Lines Increasingly Blurred Between Soldiers and Settlers in the West Bank

As Israeli military operations continue in the Gaza Strip, a parallel escalation of violence is unfolding in the West Bank. This includes intensified army attacks against Hamas targets and a reported increase in Palestinian fatalities. Alongside these developments, there has been a rise in violence by settlers, apparently aimed at pushing Palestinians from their homes and extending Israeli control in certain areas.

The violence itself is not new, but two things are worth watching. As the attacks spread, there’s growing evidence that soldiers and settlers are working hand in hand. And there are signs that settlers are increasingly worried about a political shift after the war in Gaza—and trying to change the West Bank landscape while they can.

The blurring of lines between the army and the settlers goes back at least two decades. From the 2000s onwards, there has been a bifurcation within the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), leading to the emergence of two distinct armies: the official army and a secondary policing force dedicated to operations in the Israeli-controlled West Bank.

This policing army is comprised of several elements: an infantry brigade permanently stationed in the region; units of the border police; and settler militias, which are part of what are known as territorial defense units, which are armed and trained by the IDF. The forces of the policing army are bolstered by the rotational deployment of regular combat brigades from the official IDF.

This policing army, ostensibly under formal political control, has effectively morphed into a quasi-militia entity. Its own activities in the West Bank suggest that its underlying goal is the consolidation of Israel’s control over the West Bank, particularly Area C, which encompasses both the Israeli settlements and Palestinian-inhabited regions. This strategy serves as an informal means of annexation, circumventing the need for a formal annexation that would likely face international resistance.

The process has been well documented by journalists and human rights groups. Settler militias carry out aggressive operations that are beyond the remit of official military units. “Settler violence against Palestinians serves as a major informal tool at the hands of the state to take over more and more West Bank land,” the Israeli human rights group B’Tselem wrote in a report.

This cooperation takes various forms. In some cases, the military allows settlers considerable leeway in their actions. In other cases, settlers and soldiers conduct joint operations directed at Palestinian communities.

The autonomy of the policing army surged since Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing government took power around a year ago. Now, as domestic and international attention is focused on Gaza, the policing army appears to be trying to expand territorial links between settlements with its land grabs.

The settlers are benefiting, in part, from an increased domestic legitimacy for assaults on Palestinians since the Hamas attacks of Oct. 7. And as the IDF redeploys regular units away from the West Bank to travel instead to Gaza and Israel’s northern front, the influence of the all-settler territorial defense units appears to be rising. Such redeployments may also be contributing to the increasingly blurred lines between the army and settlers. Consequently, there has been a reported escalation in incidents between settlers and Palestinians, during which settlers have been seen wearing military uniforms and carrying army rifles.

While the Oct. 7 attack opened a window for more settler aggression in the West Bank, the hard-liners are likely aware that their political opportunities could narrow in the aftermath of the current conflict in Gaza. This war could well precipitate a significant shift in the balance of power within Israeli politics. Regardless of the ultimate fate of Netanyahu’s government, its capacity to enact the legal reforms sought by settlers and others on the political right has been critically undermined.

These settlers hoped that the reforms would curb the influence of the Supreme Court, which has issued rulings adverse to their interests—including occasional orders to dismantle outposts deemed illegal by Israel’s own judicial system.

More significantly, the settlers are challenging what has long been a paradigm of Netanyahu’s right-wing governments: to keep the official status of the West Bank in limbo as settler growth gradually eliminates the possibility of territorial compromise. The settler goal is not to preserve this status quo but to alter it through a sustained annexation of the West Bank, with a particular focus on Area C. But as the war with Hamas drags on, Israel will come under increasing pressure to enter a new diplomatic process with the Palestinians and agree to a two-state solution. U.S. President Joe Biden already indicated as much in a statement last month. “There’s no going back to the status quo as it stood on Oct. 6,” he said.

It’s now becoming clear that the strategy of empowering Hamas in Gaza, which the Israeli right wing had hoped would hinder reconciliation between the Fatah-controlled West Bank and the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip— thereby weakening the foundation for a Palestinian state—has backfired. Post-conflict scenarios largely envision the Palestinian Authority assuming governance of the Gaza Strip, either alongside Hamas or independently. For Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, accepting responsibility for Gaza would likely be contingent on U.S. assurances for a path toward an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza.

Strengthening the Palestinian Authority cannot align with advancing the gradual annexation of Area C. The decisions made in the region now have implications for the borders of a potential Palestinian state and the status of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. This predicament likely drives the settlers’ urgency to aggressively expand their grip.

As the settlers come to believe they are the real losers of the Israel-Hamas conflict, they will intensify their vigilant acts in the West Bank. The current Israeli government is limited in its capacity—and its drive—to contain them.