How Netanyahu Plans to Hold on to Power

There are plenty of reasons to believe that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is nearing the end of his political career. His poll numbers are in the basement. He’s carrying around the legacy of the worst security blunder in the country’s history—one that allowed Hamas militants to cross the border from the Gaza Strip last month and brutally kill at least 1,200 Israelis. He’s presiding over a war in Gaza whose objectives could well be unrealistic and irreconcilable. And he remains a defendant in three separate corruption cases.

And yet, with every day that passes since the horrors of Oct. 7, Netanyahu seems to be a little more determined—and possibly better positioned—to remain in power well after the war is over. His strategy seems to be threefold: to deflect blame for the security lapses that allowed the Hamas attack, keep his governing coalition intact at any cost, and bide his time until he can point to concrete achievements.

“He hopes the military campaign will go well, and he is counting on time to be the best thing to heal [the country],” said Aviv Bushinsky, a political commentator who worked as an advisor to Netanyahu for nearly a decade.

Over the weekend, Hamas released about 50 Israeli hostages in exchange for some 150 Palestinian prisoners held in Israel and a pause in the fighting. The deal has wide support in the country, although Israelis remain deeply anguished over the many hostages left in Gaza.

The worst crisis in Netanyahu’s long political career began when Hamas fighters invaded Israel on Oct. 7, carrying out widespread atrocities and abducting about 240 people. It was the bloodiest attack in the country’s history. Israel responded with devastating airstrikes and ground operations, killing some 15,000 people, many of them women and children, according to Palestinian officials in Gaza. The figures could not be independently verified.

While Israel Defense Forces chief of staff Herzi Halevi and Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar acknowledged responsibility for the disaster, Netanyahu has refused to do so, despite a swell of public anger. Officials and analysts have called for an Israeli commission of inquiry to investigate the debacle and hold people accountable. In the meantime, Netanyahu has said it is not the moment to apportion responsibility since all energies must be directed toward victory over Hamas.

Yossi Alpher, a veteran political and strategic commentator who writes a column for the dovish Americans for Peace Now group, said it was noteworthy that no one in Netanyahu’s Likud party has yet challenged his leadership.

“He is busy maneuvering, and he’s good at it,” he said, referring to the political adroitness of Israel’s longest-serving premier, who survived mass protests earlier this year over his controversial bid to grab power from Israel’s judiciary.

“There are too many dynamics we don’t know at this point. It’s not a given that he’s finished,” he said.

In the short term, Netanyahu seems to be benefiting from an axiom related to politics and war: You don’t topple a leader while fighting is underway. But Amnon Abramovich, a veteran commentator for Channel 12, said survival considerations might induce Netanyahu to prolong the war beyond what is strategically necessary. “I can’t determine this with certainty, but I don’t entirely rule it out as a possibility,” he said.

Netanyahu’s office did not respond to a request for comment.

To be sure, with plummeting poll numbers and fears of embarrassing interactions with the public that have kept him away from military funerals, Netanyahu’s rehabilitation seems far away at the moment.

Still, he seems to have assured his immediate survival by drawing into his war cabinet last month two opposition figures from the National Unity party with strong security credentials: Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot.

That helps Netanyahu and his associates to cast this as a wide national campaign for survival against those who would destroy Israel and undercut the idea that decisions might have anything to do with Netanyahu’s survival. “It is not Netanyahu against Hamas. It is Israel against terrorism,” said Likud legislator Boaz Bismuth, a member of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. “We are a nation whose neighbors do not even accept our presence here. This is not a question of Netanyahu.”

But seven weeks into the war, the perception that Netanyahu bears responsibility for Hamas’s empowerment in recent years is still strong. For years, Netanyahu has allowed the group to receive millions of dollars in funding from Qatar, even as his government withheld tax revenue from the more moderate Palestinian Authority in the West Bank at times over the years. The policy is seen as Netanyahu’s way of stoking Palestinian divisions and heading off international pressure on Israel to make peace with the Palestinians.

“Strengthening Hamas was his concept,” said Gadi Shamni, a retired general who served as Israel’s military attaché in Washington. “He belongs in the garbage bin of history.”

Bushinsky said his old boss likely fears that any statement of responsibility would turn into a sound bite and be used against him by political rivals. Alpher said Netanyahu is also wary of incriminating himself in advance of any commission of inquiry.

In public remarks aired on Israeli media earlier this month, Netanyahu said “now is the time to deal with one thing only, achieving victory, eliminating Hamas, returning the hostages, and ensuring another regime in Gaza.” At the same time, he apparently views pinning the blame on others as key to his survival. He recently tweeted that senior security officials, including the heads of military intelligence and internal security, are responsible for the disaster because they repeatedly assured him that Hamas was deterred from striking at Israel. Netanyahu later deleted the tweet and apologized.

Against the backdrop of public discontent, a poll whose findings were released on Channel 12 on Nov. 16 showed Netanyahu’s Likud-led coalition losing power, dropping from 64 seats in last November’s election to 45. Gantz’s National Unity party scored 36 seats in the poll, up from 12, and Likud tallied only 17, down from 32. Asked who they favored for prime minister, 41 percent said Gantz and 25 percent said Netanyahu.

Bismuth said the poll is not indicative of public sentiment. “There is always a gap between surveys, the media, and the street. I travel around. There are many people who are hurting, but their spirits are high.”

And within Likud, Netanyahu’s standing is still strong, Bushinsky said. “In Likud, if you go against the leader, the constituents punish you. Netanyahu is still the iconic leader of the Likud brand.”

Moreover, Netanyahu is still seen as a master in maneuvering coalition politics and keeping his partners on board—including the ultra-Orthodox and ultranationalist parties. Thus, he is endorsing the continued flow of budget allocations to ultra-Orthodox institutions despite criticism that the monies now need to be spent on costs associated with the displacement of Israelis at the start of the war and other crisis needs. “He knows the national priorities, but he also knows how to keep his relations with the Orthodox and that on a rainy day he will need them,” Bushinsky said. Since elections aren’t scheduled for another three years, a rebellion by coalition partners might be the only thing that could unseat Netanyahu.

Similarly, Netanyahu stopped short of sacking far-right cabinet minister Amichai Eliyahu of the pro-settler Jewish Power party for suggesting Israel should drop a nuclear bomb on Gaza. Netanyahu wants to keep both Jewish Power and another far-right party, the Religious Zionist Party, firmly in his camp. To that end, he is unlikely to take meaningful action regarding settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank—despite calls to do so from Washington.

The poll from Nov. 16 shows a further move to the right among voters, with 32 percent of Israelis favoring the reestablishment of Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip. The settlements were dismantled in 2005 and their 8,000 residents relocated back to Israel after then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon decided their presence was no longer viable.

If the drift to the right is sustained, Netanyahu could try to work it to his advantage by casting himself as a strong leader willing to defy American and international pressure on aspects of the war, postwar arrangements, or the Palestinian issue in general. Netanyahu has already ruled out a role for the Palestinian Authority in postwar Gaza, brushing aside positions outlined by the Biden administration.

Netanyahu “has to hope that people won’t remember” Oct. 7 and his prior policy toward Hamas, Alpher said.

“He needs to have something that can be called the defeat of Hamas. He needs a reasonable outcome for those abducted, and he needs something for Gaza’s future which he can say is good for Israelis,” Alpher said.