Why Israel Needs America’s Tough Love

In a thought-provoking essay for the New York Times, Sen. Bernie Sanders advocated for conditioning U.S. military aid to Israel on policy changes. He outlined several steps, ranging from ending the conflict in Gaza to Israel’s engagement in comprehensive peace talks for a two-state solution post-conflict. Acknowledging past inadequacies in the U.S. approach, Sanders emphasized the need for a shift from goodwill efforts to more impactful strategies. “Obviously, we did not do enough. Now we must recommit to this effort. The stakes are just too high to give up,” he wrote.

While Sanders’s initiative has predictably faced criticism from Israel’s supporters, it’s crucial to view it in the broader context of Israel’s internal struggles. This proposal, far from being harmful to Israel, could serve as a catalyst for addressing Israel’s deep-seated political challenges. Struggling with a deeply paralyzed political system, Israel is hampered in making critical decisions on its own. In these circumstances, the support and intervention of its allies could prove not just beneficial, but perhaps crucial for Israel.

Israel’s strategy in the recent Gaza conflict has been marked by a lack of clear, achievable objectives, with the primary aim being to topple the Hamas regime and dismantle its military capabilities. This goal, one of the most ambitious for a democracy since World War II, was shrouded in ambiguity. The Israeli government has quietly revised its war goals repeatedly. Such frequent revisions reflect a deeper issue: Heightened domestic disagreement leads to inflated public expectations, further complicating the definition of a concrete exit plan or success criteria. Caught in this cycle, Israel faces the peril of an unending conflict. Its paralyzed political system not only struggles to set realistic goals but also to identify the right moment to step back. This paralysis cripples Israel’s immediate decision-making and casts a long shadow over its future strategic direction, significantly impacting its regional and international standing. After eight weeks of intense conflict, Israel is far from achieving these initial goals.

The Israeli government has also failed to articulate a clear political vision for what follows the war. Currently, the conflict is being directed more by military imperatives than by a cohesive political strategy. Should Israel aim to reoccupy Gaza, acting as the primary force in place of Hamas, the war might continue for months until the last enemy combatant surrenders. On the other hand, if Israel were to support a two-state solution, allowing the Palestinian Authority (PA) to govern Gaza again, it would help end the conflict more quickly. This would not only assist the PA in rehabilitating Gaza but also enhance its legitimacy among Palestinians in general, and those in Gaza in particular, portraying the PA as a savior from Israel’s military actions. However, Israel’s inability to make decisive choices due to its political paralysis is a significant impediment.

Contrary to what Sanders implies, the root of Israel’s paralysis extends beyond the influence of right-wing extremists in the cabinet. This situation is further complicated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s vested interest in prolonging the conflict in order to remain in office. As long as the fighting continues, Israelis appear ready to put off a political reckoning with the Israeli leader.

More fundamentally, two moderating forces are being stifled. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has historically acted as a counterbalance to hawkish agendas—especially under previous Netanyahu administrations—with senior officers showing a keen awareness of the limits of military power. But Hamas’s surprise attack on Oct. 7 damaged the IDF’s reputation. In response to this humiliation, the IDF has shifted toward showcasing military might, frequently neglecting the need for caution and restraint. This aggressive posture has led to an unprecedented increase in civilian casualties in Gaza, risking Israel’s international legitimacy. Such an aggressive approach, diverging from the IDF’s traditionally more restraining role, signals a worrying trend in the context of Israeli domestic and foreign policy.

As the IDF grapples with these challenges, a shift is occurring within the Israeli political landscape as well. During previous conflicts, as Israelis rallied around their government, people on the political left often found a way to critique the war and offer alternatives. Those voices are now mostly muted for a host of reasons. The Hamas attack was so heinous that even Israeli supporters of Palestinian rights are finding it hard to stand against the war. Also, the right has accused the center-left camp of eroding the country’s deterrence before the war with mass protests against Netanyahu’s judicial reform program. The protests included a refusal by air force pilots and others to volunteer for reserve duty (though the protesters did report for duty once the war began). Faced with these accusations, the center-left has been more reluctant than usual to speak up and propose ways to end the war.

This situation has fostered a narrative wherein anything but all-out war in Gaza is viewed as untenable. The argument for a forceful response following Hamas’s attack—justified as it was—overshadowed any strategic rationale behind Israel’s specific military maneuvers. Consequently, the center-left has not only overlooked the vital question of the day after, but also appears disengaged from the challenges of rebuilding Gaza in the post-conflict period. Being an antiwar activist in Israel these days amounts to advocating for pauses in the war to allow for prisoner exchanges, in contrast to the rightist preference for prioritizing the smashing of Hamas. This stance falls short of offering a substantive alternative to the prevailing approach to the war.

The paucity of alternative perspectives in Israel is exacerbated by government measures that limit free speech. Antiwar demonstrations have been restricted. Members of the Arab minority are increasingly feeling intimidated in public spaces. In politics, vacuums are rare. With the absence of a clear exit strategy and a vision for future relations with Gaza, public opinion is shifting. Polls indicate growing support for the idea of rebuilding Jewish settlements in Gaza after the war. This is a messianic fantasy of the right wing that advocates for relentless revenge in Gaza. Conversely, U.S. President Joe Biden’s proposal to empower the PA to govern Gaza after the war has not sparked the kind of public debate it warrants.

In the context of Israel’s internal paralysis, the nation cannot make the crucial decisions necessary to restore its security. For Biden to effectively guide Israel away from a potentially self-destructive path and avert a broader regional crisis, his administration needs to be more assertive. Sanders’s agenda, driven by the belief that the “stakes are just too high to give up,” could bolster the administration’s efforts to achieve this aim. Historical precedents, including the George H.W. Bush administration’s refusal in 1991 to approve $10 billion in loan guarantees for Israel unless it froze settlement construction, demonstrate the potential effectiveness of U.S. pressure. Historically, this form of external influence has helped Israel’s center-left challenge government policies. It played a pivotal role in the ascension of Yitzhak Rabin’s moderate government in 1992. Imposing such pressures today could inspire the center-left to champion a more dovish agenda. This camp, significantly composed of the middle class, might be galvanized into action as the costs of the conflict escalate—and the United States is no longer promising to finance it.

In short, a more assertive American role could be the key to unlocking Israel’s political impasse, paving the way for a more stable and secure future in the region. Now is the time for those who care about Israel to demonstrate their commitment in a constructive manner.