and reasonable expenses of 100 million RMB. The court of first instance found that Yi had abused its market dominance by restricting transactions, setting unfair high prices, and attaching unreasonable transaction conditions, and ordered it to immediately stop the above-mentioned behaviors and compensate Yang more than 68 million RMB. Both parties were dissatisfied and appealed to the Supreme People’s Court.

The Supreme People’s Court held in the second instance that Yi has a dominant market position in the desloratadine citrate API market in China, but its dominant market position has been weakened to a certain extent due to the strong indirect competition constraints from the downstream second-generation antihistamine preparation market. Based on the existing evidence, it is difficult to determine that it has abused its dominant market position. First, desloratadine citrate falls within the scope of protection of Yi’s patent rights. The time and scope of Yi’s restriction that Yang can only purchase the patented API involved in the case from it do not exceed the scope of the legitimate exercise of patent rights, and the resulting market blocking effect does not exceed the statutory exclusive scope of patent rights, so it does not constitute a restricted transaction behavior that abuses the dominant market position. Second, considering the internal rate of return after the price increase and the matching degree of price and economic value, it is more likely that the initial price of the patented API involved in the case is a promotional price, and the subsequent large price increase is likely to be a reasonable adjustment from the promotional price to the normal price. The fact that the price increase is significantly higher than the cost increase is not enough to determine that there is an unfair high-price behavior that abuses the dominant market position. Third, the existing evidence is insufficient to prove that Yi has explicitly or implicitly bundled the sales of the patented API involved in the case with unrelated products, so it is difficult to determine that there is an act of attaching unreasonable transaction conditions. Therefore, the judgment was revoked and the first-instance judgment was changed to dismiss Yang’s lawsuit request.

[Typical Significance] This case is the first monopoly civil lawsuit in China involving raw material pharmaceuticals. The judgment clarified the consideration of indirect competition constraints from the downstream market when judging the market dominance of intermediate input operators, the relationship between the market blocking effect of limited trading behavior and the statutory exclusive scope of patent rights, and the basic ideas and specific methods for judging unfair high prices. It has positive significance for promoting the accurate application of the Anti-Monopoly Law and effectively maintaining fair competition in the pharmaceutical market.

【案号】(2021)最高法知民终1482号

[Basic facts of the case] Ningbo XX Magnetics Co., Ltd. is an enterprise engaged in the production of sintered NdFeB materials in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province. A Japanese metal company has more than 600 sintered NdFeB patents in the field of rare earth materials worldwide. After licensing eight companies in China to implement its patented technology, it decided not to add new licensees. From March 2014 to March 2015, Ningbo XX Magnetics Co., Ltd. repeatedly requested a license from the Japanese metal company but was rejected. Therefore, it filed a lawsuit in December 2014, requesting that the Japanese metal company stop the abuse of market dominance such as refusal to trade and compensate Ningbo XX Magnetics Co., Ltd. for economic losses of 7 million RMB. The court of first instance determined that the Japanese metal company had a dominant position in the patent licensing market for essential patents for sintered NdFeB and that its refusal to trade had no legitimate reason. Therefore, it ordered the Japanese metal company to stop abusing its market dominance by refusing to trade and compensate Ningbo XX Magnetics Co., Ltd. for economic losses of 4.9 million RMB. The Japanese metal company was dissatisfied with the decision and filed an appeal.

The Supreme People’s Court held in the second instance that the evidence in this case was insufficient to prove that the sintered NdFeB patent of a Japanese metal company was irreplaceable, nor was it sufficient to prove that there was an independent licensing market for patents necessary for the production of sintered NdFeB. Therefore, it was difficult to determine that the relevant market in this case was the patent licensing market for patents necessary for the production of sintered NdFeB owned by the Japanese metal company. In this case, based on the demand substitution of sintered NdFeB material production technology, the relevant market in this case should be defined as the global sintered NdFeB material production technology market, including patented technologies and non-patented technologies with close substitution. Given that sintered NdFeB material production technology is used to produce sintered NdFeB materials, and the market share of sintered NdFeB materials (products) and other conditions can more accurately and conveniently reflect the market conditions of sintered NdFeB production technology, the market power of the technology owner in the relevant market involved in the case can be evaluated through the market share of the sintered NdFeB material market. Taking into account the evidence in the case, the Japanese metal company does not have a dominant position in the global sintered NdFeB material production technology market. Therefore, the court ruled to revoke the first-instance judgment and dismiss the lawsuit filed by the Ningbo magnetic company.

[Typical Significance] This case is a typical case in which intellectual property rights and antitrust are intertwined, and has received widespread attention. The second-instance judgment properly handled the relationship between the exercise of patent rights and antitrust, and through scientific and reasonable definition of the relevant market, revised the judgment in accordance with the law to determine that the foreign right holder’s refusal to license the patent involved did not constitute monopoly behavior. The judgment in this case demonstrates the judicial concept of Chinese courts to equally protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese and foreign parties and the trial ideas of antitrust cases involving intellectual property abuse in accordance with the law, and actively responded to the concerns of the industry at home and abroad.

The original text including three additional cases is available here (Chinese only).

Supreme Court Upholds Refusal to Register Trademark Containing the Name of Living Individual – Donald Trump

In a recent unanimous decision in the case Vidal v. Elster (602 U.S. ___ (2024)), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the refusal to register a federal trademark for the phrase “Trump Too Small” based on the fact that the Lanham Act prohibits the registration of the name of a living individual without their consent. The plaintiff in this case, Mr. Elster, filed a federal trademark application in 2018 for the mark “TRUMP TOO SMALL” for use on clothing as shown below, without the prior consent of former President Trump, arguing that the phrase was intended to be a criticism of Donald Trump and his policies and that the refusal was a violation of Mr. Elster’s First Amendment right of free speech. Mr. Elster claimed he wanted to register the mark to convey a political message about the former president.

The Supreme Court reviewed the matter based on the initial refusal to register issued by the United States Patent & Trademark Office, which was then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, who overturned the refusal holding that barring registration of “Trump Too Small” under a provision of federal trademark law unconstitutionally restricted free speech. The Court’s ruling upholds the “living-individual rule” established under the Lanham Act which requires the consent of the living individual prior to registration. Specifically, “No trademark … shall be refused registration … on account of its nature unless it…[c]onsists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent….” 15 U.S.C. §1052(c). Proponents of the law, including the International Trademark Association, argue that this provision of trademark law is consistent with the concepts of the right of publicity and privacy, and assists in preventing the unauthorized use of individuals’ names in commercial contexts. In explaining the rationale for the decision, Justice Thomas wrote: “This Court has long recognized that a trademark protects the markholder’s reputation, and the connection is even stronger when the mark contains a person’s name,” and further stated, This history and tradition is sufficient to conclude that the names clause — a content-based, but viewpoint-neutral, trademark restriction — is compatible with the First Amendment.”

It is worth noting the Court’s decision does not affect the ability of Mr. Elster to offer goods or services under any particular name or brand – in fact, Mr. Elster’s T-shirts bearing the phrase “Trump Too Small” are still available online for $24.99, even though his trademark application was refused. But the ruling does uphold the prohibition of seeking and obtaining federal trademark protection where the mark contains the name of a living individual without their consent. This ruling from the Supreme Court joins a string of other First Amendment challenges to provisions of the Lanham Act, the main statute governing trademarks. The high court in 2017 struck down a section of the law that barred registration of disparaging marks and did the same for a provision prohibiting immoral or scandalous marks in 2019.

The key takeaway from this narrowly tailored decision is that, prior to seeking federal trademark protection for a mark containing the name of a living individual, consent from that individual must be obtained. In the context of protecting a name or brand focused on a living individual, or in the continuation of such use post-merger or other transaction, it is important to ensure that the consent of the living individual is secured in some manner.

No Arbitration for Lead Buyer: Consent Form Naming Buyer Does Not Give Buyer Right to Enforce Arbitration in Tcpa Class Action

A subsidiary of Move, Inc. bought a data lead from Nations Info, Corp. off of its HudHomesUsa.org website. The subsidiary made an outbound prerecorded call resulting in a TCPA lawsuit against Move. (Fun.)

Move, Inc. moved to compel arbitration arguing that since its subsidiary was named in the consent form–it argued the arbitration clause necessarily covered it because the whole purpose of the clause was to permit parties buying leads from the website to compel TCPA cases to arbitration.

Good argument, but the court disagreed.

In Faucett v. Move, Inc. 2024 WL 2106727 (C.D. Cal. April 22, 2024) the Court refused to enforce the arbitration clause finding that Move, Inc. was not a signatory to the agreement and could not enforce it under any theory.

Most interestingly, Move argued that a motivating purpose behind the publisher’s arbitration clause was to benefit Move because Nations Info listed Opcity —Move’s subsidiary—in the Consent Form as a company that could send marketing messages to Hud’s users. (Mot. 1–2.)

But the Court found the Terms and Consent Form were two different documents, and accepting the one did not change the scope of the other.

The Court also found equitable estoppel did not apply because Plaintiff was not moving to enforce the terms of the agreement. Quite the contrary, Plaintiff denied any arbitration (or consent) agreement existed.

So Move is stuck.

Pretty clear lesson here: lead buyers should make sure the arbitration provisions on any website they are buying leads from includes third-parties (like the buyer) as a party to the clause. Failing to do so may leave the lead buyer stuck without the ability to enforce the provision–and that can lead to a massive class action with potential exposure in the hundreds of millions or billions of dollars.

Lead buyers are already forcing sellers to revise their flows in light of the FCC’s new one to one consent rules. So now would be a GREAT time to revisit requirements around arbitration provisions as well.

Something to think about.

How to Recover Attorneys’ Fees in a Schedule A Trademark Case in the Northern District of Illinois

In recent years, a substantial number of “Schedule A” trademark infringement cases have been filed in the Northern District of Illinois. In such a case, the trademark owner may file a trademark infringement complaint against a number of defendants, with the complaint identifying the defendants as “The Individuals, Corporations, Limited Liability Companies, Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A hereto.” [See, e.g., Opulent Complaint]

The trademark owner may file Schedule A separately from the complaint with a request to the Court that the schedule be placed under seal. Sometimes, trademark owners file the entire complaint under seal. After filing sealed pleadings that shield the defendants’ identities, the trademark owner may then file ex parte motions for temporary restraining orders (“TROs”) against the secretly-named defendants. Because the proceedings are ex parte, the alleged infringer is not given notice of the proceedings or an opportunity to appear. If the Court grants the TRO, the trademark owner may then present the TRO to online marketplaces with a demand that the marketplaces immediately stop selling the allegedly infringing goods. The result may be that an alleged infringer may find all of its activity frozen by the online marketplace, including a freeze on the alleged infringer’s cash held with the online marketplace. This may create cashflow problems for the alleged infringer and prevent the alleged infringer from making future sales. Because its identity is sealed by the court, an alleged infringer may first learn of the TRO after its accounts are frozen.

Schedule A cases appear to be concentrated in the Northern District of Illinois because judges in that district have been receptive to granting ex parte relief. See, A. Anteau, “The Northern District of Illinois v. the Internet: How Chicago Became the Center of Schedule A Trademark Infringement Litigation”; Law.Com, December 19, 2023. At least two judges in that district even provide templates for TROs, preliminary injunctions and default judgments in Schedule A cases. See Northern District of Illinois (uscourts.gov)Northern District of Illinois (uscourts.gov). The justification for the ex parte nature of these proceedings is that it, if notice was required, online counterfeiters (frequently from China) could hide their assets or move their counterfeit products to new sites as soon as an infringement case was filed.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, remedies and relief do exist if an entity is the subject of a wrongfully obtained ex parte TRO. Recently, Ya Ya Creations, a defendant in a Schedule A trademark case, obtained an attorneys’ fees award against a plaintiff that failed to conduct a proper investigation before naming two Ya Ya-affiliated entities as alleged infringers in a case filed in the Northern District of Illinois. [Award of Fees] The dispute began in August 2021, when the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Ya Ya for trademark infringement and a variety of other causes of action in the Eastern District of Texas. The Texas court transferred the case to the Central District of California in April of 2022. Four months after the transfer, the plaintiff filed a very similar lawsuit against Ya Ya in the Middle District of Florida. On May 26, 2023, the Florida court transferred the case to the Central District of California, and then the CD California consolidated the cases due to the similarity of the facts and claims. On September 26, 2023, the plaintiff filed yet another lawsuit. This time, the plaintiff filed a Schedule A trademark infringement case against a number of defendants in the Northern District of Illinois. In the Schedule A case, the plaintiff named two entities affiliated with Ya Ya as alleged infringers.

Notwithstanding the litigation history between the parties, the plaintiff obtained an ex parte TRO against Ya Ya in the Northern District of Illinois. Ya Ya first learned about the TRO after the court issued it and after an online marketplace froze Ya Ya’s accounts.

Ya Ya’s first step in seeking redress was to file an emergency motion asking the court to dissolve the ex parte TRO. [Ya Ya Motion to Dissolve TRO] Ya Ya argued that, because the parties were actively litigating against each other in California, the plaintiff had no basis to seek ex parte relief against Ya Ya or its affiliated entities without notifying Ya Ya of the proceedings. Ya Ya also argued that the plaintiff’s ex parte TRO was a transparent attempt to gain a litigation advantage in the California cases to either leverage a settlement, force Ya Ya into a position where it could not even pay its lawyers to mount a defense, or force Ya Ya to file for bankruptcy. In response to Ya Ya’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiff agreed to dismiss all of its claims against the Ya Ya-affiliated entities.

Ya Ya’s next step was to file a motion for recovery of the attorneys’ fees it expended in the Northern District of Illinois proceedings. [Ya Ya Request for Reimbursement of Attorneys’ Fees]. In response, the plaintiff argued that it was not obligated to pay Ya Ya’s attorneys’ fees, because it did not know the entities it named in the Northern District of Illinois lawsuit were affiliated with Ya Ya. But the court rejected that argument. The court concluded that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, a court may award attorneys’ fees incurred while defending an ex parte TRO when (1) the TRO caused “needless delay” and unnecessarily “increased the cost of litigation,” or (2) the TRO was obtained by pleadings that were not “well grounded in fact” or made after “reasonable inquiry.” The Court determined that plaintiff could have avoided increasing the costs of litigation if it had conducted a reasonable inquiry to determine if the two entities were affiliated with Ya Ya, but it failed to do so. As a result, the Court awarded Plaintiff to pay Ya-Ya almost $100,000 in attorneys’ fees.

Trademark litigators should be aware that judges in the Northern District of Illinois have been receptive to granting ex parte TROs in trademark cases. If you represent a client that is the subject of an improperly granted ex parte TRO, be prepared to move quickly to dissolve the TRO and consider whether you have a basis to move for an award of attorneys’ fees.

Eleventh Circuit Affirms Dismissal of FCRA Claims Since Alleged Inaccurate Information Was Not Objectively and Readily Verifiable

In Holden v. Holiday Inn Club Vacations Inc., No. 22-11014, No. 22-11734, 2024 WL 1759143 (11th Cir. 2024), which was a consolidated appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (“Eleventh Circuit” or “Court”) held that the purchasers of a timeshare did not have actionable FCRA claims since the alleged inaccurate information reported to one of the consumer reporting agencies (“CRAs”) was not objectively and readily verifiable. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed two decisions issued by United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida (“District Court”) granting of summary judgment in favor of the timeshare company in the respective cases.

Summary of Facts and Background

Two consumers, Mark Mayer (“Mayer”) and Tanethia Holden (“Holden”), entered into two separate purchase agreements with Holiday Inn Club Vacations Incorporated (“Holiday”) to acquire timeshare interests in Cape Canaveral and Las Vegas, respectively. Holiday is a timeshare company that allows customers to purchase one or more of its vacation properties in weekly increments that can be used annually during the designated period. As part of the transaction, Holiday’s customers typically elect to finance their timeshare purchases through Holiday, which results in the execution of a promissory note and mortgage.

  1. Mayer’s Purchase, Default, and Dispute

On September 15, 2014, Mayer entered into his purchase agreement with Holiday, which contained a title and closing provision stating the transaction would not close until Mayer made the first three monthly payments, and Holiday recorded a deed in Mayer’s name. The purchase agreement also included a purchaser’s default provision stating that upon Mayer’s default or breach of any of the terms or conditions of the agreement, all sums paid by Mayer would be retained by Holiday as liquidated damages and the parties to the purchase agreement would be relieved from all obligations thereunder. Further, the purchase agreement provided that any payments made under a related promissory note prior to the closing would be subject to the purchaser’s default provision. On the same day, Mayer executed a promissory note to finance his timeshare purchase, which was for a term of 120 months. On July 13, 2015, Holiday recorded a deed in Mayer’s name, and he proceeded to tender timely monthly payments until May 2017. As a result of Mayer’s failure to tender subsequent payments, Holiday reported Mayer’s delinquency to the CRA.

Approximately two years later, Mayer obtained a copy of his credit report and discovered Holiday had reported a past-due balance. Thereafter, Mayer sent multiple letters to the CRA disputing the debt, as he believed the purchase agreement was terminated under the purchaser’s default provision. Each dispute was communicated to Holiday, who in turn certified that the information was accurately reported. Mayer sued Holiday for an alleged violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) of the FCRA based on the furnishing of inaccurate information and failure to “fully and properly re-investigate” the disputes. Holiday eventually moved for partial summary judgment, which the District Court granted. The District Court reasoned that the underlying issue of whether the default provision excused Mayer’s obligation to keep paying was a legal dispute rather than a factual inaccuracy and, in turn, made Mayer’s claim not actionable under the FCRA. Mayer timely appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.

  1. Holden’s Purchase, Default, and Dispute

On June 25, 2016, Holden entered into her purchase agreement with Holiday, which contained a nearly identical title and closing provision to that of Mayer’s purchase agreement. Additionally, Holden’s purchase agreement incorporated a similar purchaser’s default provision. Similarly, Holden executed a promissory note to finance her timeshare purchase, which was for a term of 120 months, and entered into a mortgage to secure the payments under the note. After making her third payment, Holden defaulted and hired an attorney to cancel the purchase agreement pursuant to the closing and title provision and purchaser’s default provision. However, Holiday disputed the purchase agreement was canceled and, on June 19, 2017, recorded a timeshare deed in Holden’s name. More importantly, Holiday reported Holden’s delinquent debt to the CRA.

In response, Holden’s attorney sent three dispute letters to Holiday, which resulted in Holiday investigating the dispute and determining the reporting was accurate since Holden was still obligated under the note. Eventually, Holden sued Holiday for various violations of Florida State law and the FCRA. Holden claimed Holiday reported inaccurate information to the CRA, failed to conduct an appropriate investigation, and failed to correct the inaccuracies. The parties filed competing motions for partial summary judgment, which ended with the District Court granting Holiday’s motion and denying Holden’s motion. Specifically, the District Court held that Holden’s FCRA claim failed because contract disputes regarding whether Holden still owed the underlying debt are legal disputes and not factual inaccuracies. Holden timely appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.

The Fair Credit Reporting Act

As the Eleventh Circuit reiterated in Holden, when a furnisher is notified of a consumer’s dispute, the furnisher must undertake the following three actions: (1) conduct an investigation surrounding the disputed information; (2) review all relevant information provided by the CRA; and (3) report the results of the investigation to the CRA. When a furnisher determines an item of information disputed by a consumer is incomplete, inaccurate, or cannot be verified, the furnisher is required to modify, delete, or permanently block reporting of the disputed information. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(E). Additionally, any disputed information that a furnisher determines is inaccurate or incomplete must be reported to all other CRAs. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(D). Despite the foregoing, consumers have no private right of action against furnishers merely for reporting inaccurate information to the CRAs. The only private right of action a consumer may assert against a furnisher is for a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) for failure to conduct a reasonable investigation upon receiving notice of a dispute from a CRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c)(1)).

To successfully prove an FCRA claim, the consumer must demonstrate the following: (1) the consumer identified inaccurate or incomplete information that the furnisher provided to the CRA; and (2) the ensuing investigation was unreasonable based on some facts the furnisher could have uncovered that establish the reported information was inaccurate or incomplete.

The Eleventh Circuit’s Decision

In affirming the District Court’s decisions granting summary judgment and dismissing the FCRA claims, the Eleventh Circuit clarified that whether the alleged inaccuracy was factual or legal was “beside the point. Instead, what matters is whether the alleged inaccuracy was objectively and readily verifiable.” Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit cited to Erickson v. First Advantage Background Servs. Corp., 981 F. 3d 1246, 1251-52 (11th Cir. 2020), which defined “accuracy” as “freedom from mistake or error.” The Eleventh Circuit continued by reiterating that “when evaluating whether a report is accurate under the [FCRA], we look to the objectively reasonable interpretations of the report.” As such, “a report must be factually incorrect, objectively likely to mislead its intended user, or both to violate the maximal accuracy standards of the [FCRA].”

Based on this standard, the Eleventh Circuit held that the alleged inaccurate information on which Mayer and Holden based their FCRA claims was not objectively and readily verifiable since the information stemmed from contractual disputes without simple answers. As such, the Eleventh Circuit found that Holiday took appropriate action upon receiving Mayer and Holden’s disputes by assessing the issues and determining whether the respective debts were due and/or collectible, which thereby satisfied its obligation under the FCRA. While Mayer and Holden argued to the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit held that the resolutions of these contract disputes were not straightforward applications of the law to facts. In support of its decision, the Eleventh Circuit cited to the fact that Florida State courts have reviewed similar timeshare purchase agreements and reached conflicting conclusions about whether the default provisions excused a consumer’s obligation to pay the underlying debt.

Conclusion

Holden is a limited victory for furnishers, as the Eleventh Circuit declined to impose a bright-line rule that only purely factual or transcription errors are actionable under the FCRA and held a court must determine whether the alleged inaccurate information is “objectively and readily verifiable.” Accordingly, there are situations when furnishers are required by the FCRA to accurately report information derived from the readily verifiable and straightforward application of the law to facts. One example of such a situation is misreporting the clear effect of a bankruptcy discharge order on certain types of debt. Thus, furnishers should revisit their investigation and verification procedures so they do not run afoul of the FCRA. Furnishers should also continue to monitor for developing case law as other circuit courts confront these issues.

A New Day for “Natural” Claims?

On May 2, the Second Circuit upheld summary judgment in favor of KIND in a nine year old lawsuit challenging “All Natural” claims. In Re KIND LLC, No. 22-2684-cv (2d Cir. May 2, 2024). Although only time will tell, this Circuit decision, in favor of the defense, may finally change plaintiffs’ appetite for “natural” cases.

Over the many years of litigation, the lawsuit consolidated several class action filings from New York, Florida, and California into a single, multi-district litigation with several, different lead plaintiffs. All plaintiffs alleged that “All Natural” claims for 39 KIND granola bars and other snacks were deceptive. Id. at 3. Plaintiff had alleged that the following ingredients rendered the KIND bars not natural: soy lecithin, soy protein isolate, citrus pectin, glucose syrup/”non-GMO” glucose, vegetable glycerine, palm kernel oil, canola oil, ascorbic acid, vitamin A acetate, d-alpha tocopheryl acetate/vitamin E, and annatto.

The Second Circuit found that, in such cases, the relevant state laws followed a “reasonable consumer standard” of deception. Id. at 10. Further, according to the Second Circuit, the “Ninth Circuit has helpfully explained” that the reasonable consumer standard requires “‘more than a mere possibility that the label might conceivably be misunderstood by some few consumers viewing it in an unreasonable manner.’” Id. (quoting McGinity v. Procter & Gamble Co., 69 F.4th 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2023)). Rather, there must be “‘a probability that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.’” Id. To defeat summary judgement, the plaintiffs would need to present admissible evidence showing how “All Natural” tends to mislead under this standard.

The Second Circuit agreed with the lower court that plaintiffs’ deposition testimony failed to provide such evidence where it failed to “establish an objective definition” representing reasonable consumer understanding of “All Natural.” Id. at 28. While one plaintiff believed the claim meant “not synthetic,” another thought it meant “made from whole grains, nuts, and fruit,” while yet another believed it meant “literally plucked from the ground.” Id. The court observed that plaintiffs “fail[ed] to explain how a trier of fact could apply these shifting definitions.” Id. The court next rejected as useful evidence a dictionary definition of “natural,” which stated, “existing or caused by nature; not made or caused by humankind.” Id. at 29. The court reasoned that the dictionary definition was “not useful when applied to a mass-produced snack bar wrapped in plastic” – something “clearly made by humans.” Id.

The court, finally, upheld the lower court’s decision to exclude two other pieces of evidence the plaintiffs offered. First, the Second Circuit agreed that a consumer survey was subject to exclusion where leading questions biased the results. Id. at 21-22. The Second Circuit also agreed that an expert report by a chemist lacked relevance where it assessed “typical” sourcing of ingredients, not necessarily how KIND’s ingredients were manufactured or sourced. Id. at 22-24.

© 2024 Keller and Heckman LLP
by: Food and Drug Law at Keller and Heckman of Keller and Heckman LLP

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