Ukraine’s Opportunity at the NATO Summit

Ukraine should be front and center this week when the Biden administration hosts the NATO summit in Washington. This is no time, into the third year of this terrible war, for obfuscation—either out of fear that Russian President Vladimir Putin might escalate into use of nuclear weapons (highly unlikely) or of the unknown if Russia were to suffer defeat in Ukraine (beyond our control).

The more weapons, technology, and assistance provided to Ukraine and the faster it is done, the more successful Ukraine’s outlook will be in defeating Russia. Success for Ukraine is difficult but by no means impossible. Failure is not an option.

Putin declared in mid-June that any negotiations would have to be based on Ukraine’s surrender of huge swaths of territory beyond those parts occupied by Russia, neutrality, substantial demilitarization, and a change in government. In other words: submission. So much for Western accommodationists who have advocated for negotiations to end the war.

Victory, according to President Volodymyr Zelensky and the vast majority of Ukrainians, means no Russian soldiers on Ukrainian territory, including Crimea; Russian accountability for the war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide that Russian forces have committed against Ukraine; and Russian payment for the destruction it has caused, estimated to be roughly half a trillion dollars and rising. The United States should embrace this definition of victory wholeheartedly. After all, it is Ukrainians who are the ones doing the fighting against Russia, not U.S. troops. This means ramping up assistance to provide the Ukrainians with the weapons they need not simply to fend off Russian attacks but to achieve victory. That is the quickest and best way to end this war and the toll it has taken on Ukraine.

First, the administration needs to clarify that its goal is to help Ukraine win and defeat Russia. Previous administration slogans—from “as long as it takes” to “as long as we can” to help Ukraine have the “strongest hand possible” for eventual negotiations—are inadequate. Administration officials have offered muddled answers when asked for a clear answer on what the policy is.

Second, to achieve this outcome, the United States and its allies need to accelerate the delivery of weapons, new technology, and assistance to Kyiv. There are signs, albeit belated, that things are moving in this direction: The administration announced last month that it would prioritize delivery of air defense systems to Ukraine over other countries that have ordered them. It has also lifted the geographical restrictions on the use of U.S.-provided weapons against targets inside Russia—limits that had provided the Russians with a sanctuary to launch strikes against Ukraine.

But here, too, the administration should do more. It should allow Ukraine to use longer-range ATACMS missiles against targets in Russia out of self-defense—otherwise, it allows Russia sanctuary inside Russian territory to launch attacks against Ukraine without fear of retaliation. The administration should also do a better job of tightening the sanctions it has already imposed against Russian entities, especially in the financial and energy fields, tightening the screws on Russian revenue streams as much as possible. It should implement more aggressive secondary sanctions, including against entities in China, which has been providing support—albeit not overt military aid—to Moscow that has been critical to Russia’s economy and war effort.

It also should capitalize on the progress made at the recent G-7 summit, where the administration marshaled support for using the interest earned on Russia’s $300 billion in assets frozen by the West to securitize a $50 billion loan for Ukraine, to move to seize all $300 billion of those assets, not just the proceeds. Doing so is legal under U.S. law (i.e., the REPO for Ukrainians Act, signed into law in April) and international law and is guided by precedent, as in the case with Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait. It also is the morally right thing to do. How could the West ever contemplate allowing Russia to regain control over these assets and not use the funds to compensate Ukraine for the destruction Moscow has caused? Why should Western citizens pony up funds to pay for the damage Russia has caused when many of the costs can be covered by these Russian funds?

Third, it is possible that the upcoming NATO summit may be the last one on this administration’s watch. Thus, it must seize the moment and recognize that progress on Ukraine’s membership in NATO may get derailed if there is a change in the White House.

Recent excuses for delaying Ukraine’s entry into the alliance have focused on corruption in Ukraine. That’s a problem, to be sure, but one that is being addressed in a serious, if not complete, way as dozens of Ukrainian officials have been fired and investigated for allegations of corruption. Corruption didn’t seem to present a major obstacle for some existing members of the alliance.

More recently, the White House insisted that Ukraine must win the war first before it can be considered for membership. This excuse risks incentivizing Putin to extend the war as long as possible to make sure Ukraine never receives an invitation to join NATO. Extending NATO’s Article 5 security guarantees initially to the parts of Ukraine controlled by Ukrainian forces, and then over time expanding that sweep as Ukraine regains more land, is the best way to avoid risking a wider war.

Think about what Ukraine already has accomplished. It has inflicted more than half a million casualties on the Russian side. It has regained more than 50 percent of the territory Russia initially seized in the days and weeks after Feb. 24, 2022. It has taken out one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and made the Crimean port of Sevastopol unusable for Russia. It has restored use of the Black Sea routes for Ukrainian exports and developed a strong indigenous drone capability that is causing real damage to Russian assets inside Russia.

Much of this Ukraine did on its own, and much was achieved with Western assistance. Ukraine has suffered terribly, and much of that toll came during the holdup in U.S. military aid before Congress finally voted for the new assistance package in April. Even during the seven-month period when no U.S. aid was flowing, Russian forces made very little headway, and what they did gain in places such as Avdiivka came at huge costs.

Russia has had to resort to using prisoners and immigrants to man the front lines, given Putin’s reluctance to enact a second mobilization. (Ukraine recently has also turned to recruiting prisoners, but that is because its population is roughly a quarter of Russia’s.) Russian authorities have had to increase bonuses for joining the military several times. And without Iranian and North Korean support, Russia would really be on the ropes now.

All this means that, with the right and prompt assistance, Ukrainian victory is in fact possible. The Biden administration should embrace that prospect. It also should support an invitation for Ukraine to join NATO, a process that would take several years and not happen overnight.

No country has had the unfortunate and costly experience of fighting the Russians like Ukraine. No country deserves membership in NATO more than Ukraine. And an invitation would let Putin know that he cannot exercise a de facto veto over Ukraine’s aspirations.

The steps outlined here are critical for U.S. security. Putin identifies the United States as Russia’s principal adversary, and his aim is to undermine America’s standing and interests in Europe and elsewhere. Putin is responsible for the worst security crisis on the European continent since the end of World War II. If allowed to change borders by force and get away with war crimes and crimes against humanity, he will not stop at Ukraine. He will threaten countries that already are members of NATO, with the Article 5 security guarantees that come with that.

It is in Ukraine that Putin must be stopped and defeated. Moreover, giving Ukraine the means to deliver Putin a clear defeat would also deter Chinese President Xi Jinping from moving on Taiwan and send a signal to all authoritarian leaders that the United States will not back down.

Nobody wants this war to end sooner than Ukrainians. The way to reach that point is to help Ukraine win as quickly as possible and welcome the country into NATO so that this war is never repeated.