How Will Modi Rule in Coalition?

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief.

The highlights this week: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi begins his first term leading a coalition government, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif concludes a five-day visit to China with little action, and the U.S. men’s cricket team upsets Pakistan at the World Cup.

Modi Begins Third Term

Narendra Modi was sworn in on Sunday for his third term as India’s prime minister—and his first leading a coalition government. By some measures, his new administration looks a lot like the previous one: Of 72 ministers, nearly 85 percent belong to Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Many of the cabinet ministers from his second term have stayed on.

For all the talk about the BJP’s setback—it won far fewer seats than expected when national election results were released last week—the party still occupies such a strong position within the coalition that it will continue to dominate India’s politics; the BJP holds more than 80 percent of the seats controlled by the coalition, which is known as the National Democratic Alliance.

As a result, Modi should be able to pursue many of his top policy priorities with few obstacles from the rest of the coalition. However, one of his most critical goals—advancing his Hindu nationalist agenda—could be hampered by his partners.

Modi is unlikely to attract resistance from coalition partners when it comes to stepped-up efforts to rein in inflation and spark more job growth. They will agree that tackling those challenges makes political and economic sense. Economic reforms will be tougher, though more so because of factors beyond the coalition, such as powerful agricultural lobbies. The finance, commerce and industry, and agriculture ministries will be led by BJP members who won’t defy Modi.

Similarly, Modi’s coalition partners are unlikely to oppose his core foreign-policy priorities: long-standing goals such as strengthening ties with regional neighbors, excluding Pakistan; countering China; deepening engagement with the Indo-Pacific, the West, the Middle East, and the global south; and bolstering India’s broader role on the global stage. Modi’s coalition partners don’t seem to have strong views on foreign policy, so they’re likely to take agnostic positions.

Even in cases where Modi’s coalition partners disagree with him, they will have political incentives to hold back. They are small, regional parties that gain much from participation in a coalition government and the influence that comes with it. They can also exploit their roles by pushing for more development assistance and other funding for the states where they hold sway.

However, the other parties do have the leverage to push back in ways that could be politically dangerous for Modi. The BJP’s two main coalition partners—the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and the Janata Dal (United), or JD(U)—hold a combined 28 seats. If they pulled out of the coalition, the government’s total seat share would fall to 265, depriving it of its parliamentary majority.

And if there is one issue that could prompt major concerns for both of those parties, it’s Hindu nationalism—something that Modi and the BJP are not inclined to compromise on. The TDP and JD(U), with their relatively secular outlooks, are ideologically dissimilar from the BJP; both TDP leader N. Chandrababu Naidu and JD(U) chief Nitish Kumar have sparred with Modi in the past.

Understanding the challenges that Modi will face while leading a coalition requires looking beyond all the BJP ministers serving in it as well as the familiar Modi allies with cabinet portfolios. The two main coalition partners have previously flipped—including by backing out of BJP alliances—in ways that make them unpredictable. The coalition leaders that aren’t a formal part of the government, particularly Naidu and Kumar, pose greater risks for Modi than those that are.

Modi has already suffered a defeat: His government lacks a two-thirds majority and has a reduced mandate. That means that he is unable to amend the constitution, as some critics suspected he would, to remove protections for lower castes and religious minorities. The new government may look much like his old one, but Modi can’t hide the fact that his wings have been clipped.

What We’re Following

Sharif concludes China visit. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif spent much of last week in China, one of Pakistan’s most important allies. The trip was meant to inject momentum into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the Pakistani component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, although a joint statement issued on June 8 featured little indication of any new agreements but emphasized the importance of continued cooperation.

In recent years, gaudy rhetoric that overstates deliverables has been a common feature of China-Pakistan relations; Pakistani Information Minister Attaullah Tarar, one of many senior officials to accompany Sharif to Beijing, described the visit as “extremely successful and historic.” But the trip’s limited outcomes aren’t surprising. As long as Pakistan suffers from severe economic stress and high debt, neither side will be comfortable making new CPEC deals.

China also remains concerned about security risks in Pakistan, especially after five Chinese workers were killed in a terrorist attack in March. Additional attacks have killed around a dozen Chinese nationals in recent years. Islamabad has repeatedly promised to address these concerns, and Army Chief Asim Munir—who was also on the trip—likely underscored this message. But Beijing won’t be appeased until the attacks stop.

Overall, bilateral ties remain strong. Pakistan is heavily dependent on Chinese economic and military support, while China views Pakistan as critical territory to connect it to the Middle East. Shared rivalry with India ensures strong strategic convergences. Still, CPEC is a cornerstone of the partnership, and its struggles pose an awkward challenge.

Muizzu attends Modi’s swearing-in. Modi invited most of India’s South Asian neighbors to his swearing-in ceremony on Sunday, reflecting his desire to make regional diplomacy a priority in his third term. (Only Pakistan and Afghanistan didn’t get an invitation.) Most accepted the invitation, including Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu, who sailed to electoral victory last year on a promise to expel India’s military presence in the country.

Muizzu has strengthened military ties with China since taking office, and his visit to India was his first since he was inaugurated last November. He said he met with Modi and Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and spoke highly of India-Maldives relations. Muizzu’s visit was the latest indication that for all his outreach to China, he aims to better balance relations with the regional powers.

In his public comments, Muizzu seemed keen to retain and perhaps strengthen India-Maldives economic cooperation while also focusing on scaling up security cooperation with China.

U.S. cricket team stuns Pakistan. In a Men’s Cricket World Cup match last Thursday in Dallas, Texas, the U.S. team pulled off what has been described as one of the biggest upsets in the history of the sport. The United States, fielding its first World Cup squad, dethroned Pakistan, one of the sport’s long-standing heavyweights.

Before the match, many cynical Pakistani fans predicted a chance of an upset, given that their team looked sluggish in its previous few matches; Pakistan also lost to archrival India on Sunday before defeating Canada on Tuesday.

Given that cricket has failed to take hold in the United States, many Americans were confused by the reaction to the upset. But as South Asia Brief noted recently, success on the pitch can help drive more U.S. interest, especially with an assist from the country’s large South Asian diaspora.

Under the Radar

Last Sunday, militants fired on a bus carrying Hindu pilgrims in Indian-administered Kashmir. The bus fell into a gorge, killing nine people and injuring 42 more. The Resistance Front, an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based terror group that targets India, appeared to take responsibility in social media posts, although Indian law enforcement officials have expressed skepticism about the claims.

The Indian government has not made any public comments about which group perpetrated the attack, which was followed by two smaller-scale assaults earlier this week. Indian-administered Kashmir is home to a long-running insurgency, but it has had relatively few attacks in recent years. Violence on the whole has been less intense since India and Pakistan signed a truce in 2021 along the disputed Line of Control.

The three recent attacks could put that truce under strain. The timing of the incident on Sunday may be coincidental, but it’s notable that it happened the day that Modi was sworn in for a third term. One can’t rule out that the attack was meant to send a message to the BJP-led government.

Since revoking the special autonomous status of India-administered Kashmir in 2019, New Delhi has projected a narrative of normalcy. But the region remains restive, in great part because of opposition to national government policies and India’s large security presence. Tellingly, the BJP declined to field any candidates in Kashmir in the recent election, likely fearing that it would fare poorly.

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Regional Voices

In the Print, journalist Karanjeet Kaur laments the problems caused by outside visitors to the southwestern Indian state of Goa: “Tourism in Goa, which successive state governments cannot stop trumpeting, has a way of wreaking havoc over the lives of its citizens,” she writes. “It isn’t just Goa’s beaches that are treated with contempt. It’s also the riverfronts, the vast paddy fields, and the tiny crumbling bridges.”

Writer Asif Mahmud warns in Prothom Alo about the risks of Bangladesh’s young entrepreneurs succumbing to brain drain. “We must address the systemic challenges that often drive our brightest minds abroad, such as limited job opportunities and lack of support for startups,” he writes. “By creating an ecosystem that supports innovation and rewards talent, we can incentivize our youth to stay and build their futures here in Bangladesh.”