Biden’s New Tariffs Should Raise Alarm Bells in Beijing

On May 14, Washington slapped new tariffs on China in what looks at first glance like the latest round of a familiar trade spat. The White House imposed duties of 25 to 50 percent on a range of industrial, medical, and clean tech goods—including semiconductors, solar cells, batteries, steel, aluminum, graphite, magnets, syringes, and ship-to-shore cranes. Strikingly, the latest measures also include a whopping 100 percent tariff on electric vehicles, effectively shutting the U.S. market to Chinese-made EVs.

Seen from Washington, these measures also look like a political move as U.S. President Joe Biden courts blue-collar voters in industrial swing states such as Michigan and Pennsylvania ahead of the November presidential election. It’s unlikely, however, that Beijing shares this benign interpretation. Seen from China, the tariffs look like a serious escalation of the U.S.-China contest and are probably raising alarm bells. Here’s why.

1. Washington is playing the long game. Stories of how China has become the world leader in EV manufacturing and is flooding the world with cheap vehicles have flourished over recent months. At the global level, there certainly is something to this analysis. Chinese exports of EVs jumped by a whopping 80 percent last year, propelling China to the top of the global ranking of car exporters. Yet this does not apply to the United States, where China supplied just 2 percent of EVs sold last year. (U.S. consumers appear to have a distinct preference for South Korean, Japanese, and European EV imports.) In other words, a 100 percent tariff on a few thousand cars will not hit Chinese firms hard.

A closer look at the list of targeted sectors suggests that batteries, not cars, will be the real pain point for China. The U.S. market is important for Chinese battery firms, which supply around 70 percent of the lithium-ion batteries used in the United States. For China’s battery sector, this means that the impact of the latest U.S. tariffs will likely be huge: The usual rule of thumb is that a 1 percentage point increase in tariffs entails a 2 percent drop in trade. With tariffs rising from 7.5 percent to 25 percent, the rule suggests that Chinese battery firms’ U.S. sales could drop by around one-third—or by $5 billion when one includes the entire battery supply chain. With Chinese battery-makers already seeing their profits plummet amid softening global demand, this is certainly bad news for Beijing.

Crucially, batteries are also an area where the U.S. government is investing huge amounts of public funds, in particular through the Inflation Reduction Act, which seeks to boost U.S. domestic production of clean tech goods. Seen in this light, the latest U.S. tariffs are preemptive measures to protect a nascent clean tech industry and make sure that there is domestic demand for future U.S. production. This suggests that the United States is playing the long game here, with little chance the tariffs will be lifted anytime soon. On the contrary—the U.S. clean tech market could well be closed to Chinese firms from here on out.

2. The White House is trying to force Europe to come on board and impose similar tariffs on China. Biden is probably seeking to score electoral brownie points with a 100 percent tariff on EVs, making former President Donald Trump’s proposal for 60 percent on U.S. imports from China look almost feeble. (Not to be outdone, Trump just announced that he would apply a 200 percent tariff on Chinese-branded cars made in Mexico.) Yet the reality is that Biden’s tariffs will not prove game-changing in the short term: Their implementation will be phased in over two years, and supply chain adjustments typically take time. In short, the measures are unlikely to fuel a U.S. industrial boom in time for the November elections.

What will happen before the election, though, is the conclusion in June or July of the European Union’s ongoing anti-subsidy investigation into China’s EV makers. Rumors abound of a possible tariff of 20 to 30 percent on Chinese EVs. Such a prospect is probably unnerving for Beijing; the EU is the biggest export market for China’s EVs, absorbing around 40 percent of Chinese shipments. The United States hopes that its 100 percent tariff on EVs will compel the EU to not only follow Washington’s example in imposing a tariff on Chinese EVs but perhaps also consider a higher one. This bold strategy could well work. Europe is unlikely to enjoy having its arm twisted by Washington, but the bloc will also worry that Chinese EV makers could double down on their push to dominate the EU market now that they have lost access to the U.S. one.

Chinese EVs look set to be a key topic when G-7 leaders meet for their annual summit in June. The United States will probably try to cajole Germany, which has long been dovish vis à vis China, into supporting sharply higher tariffs. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has pointed to the fact that European auto manufacturers “sell a great many vehicles that are produced in Europe to China”—hinting at German fears that China could retaliate against EVs and internal combustion engine cars imported from the EU.

3. The tariffs are a serious escalation from Washington’s previous de-risking strategy. In recent years, U.S. de-risking has focused on reducing the United States’ reliance on China for crucial goods and curbing Beijing’s access to dual-use technology in a bid to avoid fueling the country’s military advances. To implement this strategy, Washington has so far relied on two main tools from its economic statecraft kit: financial sanctions (for instance, on firms linked to the People’s Liberation Army) and export controls (notably on semiconductors, which are dual-use goods found in most military equipment).

Washington is slowly realizing that these two tools are imperfect. China’s massive sanctions-proofing efforts mean that sanctions do not always deal a blow to Chinese firms, which may no longer be using the U.S. dollar (China now settles around half of its cross-border trade in renminbi) or Western financial channels such as SWIFT, the global payments system. Washington also understands that export controls on clean tech would not curb China’s ambitions in the field, as Chinese firms already have all the tech they need. This leaves only one option for U.S. economic statecraft: tariffs that leverage one of the country’s greatest economic assets—access to its market.

This is why the latest U.S. tariffs are likely raising red flags in Beijing. The United States is now severing access to its market in clean tech and other areas that China sees as crucial for its plans to become the world’s future economic superpower. If the EU plays ball, this approach would expose a central flaw in Beijing’s industrial strategy: What if the world’s two biggest markets—the United States and the EU—become no-go areas for Chinese firms dependent on exporting their vast production, leaving them with piles of unused goods? Few other markets are available for Chinese clean tech exports—outside Europe, North America, and East Asia, most countries lack the infrastructure for large-scale EV adoption, for example. This prospect may well keep Beijing’s planners up at night, with no easy solution in sight.

Read More

The Man Who Would Help Trump Upend the Global Economy

As a potential U.S. Treasury secretary, Robert Lighthizer has more than trade policy to revolutionize.

Profile

|

Edward Alden

The question now is whether and how Beijing will react. Serious retaliation is unlikely, since the United States exports far less to China than vice versa. Given its current economic woes, China also has little interest in further weakening its economy—for example, by imposing export bans on critical raw materials, rare earths, or other crucial goods for Western economies.

As the latest skirmish in the battle for economic dominance between Washington and Beijing, the new U.S. tariffs raise a number of bigger questions: Will Washington succeed in its efforts to create a domestic ecosystem for clean tech? Will the United States and Europe manage to cooperate—or go their own ways in their economic relations with China? Will the United States continue to curb Chinese access to the U.S. market for the purposes of de-risking—and if so, in which sectors? There is probably only one certainty in the U.S.-China economic war: The conflict will continue well after the November elections, whatever their outcome.