A Middle East Paradox

With the benefit of long memories, we can confidently say that never in the history of the Palestinian-Israeli tragedy has the situation been as dire or perilous as it is today. But never has there been greater clarity about the essential components of a future peace settlement.

What sets apart the recent atrocious events—the horrific Hamas attack on Israel that killed over 1,100 people and the ongoing, belligerent Israeli response on Gaza, which has killed over 25,000 Palestinians—is that they have reopened deep wounds for both peoples: for Israeli Jews of the Holocaust; for Palestinians the Nakba, or “catastrophe.” Both peoples are in psychological turmoil, and emotions are exceptionally raw.

When the cannons eventually fall silent, the reckonings will begin. Hamas is currently enjoying a spell of popularity among traumatized Palestinians, but will it ever be forgiven for the death and destruction it recklessly—and almost certainly knowingly—provoked? Caught woefully off-guard on Oct. 7, 2023, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may have the country behind him in pursuit of Hamas, but for how long will he be able to stay the course once a semblance of normality is restored?

Sooner or later, after decades of suffocating Israeli occupation, there was bound to be a seismic explosion, but not necessarily in the form it took. Hamas could have chosen instead to emulate the largely nonviolent border protests it had itself orchestrated some five years earlier, but to greater effect this time in light of its resourceful thwarting of Israel’s electronic surveillance barriers. Had they come unarmed in their thousands to explain and not to kill, Palestinians’ pleas for freedom and equality could instantly have been broadcast across the land and further afield and could have had a profound impact on the political climate in Israel and fostered new political currents.

By choosing a violent path instead, Hamas instantly nullified its long-term strategic goal to be accepted by world governments as a legitimate interlocutor in any discussions about the future. While the group might claim some tactical benefits, Oct. 7 will be seen as a massive act of self-sabotage when the dust settles.

In its vindictive reflex response, the Israeli war cabinet likewise abandoned the strategy that had been pursued for years of bolstering Hamas’s rule in Gaza to forestall the prospect of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza under a unified leadership. The new aim—to destroy every vestige of Hamas—was not the outcome of rigorous strategic thinking but a spontaneous lashing out by the supposed guardians of Israel’s security.

The new goal is not just ill-thought-out. It is also unattainable, although it is not beyond Israel’s leaders to keep moving the goal posts to enable them at some point to declare victory. Rather than destroying Hamas, the relentless battering of Gaza and its entrapped inhabitants is more likely to act as a recruiting sergeant for the organization. This, in turn, is Israel’s own act of self-sabotage.

Israel also had choices. In the light of the new era in which the state had acquired official relations with a growing number of Arab countries, a robust, inclusive, regional response could potentially have been swiftly devised. The outcome would almost certainly have been less destructive and more effective than Israel’s unilateral military response. It might have avoided the deaths of thousands and led to the release of the Israeli and foreign hostages captured by Hamas on Oct. 7.

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For all this, the prospects of a new peace process emerging from the ashes of the present wretchedness may, ironically, have been enhanced by recent events, for two main reasons.

First, the common fallacy that the Palestinians are a defeated people and that the Palestinian issue could be sidelined has been exposed as the nonsense it always has been. Second, the related illusion that the conflict could be managed or contained has been shattered. It cannot be. It has to be resolved, for otherwise there will be more explosions with the resulting toxins continuing to overflow into the rest of the world. There is no way of resolving this conflict without Israel fully ending its decades-old occupation of the West Bank and the siege of Gaza, so that the Palestinians may be free to exercise their self-determination and live in freedom and dignity.

Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, every seismic explosion of violence related to the conflict has sparked moves toward peace, even if, in some cases, they ultimately failed to reach fruition: The 1967 war itself prompted a steady evolution in Palestinian attitudes toward accepting a Palestinian state alongside Israel instead of in place of Israel; the 1973 war led to the Egypt-Israel peace treaty six years later; the First Intifada in 1987 culminated in the Oslo Accords in the 1990s, which, at the time, were widely believed to herald a new era of peace based on two states; and the Second Intifada in 2000 triggered the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, with its offer to Israel of full recognition by all 22 members of the Arab League, in exchange for Palestinian statehood on the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

As for the future, the wheel need not be reinvented. Peace between sovereign states can only be achieved through a cooperative relationship between the Arabian Peninsula and the Levant. This is the only course of action to end the current nightmare of violence and brutality.

All the vital ingredients for such a settlement and peace in the Middle East were set out in the aforementioned Arab Peace Initiative, which has also been endorsed by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. It urgently needs to be revived—and revised if warranted—and energetically promoted from within the region to the Israeli and Palestinian people who, in the wake of Oct. 7, both need credible assurances of their safety, security, and acceptance in the region that—in the end—is their home.