Can a Reformist President Change Iran?

Among the candidates running in Iran’s June 28 presidential election, only Masoud Pezeshkian stands out as a nonconservative, proudly backed by reformists. Pezeshkian, a heart surgeon, served as health minister in Mohammad Khatami’s government from 2001 to 2005. According to the latest polls, he is currently leading with approximately 25 percent of the vote, and his support has been steadily increasing in recent weeks. However, if Pezeshkian actually manages to win, there is no guarantee that it will lead to real change in Iran’s government.

Pezeshkian’s campaign has significant backing from reformists, with Mohammad Javad Zarif, who was foreign minister in Hassan Rouhani’s moderate government from 2013 to 2021, serving as his foreign-policy advisor. Zarif’s presence in Pezeshkian’s campaign is notable, and he appears frequently in promotional events.

Khatami himself has also publicly endorsed Pezeshkian, along with reformist parties that previously supported Rouhani in his successful 2013 presidential bid. These endorsements underscore the significance of Pezeshkian’s candidacy within the reformist movement, which is aiming to revive its influence.

Just a few months after the signing of the 2015 nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), reformists achieved a historic victory in the February 2016 parliamentary elections, securing all 30 seats in Tehran. Rouhani then won the 2017 presidential election with more than 57 percent of the vote.

Yet Iranian society has undergone substantial changes over the past decade, leading many to doubt whether reformists can bring about any meaningful changes in Iran’s governance.

Although the Iranian Constitution designates the president, elected by direct popular vote, as the head of the government, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has significantly expanded his influence over the past few decades. This has been achieved through the creation of parallel institutions, the extension of their powers, and the formulation of overarching policies for the regime. The supreme leader’s influence is further reinforced by his private veto power over members of the president’s cabinet—increasing his control and limiting the president’s authority.

Since the nuclear deal was signed, a moment seen as the pinnacle of reformist and moderate popularity in Iran, the political landscape has shifted dramatically. Moderates have since become marginalized within Iranian society. After Ebrahim Raisi’s victory in the 2021 presidential election, reformists were completely removed from the government. However, even before this month’s election, the Guardian Council had disqualified the main figures of the reformist movement from running, leaving only Pezeshkian.

The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, Khamenei’s opposition to improving Tehran-Washington relations during the Obama administration, and military actions conducted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—including, most recently, the launching of missiles and drones at Israel in April—all marginalized moderates. Additionally, Iran’s arrest of U.S. sailors and seizure of patrol boats in the Persian Gulf, the expansion of the IRGC’s Quds Force activities in Syria, and Iran’s broader support of the so-called Axis of Resistance have escalated tensions with the West.

These military actions impeded the Rouhani government from fully capitalizing on the benefits of the nuclear deal, thereby limiting the potential advantages that it could have brought to the reformist and moderate political movement. The IRGC’s actions have also deterred foreign investors who might otherwise have been eager to engage in business with Iran.

Moreover, during Rouhani’s tenure, Iran witnessed several rounds of nationwide protests, reflecting widespread societal dissatisfaction with the government’s performance. They began with the protests in 2017 and 2018 against economic problems, where the slogan “Reformist, principlist, it’s over” from protesters targeting the Rouhani government was first heard. (Conservatives are known as “principlists” in Iran.) Over time, these slogans began to target Khamenei as well. In 2019, protests erupted in response to high gasoline prices, initially directed at the Rouhani government but soon expanding to criticize the entire regime.

These developments led to the lowest voter turnout in the Islamic Republic’s history in the 2021 presidential election, with only about 48 percent voter participation and Raisi winning 62 percent of the vote. (Raisi died in a helicopter crash last month, paving the way for Friday’s election.)

The “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests in 2022 and 2023 erupted following the death of a young woman, Mahsa Amini, in police custody. The demonstration was organized to protest the widespread suppression of women’s rights in the Islamic Republic, yet almost no slogans targeted Raisi. Instead, angry protesters directly blamed Khamenei for problems. This rare event underscored that at least some in Iranian society believe that changing the government won’t resolve their problems, identifying the supreme leader as the primary obstacle.

Against this turbulent backdrop, reformists hope to rally a tired and disheartened electorate to support their candidate. This comes as a significant portion of society has boycotted recent presidential and parliamentary elections in 2021 and 2024, respectively.

Voters did so for two reasons. First is the widespread disqualification of reformist candidates, which led to Khatami, the leader of the reformists, not participating and not voting in recent elections, including the parliamentary elections in March.

The second and more important reason is the disillusionment that Iranian society had toward the performance of Rouhani’s government. Initially supported with high hopes for the JCPOA, this optimism quickly dissipated with the failure of the deal and the reinstatement of sanctions, replacing hope with anger and despair. Reformists are now urging the public to reconsider their election boycott strategy, arguing that it has not brought meaningful change.

Khatami himself announced in a video message this week that he intends to vote for Pezeshkian. While acknowledging the imperfections of Iran’s elections, he expressed optimism that Pezeshkian’s win could bring about at least some positive change in the country.

However, many in Iranian society now believe that improvement does not lie within the electoral process. Under Khamenei’s 35-year reign as supreme leader, the government’s powers have steadily decreased. Pezeshkian, the hopeful reformist candidate, frequently emphasizes in his statements that Khamenei sets the overall direction for the country. During his campaign, he reiterated that Khamenei determines general policies, including foreign policy, and the government must align with these directives.

On June 18, during one of his campaign programs, Pezeshkian stated, “The final word in political discussion in society should be leadership. When there is a dispute in the country, he is the one who has to solve these issues, and if a person or a group talks too much, the leadership determines that that person or group should be silent.”

Although reformists can still influence public opinion, a significant portion of society has lost trust in them. This disillusionment follows decades of events that eroded the reformists’ support base, once strong enough to elect Khatami in 1997 and keep him in office for eight years and later Rouhani for another eight years starting in 2013. However, these efforts have not resulted in lasting changes in the Islamic Republic establishment. Parallel institutions under the supreme leader’s control have stifled any efforts toward progressive change.

There have been no improvements in the economy, social and civil liberties, Iran’s global standing, or freedom of expression. Dissatisfied citizens have repeatedly pinned their hopes on reformists and moderates to deliver these improvements through elections, only to see their hopes dashed, leading to increased disappointment and anger each time.

As a result, Pezeshkian faces significant hurdles. The reformist movement’s credibility has been severely undermined by the failure to deliver on promises and the harsh crackdown on dissent. The movement’s association with Rouhani’s government, which many Iranians view as having failed to bring about meaningful change, further complicates Pezeshkian’s prospects.

Moreover, the Iranian political landscape is now dominated by hard-line elements, with the IRGC and other conservative factions wielding significant power. Pezeshkian’s ability to navigate this complex environment and implement his proposed reforms remains uncertain. His candidacy may ultimately serve more to increase voter turnout than to bring about substantial policy changes.

The June 28 election is taking place in a context of widespread disillusionment and frustration. The economic situation in Iran is dire, with high inflation, unemployment, and the impact of international sanctions causing widespread hardship. The social fabric is fraying, with increasing public demands for greater freedom, justice, and accountability. In this environment, Pezeshkian’s message of reform and hope faces both skepticism and cautious optimism.

Given the limited powers of the presidency, a reformist victory could even deepen disillusionment within Iranian society—even if responsibility for the government’s failures lies elsewhere.

To avoid this, reformists should learn from recent history. Either they clear the path for extremists, hoping the Islamic Republic will collapse or amend its approaches—a stance strongly advocated by proponents of regime change—or they acknowledge and communicate to voters that the reformists’ ability to reshape the Islamic Republic’s structures and approaches is limited.

Failing to heed these lessons risks repeating past frustrations and escalating public discontent.