How Local Authorities Negotiate with Nail Residents and Why Concessions Are Made

This chapter demonstrates that the “success” of nail residents can be attributed to three factors. First, bureaucratic divisions within the state provide the necessary political openings that residents can exploit. Second, effective anti-demolition tactics help residents to complete their unapproved constructions, to create difficulties for local authorities’ thought work, and to increase as much as possible local authorities’ risk during the forced eviction process. Thirdly and most importantly, the “half-opened” state-society bonds reveal why only some of the residents can successfully use the aforementioned openings and tactics in their protests against local authorities, and thus negotiate a better bargain with the latter. Such bonds explain how the limits and the strength of the state exert an influence on protest outcome, and why residents with weak ties to local authorities have better opportunities for resisting official pressure than residents with strong ties to them.

1. 1.

   Many nail residents have failed in their contention by resorting to violence. see 宜黄自焚事件 (Yihuang zifen shijian, Yihuang Self-immolation Incident), available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yihuang_self-immolation_incident, accessed on 20th, October, 2013; Also see 唐福珍事件 (Tang Fu-zhen shijian, Tang Fuzhen Self-immolation Incident), available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tang_Fu-zhen_self-immolation_incident, accessed on 20th October 2013.

2. 2.

   The relations between township officials and street or village cadres are delicate not just in Y District but also elsewhere in China. For detailed analysis of this issue, see (Ouyang, 2009; Wang & Wang, 2009; Wu, Y., 2007b, pp. 614–618; Zhao, S., 2010, pp. 191–195).

3. 3.

   The dilemma of Chengguan in managing unapproved constructing work is also ubiquitous in China. See (Duan, 2010; Liang, 2012; Ni, 2012).

4. 4.

   The tactic of creating unapproved constructions after some residents take the first step is also adopted by residents elsewhere in China. For more details also see (Wu, J., 2011, pp. 191–195; Wu, Y., 2007, pp. 270–282).

5. 5.

   It is very sensitive to discuss corruption and rent-seeking acts with my interviewees. Only some officials who were unhappy with their situations were willing to discuss this issue with me (Int. 3, 10, 11, 18).

6. 6.

   The compliance of capable resident with local authorities due to the particularized interest distribution between two parties has also been observed elsewhere in China (Chen, B., 2013; Chen, F., 2013; Wu, Y., 2007a).

7. 7.

   I accidently overheard this conversation in an office in the District Petition Bureau. Although they did not mention the name and stopped talking when I came into the office, I nevertheless recognized what they were talking about from my fieldwork at that time.

8. 8.

   These sanctions are also quite common elsewhere in China. See (Deng & O’Brien, 2013).

9. 9.

   Scholars also find that the weak ties between thought workers and resident tend to fail in thought work elsewhere in China (Deng & O’Brien, 2013; Li, Z., 2012).

10. 10.

    The aforementioned procrastination tactics are also adopted by resident elsewhere in China (Lu, 2013).

11. 11.

    This typology of the demolition tactics of local authorities in China has been inspired by Jennifer Earl’s typology of repression (Earl, 2003).

12. 12.

    For some of the documents in prohibiting forced eviction, see 禁止非法强拆紧急通知 (Jinzhi feifa qiangchai jinji tongzhi, An Emergent Notice to Forbid Illegally Forced Eviction) issued in May, 2010, available at: http://zhidao.baidu.com/question/157609256.html, accessed on 20th October 2013, and 国有土地上房屋征收与补偿条例 (Guoyoutudi shang fangwu zhengshou yu buchang tiaoli, The New Regulation on the Dismantlement of Urban Houses) issued in January, 2011, available at: http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-01/21/content_1790111.htm, accessed on 20th October 2013. After that, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CPC and Minister of Supervision of the PRC (zhongjiwei jianchabu, 中纪委监察部) issued a notice in March, 2011 which required each Province to make further efforts in institutionalizing the activities of land expropriation and house demolition, and to summarize rewarding experience of lawful demolition (yifachaiqian, 依法拆迁), transparent demolition (yangguang chaiqian, 阳光拆迁), and harmonious demolition (hexiechaiqian, 和谐拆迁), available at: http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_6b2a9f9f0101al00.html, accessed on 20th October 2013. In September, 2011, the Supreme People’s Court of the PRC also issued 最高人民法院关于坚决防止土地征收, 房屋拆迁强制执行引发恶性事件的紧急通知 (Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu jianjue fangzhi tudi zhengshou, fangwu chaiqian qiangzhi zhixing yinfa exing Shijian de jinji tongzhi, Urgent Notice on Firmly Guarding against the Triggering of Vicious Incidents by Land Expropriation and Forced Housing Demolition and Relocation), available at: https://baike.sogou.com/v76638833.htm, accessed on 20th October 2013.

13. 13.

    For details, see 去年查处违法、违规强征强拆案427件, 其中437人受到追责 (Qunian chachu weifa , weigui qiangzheng qiangchai an 427 jian, qizhong 437ren shoudao zhuize, 427 Instances of Illegally Forced Eviction Identified Last Year, 437 Individuals Disciplined), available at: http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0109/c164113-20141977.html, accessed on 21th October 2013; 中国查处违法、违规强拆问题1480个,其中509人被追究责任 (Zhongguo chachu weifa, weigui qiangchai wenti 1480ge, qizhong 509ren bei zhuijiu zeren, 1480 Instances of Illegally Forced Eviction Identified in China, 509 Individuals Disciplined), available at: https://news.sina.com.cn/o/2012-01-08/144223765453.shtml, accessed on 21th October 2021.

14. 14.

    There are many reports about resident’s performance tactics. For a good example, see 重庆钉子户事件调查 (Chongqing dingzihu shijian diaocha, An Investigation of the Best-known Nail Residents in Urban Chongqing), available at: http://www.infzm.com/contents/9631, accessed on 29th December 2013.

15. 15.

    For details of this news, see 老人自制大炮模型抗拆 (Laoren zizhi dapao moxing kangchai, An Old Man Protests against Demolition by Resorting to Home-made Fake Cannons), available at: http://news.sina.com.cn/s/p/2013-12-24/032129063019.shtml, accessed on 16th March 2014.

16. 16.

    The aforementioned defensive tactics are widely reported by the media. For one example of the defensive tactics by using human bodies, see 宜黄自焚事件 (Yihang zifen shijian, Yihuang Self-immolation Incident), available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yihuang_self-immolation_incident, accessed on 29th, December, 2013. For one example of the defensive tactics by using certain things, see 钉子户养狗防强拆 (Dingzihu yanggou fang qiangchai, A nail resident’s protest by using dogs), available at: http://news.sohu.com/20130828/n385216225.shtml, accessed on 29th December 2013.

17. 17.

    Hidden compensations are a widespread phenomenon elsewhere in China. For a very detailed and latest analysis of how to use this tactic in Hubei Province, see 拆迁谜题之我解 (Chaiqian miti zhi wo jie, Disclosing the Puzzle of Demolition), available at: http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4dc4629501014gmv.html, accessed on 25th December 2013.

18. 18.

    Public servants who gave up their positions and became nail residents were also found elsewhere in China. For a latest example, see 南京两公务员买违建成钉子户 (Nanjing liang gongwuyuan mai weijian cheng dingzihu, Two Public Servants had Bought Unapproved Buildings and Become Nail Residents in Nanjing, their Nail Houses had finally been Demolished after Two Years of Protests), available at: http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/0726/c70731-22335385.html, accessed on 25th December 2013.

19. 19.

    For other studies with similar arguments, also see (Goldman, 2005; 2007; Yu, J., 2004; Zweig, 2003).

Authors and Affiliations

1. School of Sociology, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China

   Xiaowei Gui

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Xiaowei Gui .

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