U.S. Policy on Venezuela Is Converging

These days, political consensus in Washington is hard to come by. But there is a rare degree of alignment in both Democratic and Republican foreign-policy circles on the need for a more realist approach toward Venezuela—one that balances U.S. interests with the need for a democratic solution to Caracas’s political crisis.

Like the United States, Venezuela also holds presidential elections later this year. Though the concurrent votes—and their varied potential outcomes—will have significant ramifications for U.S.-Venezuela relations, Washington’s policy toward Caracas is unlikely to change dramatically based on who wins the White House.

Those who have followed the recent ups and downs of U.S. Venezuela policy know this story: After a so-called “maximum pressure” campaign failed to topple Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the White House changed tactics, pivoting to support negotiations with Maduro’s government—and even sending officials to Caracas to engage in back-channel conversations to further U.S. interests.

This shift is often described as taking place under U.S. President Joe Biden, who last year lifted some sanctions on Venezuela and its vast oil sector in exchange for concessions in long-running—yet often stalled—talks between Maduro and the opposition. Sanctions relief was meant to incentivize Maduro to ensure that Venezuela’s July 28 vote is more competitive than previous elections, and to facilitate the release of American prisoners held in the country. Biden officials have also worked with their Venezuelan counterparts to move these issues forward.

In practice, however, this shift was already in motion under former President Donald Trump. Though their rhetoric was different, both administrations paired pressure with strategic engagement in their relations with Caracas. The parallels between Biden’s and Trump’s Venezuela policies suggest that, regardless of who wins the U.S. election in November—Biden and Trump are their respective parties’ presumptive presidential nominees—Washington is unlikely to revert to the failed maximum pressure strategy of the past.

Trump’s maximum pressure campaign involved imposing crippling sanctions on Venezuela and issuing criminal indictments of key government figures. According to former National Security Advisor John Bolton, the sanctions were projected to cause Venezuela to lose $11 billion annually in revenue from oil exports, the primary motor of Venezuela’s economy. In 2019, the White House embraced an opposition interim government led by then-National Assembly President Juan Guaidó. While Guaidó lacked control of the military or other national institutions, he sought to encourage defections from the Maduro government to spark a transition of power in Venezuela. Bolton would later characterize this as an attempt at U.S.-backed regime change.

But Trump also showed a pragmatic streak. After Bolton left office, the administration laid out a path to elections in exchange for the gradual lifting of sanctions, known as the 2020 “Democratic Transition Framework” for Venezuela. The plan was hamstrung by its call for Maduro to cede executive power as a condition for new elections, but it nevertheless emphasized carrots rather than sticks—evidence of a paradigm shift in Washington’s approach to Caracas. The plan also called for an amnesty law for Maduro officials and emphasized a proposal for a power-sharing agreement between Maduro’s ruling United Socialist Party and the opposition.

This Trump-era pragmatism was spearheaded by figures such as Elliott Abrams, then the special representative for Venezuela, who held quiet conversations with Maduro’s foreign minister in New York in 2019, according to The Associated Press. These talks did not appear to yield results, but they demonstrated Trump’s interest in communication with Maduro even as his administration technically recognized Guaidó as Venezuela’s president.

This pragmatism was echoed in September 2020, when Trump sent Richard Grenell, the former acting U.S. director of national intelligence, to Mexico City to meet with Jorge Rodríguez, a former Venezuelan vice president and close confidant of Maduro’s. By this point, Trump reportedly voiced doubts about the failure of his own maximum pressure strategy and regarded Guaidó as weak, according to Bolton.

That both Biden and Trump have sought to engage with a government they previously treated as a pariah means that they recognize the constraints of U.S. influence over decisions made in Caracas. It’s also emblematic of shifting dynamics in global energy and geopolitics.

Years of U.S. economic sanctions failed to dislodge Maduro. The first financial penalties on Caracas were imposed in August 2017, exacerbating a preexisting economic crisis by blocking state oil company PDVSA and its partners from accessing credit. Then came individual sanctions on more than 150 political and military allies in Maduro’s coalition, and criminal indictments against nearly every major minister in the country. These were followed by direct sanctions on the oil sector, described in some U.S. policy corners as the “nuclear option” to pressure Maduro. These sanctions contributed to a nearly fivefold decrease in oil production from the pre-sanctions period. Repeated U.S.-backed efforts to spark a military coup in Venezuela and an attempt at a mercenary-led invasion in partnership with a U.S. private security firm failed to oust Maduro, too.

Faced with the reality that Maduro’s coalition is unlikely to collapse under its own weight, the United States now recognizes that the best hope for stability and democratic change in Venezuela is from some form of a negotiated transition and elections. Venezuela’s ruling coalition is not going to disappear into thin air; if Caracas is to restore its institutions and economy, the United Socialist Party must see a political future for itself. As Biden’s and Trump’s approaches demonstrate, many in both the Democratic and Republican parties now realize this.

Great-power competition is also shaping U.S. policy toward Venezuela. U.S. financial sanctions have created an opportunity for rivals such as Russia and China to deepen their influence in Caracas. Since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine—which prompted U.S. and European allies to seek oil and gas alternatives to Moscow—there has been a growing recognition that it is not in Washington’s interest to cede space to geopolitical rivals in the Western hemisphere. Since Venezuela is home to the world’s largest oil reserves, it will continue to be important for the United States and other Western countries to maintain a footprint there.

With U.S. and European energy companies once again investing in Venezuela, the West has a chance to stabilize the country’s economy while also pushing for transparency in the private sector. Western companies have their own strict compliance and oversight standards, and their greater investment in Venezuela will leave less room for corruption. An improved economy may also help stem the outward flow of Venezuelan migrants, who are arriving at the southern border of the United States in large numbers. Venezuelans are fleeing both their country’s political crisis as well as a lack of opportunity, but a stabilized economy combined with broad political agreements could see fewer migrants deciding to risk the perilous journey north.

U.S. policy on Venezuela has produced some significant recent wins. The sanctions relief that the Biden administration negotiated last year was part of a deal that secured the release of all U.S. detainees in Venezuela, in addition to two dozen Venezuelan political prisoners. It also led opposition and Maduro government representatives to sign an electoral road map agreement in Barbados.

This agreement has not resulted in a free or balanced electoral environment ahead of July’s vote; opposition front-runner Maria Corina Machado remains barred from running, as is backup candidate Corina Yoris. But the opposition coalition has declared that it is committed to electoral participation and remaining engaged in dialogue with Maduro nonetheless. There may be room for the wider coalition to endorse another candidate who has been permitted to register, such as Zulia state Gov. Manuel Rosales and former diplomat Edmundo González. Unlike Cuba or Nicaragua—other undemocratic U.S. adversaries in the region—Venezuela has an active opposition that has demonstrated success at the ballot box in recent state and local elections.

The White House recognizes that the United States can achieve more to advance a democratic opening in Venezuela—and pursue U.S. geostrategic interests—by pairing targeted engagement with support for negotiations rather than resorting solely to sanctions. The United States should instead empower committed opposition and Chavista voices who are working on a realistic path to democratic reconciliation.

Venezuelans should not be encouraged to sit back and place their future entirely in the hands of a foreign government—even the U.S. government. In the past, this magical thinking led the opposition to tremendous blunders, ranging from repeatedly dividing over unpopular electoral boycotts to openly calling for foreign military intervention.

Unless it is accompanied by some form of engagement and negotiation, pressure alone will not lead to change in Caracas. As Carlos Trujillo, the former ambassador to the Organization of American States under Trump, said in a recent interview: “I don’t think sanctions in and of themselves will drive a unique outcome. I think they are part of a solution, just like negotiations have to be part of the solution.”