The West Can No Longer Hesitate on Ukraine

As Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine enters its third year, the West remains in need of a clearer strategy for achieving victory and stopping Russian President Vladimir Putin from overturning the rules-based international order. Western leaders’ hesitation and incrementalism in providing Ukraine with the military capabilities that it needs to defeat Russia are the main reasons for the disappointing results of last year’s Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Victory means securing Ukraine’s survival as a sovereign, democratic state that is fully integrated in the European Union and NATO, as well as bolstering its economic and military capacity to deter future Russian aggression. Given Putin’s denial of Ukraine’s right to exist, Russia must be defeated first and foremost on the battlefield.

Putin hasn’t scaled back his war aims despite the heavy Russian losses. He continues to believe that time is on his side and that his military can outlast Ukraine and its Western backers. The erosion of Republican Party support for Ukraine in the U.S. Congress has buoyed his hopes, along with the possibility that former U.S. President Donald Trump will return to power and either sever or downgrade the U.S. commitment to NATO. With Ukraine running out of ammunition, Russia has gone on the offensive and captured strategic towns in the eastern Donbas region, including Avdiivka, breaking the stalemate.

At home, the Russian elite and much of the public continue to at least passively support Putin’s so-called special military operation, which has been conducted in a way that limits the impact on their daily lives. Russian propaganda distorts history and in part blames the war on Western Russophobia, while the West struggles to counter disinformation. Putin has made clear that he does not feel any pressure to negotiate and seek a diplomatic solution unless the terms involve Ukraine’s total capitulation.

It is vital to U.S. interests to help Ukraine defeat Russia and to prevent the normalization of wars of aggression and changing borders by force. The United States must also deny impunity for war crimes against civilians, as well as the disruption of global energy and food supplies. Even partial success for Putin could embolden other actors, such as China or Iran, to achieve their own goals by force—such as attacking Taiwan or increasing support for extremist groups in the Middle East. And in the long term, a Russian victory in Ukraine would make Moscow’s return to the path of reform and peaceful coexistence less likely.

To mount an effective strategy for victory in Ukraine, the U.S. Congress must promptly pass a bill to fund Ukraine’s defense through the end of 2024 and beyond, if possible. A lack of U.S. funding—and by extension, of U.S. arms supplies—will jeopardize Ukraine’s ability to hold off new Russian offensives and undermine U.S. credibility and NATO solidarity. Washington’s allies understand that they will need to help fill the gap if the congressional impasse continues. The European Union’s $54 billion aid package will help, but there is only so much that European countries can do on the military side: Their stockpiles are dwindling, and efforts to build up their defense industries will take years to deliver results.

Assuming that Congress restores U.S. funding, there are two critical areas for ramping up support to Ukraine. The first is pulling out all the stops on military assistance—that is to say, playing to win, not just doing enough to ensure that Ukraine doesn’t lose. Last year’s decisions to provide a short-range version of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), F-16 fighter jets, and Abrams tanks were encouraging, but they could have been provided earlier and in larger quantities.

Most urgently, the United States needs to lift its self-imposed ban on the longer-range version of the ATACMS, which would enable Ukraine to strike targets deeper in Crimea and hit the systems launching missiles from inside Russia. Despite leaks suggesting an impending change in U.S. policy on this long-range missile system, the Biden administration continues to hesitate. Breaking Russia’s grip on Crimea is the key to Ukrainian victory and to the long-term viability of the Ukrainian state.

Second, the West should put Ukraine on a path to NATO membership during the alliance’s summit in Washington in July. Although it is good news that allies are extending bilateral security commitments to Ukraine, as the G-7 countries agreed last year, that cannot be the final answer. Until Ukraine joins NATO and is covered by Article 5, the alliance’s collective defense clause, there can be no certainty that Russia will not attack Ukraine again.

The communiqué from NATO’s summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, last year used the right words—that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO”—and simplified the process for Kyiv’s accession. But it was vague on when and under what conditions Ukraine can expect to receive an invitation and begin accession talks. It’s not too late to adopt a more ambitious approach at the summit in Washington, which will mark the alliance’s 75th anniversary.

The decision is not a simple one for NATO. Although the alliance admitted West Germany in 1955, when Soviet troops occupied East Germany, Ukraine’s accession would be the first time a country was invited to join NATO while engaged in active combat with a hostile neighbor. Some allies have suggested that NATO can only take a decision on Ukrainian accession once the war is over. That might be the simplest approach, but it would give Russia an incentive to drag out the war—effectively giving Moscow a veto.

Beginning accession talks at the Washington summit would be a better approach. Allies could engage Ukraine in the practical work required to meet NATO membership criteria on an expedited basis: defense capabilities, reforms, interoperability, and adherence to democratic principles, among others. This would enable Ukraine to demonstrate its ability to meet the political, legal and military obligations of membership. It would also echo the EU’s approach to Ukraine’s EU accession while deferring a full invitation to join the alliance to a later decision.

Setting Ukraine on this path would give Kyiv and its allies time to work out solutions to problems related to bringing in a member still engaged in a war with Moscow. For example, if there were stability along most of the line of contact separating Ukrainian and Russian forces, NATO might proceed with accession but initially apply Article 5 only to territory fully under Ukrainian control to ensure the credibility of the collective defense guarantee.

Even after Ukraine becomes a NATO member, allies will need to continue to arm and train Ukrainian forces for the long term, including by helping them develop their own defense industry. Providing Ukraine with all the weapons that it needs to defeat Russia on the battlefield is the best way to end the war; setting Ukraine on the path to NATO membership is the best way to secure the peace.

Taken together, these steps can form the basis for a strategy for victory that is worthy of the name.