Will There Be a Wider War in the Middle East?

As Israel continues its war on Hamas, and as the number of civilian casualties in Gaza rises, neighboring countries are on edge. From Israel’s north, in Lebanon, the militant Islamist group Hezbollah has already launched a small number of rocket attacks, with “all options” on the table, according to a speech by the group’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, on Friday. To the east, there’s Iran, which backs Hezbollah and also Hamas, and has been making ominous public statements against Israel. South of Israel, beyond Saudi Arabia, there’s Yemen: Evidence indicates that Houthi rebels there may have been responsible for an intercepted missile attack headed toward Israel. And meanwhile, to Israel’s southwest, there’s Egypt, which is worried about a potential influx of Palestinian refugees.

Will a broader regional war break out? I spoke with two experts on the Middle East: Steven Cook, a columnist at FP, and Kim Ghattas, a Beirut-based journalist. Subscribers can watch the full interview on the video box atop this page. What follows is a lightly edited transcript.

Ravi Agrawal: Kim, you’re in Beirut. What’s the mood like there, and what would it take for Hezbollah or Lebanon to get involved in this conflict?

Kim Ghattas: Beirut is very tense, as is Lebanon as a whole, because this country has been through many conflicts in the past—not only its civil war, but also wars between Hezbollah and Israel, including the last one in 2006, which was devastating for Lebanon. There’s a hysterical psychosis in the country. We feel like we’re living in a twilight zone. We’re not sure if we are going to have war or not. Many people have left the country. A lot of people have left their villages in southern Lebanon. People have canceled their Christmas holiday plans. Lebanon has a huge diaspora around the world, and typically, many people come back for Christmas.

In the midst of that, there has been a contained but active front between Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and Israel’s northern front for the last three weeks. Hezbollah has already lost 47 combatants. There have been civilian casualties on the Lebanese side. The IDF [Israel Defense Forces] has lost some soldiers as well as civilians. It seems like this is the extent of what the two sides want to stick to at the moment. This is because Hezbollah has many reasons to show that it is supporting Hamas, but many reasons to make sure that this does not become a full-blown war, including because it doesn’t suit Iran.

It certainly doesn’t look like Iran is looking to de-escalate, but they’re not looking to escalate. They’d like to contain this because, first and foremost, on their mind is the survival of the Iranian regime. A full-on regional war is just not something that is going to help them.

I’m surprised at how few protests there have been in the region thus far. Sentiments are inflamed. There is a lot of anger and outrage, a lot of upset at the West’s perceived double standards, but generally the mood is subdued on the street. The mood in Tehran is especially interesting, where the regime itself has a problem with its domestic politics and is likely worried about calling protests in support of Palestine.

RA: Steven, what is your sense of the chances for a broader regional conflict emerging out of this?

Steven Cook: There are a range of constraints on Hezbollah and Iran. One of the more concerning elements is how long Hezbollah can sit on the sidelines as the Israelis push deeper into the Gaza Strip and as the humanitarian catastrophe there unfolds. It may very well be that when Nasrallah gives his speech, they’re not ready yet, and that the low level of skirmishing continues, but something may happen that may make them decide at an ideological level that would make it hard for Hezbollah and the Iranians to stay on the sidelines.

[Editor’s note: This FP Live was conducted before a scheduled Friday speech by Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah.]

It’s not a bad strategy from the Iranian perspective. They have proxies with varying degrees of autonomy. In Washington, many are confident that it won’t spill out into a regional conflict. But I’m not one of those people. I can see a number of ways, either ideologically or a mistake. The Israel-Hezbollah war of 2006 began when Hezbollah kidnapped three Israeli soldiers, and it turned into a summer-long conflict, so there are ways in which they can stumble into it.

The other quite concerning front that gets less attention is the West Bank. As the conflict has been unfolding in the Gaza Strip, Israeli authorities have turned a blind eye to settler violence. Hamas has a significant backing there, and the Palestinian Authority has very little sway on what happens.

RA: Kim, what should we expect from Tehran in the coming days?

KG: For Iran and for Hezbollah, the key is to preserve Hezbollah as a key line of defense for Iran, should Iran come under threat. They will explain away whatever might happen in Gaza for quite a long time. They have a high threshold for how much could go wrong in Gaza before they feel they need to get more involved. They’re almost equal partners. Hezbollah is no longer a proxy. Iran’s priority is the survival of the regime and the survival of Hezbollah as a key line of defense. They view Lebanon as a forward defense base for the Iranian regime, and they don’t want to be in a situation where they waste that card for the Palestinians.

There is anger from Egyptian journalists who are saying, “What did Hamas expect? Instead of all of the tunnels they’ve built, couldn’t they have built shelters for their people if they knew that this is what was going to come out of their horrific attack on Israel?” There are also questions from Hamas members about Hezbollah’s whereabouts. They are saying we’re out there in front fighting, and we thank them for their support, but we expect more.

This is really showing some of the divisions within what is called the axis of resistance. The longer it takes, their ability to explain why they haven’t taken action becomes harder, and the more likely it is that mistakes happen.

RA: Steven, what about Israel? Is it in its interest to escalate and hit Hezbollah?

SC: I think what you’re getting from the Israelis is the idea that there needs to be an entirely new security paradigm for Israel. And right now, the immediate issue is the Gaza Strip. They have said unless they defeat Hamas and make it impossible for Hamas to threaten Israel, it would essentially cut off half of the country—that people would not be able to live in southern Israel. And that is why they are doing what they are doing.

That’s why they will prosecute this war regardless of international pressure until their goals are met, without a lot of deep thinking about what comes next. But when they talk about a new security paradigm, it makes me wonder that once Gaza is complete, what is next? Will they continue to want to live in this kind of wild and wary deterrence with Hezbollah?

If there is a real change in Israel, it is about how to pursue their security and that establishing deterrence with these groups may not work and may portend going on the offensive.

RA: Steven, there’s still the issue of the hostages. Talk to us about Qatar’s role in all of this.

SC: The Qataris are deeply involved in trying to negotiate the release of these 200-plus hostages. The Mossad chief was reportedly in Doha to coordinate negotiations to get these people released. They’re clearly playing an important and constructive role. Prior to this, the Israelis would say we want the Qataris in Gaza, because if it’s not the Qataris, who is it going to be? They don’t trust the Turks.

At the same time, there is a sense that the Qataris are both the arsonist and firefighter here. Hamas has set up shop in Doha with very little restrictions, and there is an understanding that this is useful for the United States as well as the Israelis, to be able to communicate with Hamas. After Oct. 7, there is a desire in Washington to review and understand what the military relationship between Qatar and Hamas is. The Qataris were supposed to administer the funds in Gaza for those who are in need. Yet while they were doing this, Hamas was building out this massive tunnel network and infrastructure that has now been used to devastating effect in this war. It’s a problem Washington and Israel are going to have to confront, and there’s no consensus on how to do that.

It is a much more complicated and difficult problem for the United States, especially since the Qataris have been important allies, whether it was the withdrawal from Afghanistan, whether it’s Al Udeid Air Base, which is the forward operating base for the U.S. Central Command for its activities in the Middle East, including containing the Iranians. The United States is in a position where it cannot and does not want to penalize the Qataris for their relationship with Hamas, but increasingly there are voices here and elsewhere that this is an untenable situation.

RA: Kim, I want to talk about Egypt and Egypt’s president, [Abdel Fattah] al-Sisi. Like with many of his predecessors, he’s quite hostile to Hamas, which is affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood movement. How much leverage does Egypt have in mediating anything in the coming weeks, and what does Cairo want here?

KG: First and foremost, Egypt wants to make sure there are not 2 million Palestinians crossing the border into Egypt, which is an idea that has been floating around and which is quite dangerous for several reasons. Those who put this idea forward, including Western diplomats, don’t realize the extent of the problem they would be creating. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has made very clear that this is simply not an option. One of the reasons is that the Gazans would mostly be in Sinai, and how can you guarantee that you’ve gotten rid of the Hamas militants and elements within them? Abdel Fattah al-Sisi doesn’t necessarily control a lot of these areas in Sinai. He certainly doesn’t want to see this becoming a staging ground for attacks against Israel. He’s also made it very clear to the United States that it would be a declaration of war for him. The Egyptians are really concerned about this prospect.

It’s also a deep concern for the Jordanians as tension mounts on the West Bank and we hear Israeli officials or Israeli settlers making rather vitriolic statements about what their vision is for the West Bank. There is also deep concern in Jordan that there could be a push to expel Palestinians there.

The Saudis have said they are still ready for normalization talks. They’re very worried about the widespread tension, the potential for years of conflict, skirmishes, and more violence. Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, wants to preserve his vision. He has his own self-interest for why he’d like to avoid this becoming a simmering conflict or an active conflict for many years. The Saudi defense minister, Khalid bin Salman, was in Washington this week saying openly that they are still considering normalization talks between Israel and the kingdom, but it will require a much bigger substantial package when it comes to the Palestinians and the potential for a political horizon for them. If the Saudis were willing to throw the Palestinians under the bus before and say here’s a few little cosmetic changes on the ground, that’s not going to cut it anymore after what’s happened. Interestingly enough, the Saudis have also not suspended the rapprochement with Iran—quite the contrary. Keep your friends close, keep your enemies closer. The Saudis are talking to the Iranians. They’ve talked to the Iranian president. The Iranian foreign minister was in Saudi Arabia.

Today it’s all war, tragedy, and death, but it’s important to look for a longer-term horizon that can bring us back from the brink, because it could look really bleak for many years indeed.

RA: Steven, what is your sense of the status of Israel’s relations with countries in the region, such as those it has diplomatic ties with as a result of the Abraham Accords? Will the events of the last few weeks be a setback for that process?

SC: Before I answer that question, I want to underline what Kim mentioned, which is the total irresponsibility of Western diplomats and Western thinkers when they talk about an international solution or an Arab solution for the Gaza Strip. That sets off all kinds of alarm bells in Cairo that they are aligning with Israel to dump Gaza on the laps of the Egyptians. That would put the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in jeopardy because of all of the things Kim pointed out. These are fantasies cooked up in Washington 6,000 miles away, which has no reflection of the realities on the ground and the concerns and sensitivities of the actors.

Regarding the Abraham Accord countries. Israel is worried about relations with the countries in the Abraham Accords. The Emirati statements after Oct. 7 heartened Israelis because they called the attacks appalling. The Emiratis have sharpened their rhetoric on this a bit but have also underlined the fact that they see no reason to break diplomatic relations. The same can be said of the Bahrainis. It’s a bit more difficult with the Moroccans, and that was one of the countries in the Abraham Accords where things had gone quite forward quite quickly. But there’s no indication that any of these Arab countries are interested in a breach of relations.

RA: Kim, you were a diplomatic correspondent in D.C. in the past. You followed the State Department’s moves for many years. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is back in the region this week. How do you assess America’s role so far?

KG: There’s a lot riding on this for President Biden. Foreign policy typically isn’t the priority for people when they go to the polls in the United States, but this certainly seems to be playing out in a big way for many people there: the Jewish community, the Arab American community, and certainly from people in the region who are beyond outraged that there wasn’t an immediate call for a cease-fire.

The Biden administration is navigating this as well as you could, because we were very close to a potential preemptive Israeli strike against Hezbollah in Lebanon within the first few days after Oct. 7. A full-blown ground invasion with carpet bombing of Gaza was also in the cards. I’m not saying that what is happening now is better or less deadly for civilians, but it could have been even worse.

The initial reaction, because of the horror of Oct. 7, was understandable. There is a reflexive statement that always comes out of Washington: “We stand by Israel, full stop.” This is how it works. In the Lebanon-Israel war in 2006, it took a long time before Washington pronounced the word “cease-fire,” I believe almost 34 days. We even had Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice saying these were the birth pangs of democracy in the Middle East. We’re doing a lot better with this administration, and I know it’s hard for people who are suffering to see that. How they move forward and what they can convince the Israelis to do or not will be the most difficult part of this equation.