How Iran Really Sees the Israel-Hamas War

Tehran’s relationship to the conflict is not nearly as straightforward as its rhetoric suggests.

By , a senior nonresident fellow at the Center for International Policy.
In a pro-government demonstration on October 18, 2023, in Tehran, Iran, mock body bags are placed on the podium as Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi addresses the crowds.
In a pro-government demonstration on October 18, 2023, in Tehran, Iran, mock body bags are placed on the podium as Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi addresses the crowds.
In a pro-government demonstration on October 18, 2023, in Tehran, Iran, mock body bags are placed on the podium as Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi addresses the crowds. HOSSEIN BERIS/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images

The Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel, dubbed the “Al-Aqsa Storm,” was a historic turning point in the region, according to Iranian Minister of Intelligence Esmaeil Khatib. “In our view, the conditions in Israel after the Al-Aqsa Storm are historical, and in my opinion, it is the starting point of history itself. … Operation Al-Aqsa Storm eliminated one of the most strategic and fundamental plans of the United States in the region,” he declared on Oct. 30.

The Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel, dubbed the “Al-Aqsa Storm,” was a historic turning point in the region, according to Iranian Minister of Intelligence Esmaeil Khatib. “In our view, the conditions in Israel after the Al-Aqsa Storm are historical, and in my opinion, it is the starting point of history itself. … Operation Al-Aqsa Storm eliminated one of the most strategic and fundamental plans of the United States in the region,” he declared on Oct. 30.

Khatib’s statement reflects the triumphalism and confidence that Iran’s leaders have expressed in the aftermath of the Hamas attack, which they view as a strategic victory for their regional allies and interests. Iran has been a staunch supporter of both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), supplying them with money, weapons, and political support. It has also built a network of allies across the Middle East, from Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen to various armed groups in Iraq and Syria, forming what it calls an “axis of resistance” against Israel and its allies.

However, Iran’s role and influence in the region are not as straightforward as its rhetoric suggests. The conflict in Gaza has revealed the complex and contradictory forces that shape Iran’s behavior and interests in the Middle East, which are driven by both ideology and pragmatism.


Iran’s top leaders have been quick to deny any direct involvement in the war, while expressing their full support and solidarity for the Palestinian cause. In his first speech after the Hamas attack, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said: “We support Palestine and its struggles … but those who claim that the work of Palestinians is the result of non-Palestinians … are making a wrong calculation. This attack is the work of the Palestinians themselves, and we salute and honor the planners of this attack.” Khamenei’s statement reflects Iran’s official stance of distancing itself from any direct responsibility for the war while claiming credit for its indirect role of providing assistance and guidance to Hamas and PIJ.

Iran is playing a game of strategic ambiguity in the Israel-Hamas war, keeping its level of involvement and intervention unclear. Contrary to some expectations, Iran’s top officials have so far only authorized limited attacks by their allies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. These attacks are likely not only meant to show Iran’s strength and deterrence capabilities to Israel and the United States, but also to avoid a direct clash that could harm Iran’s interests and security.

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi has stressed that Iran’s so-called axis of resistance allies “operate independently in decision-making, determination, and action. This approach has been the same in the past and will continue to be so in the future.” He has also slammed the United States for providing Israel with weapons and financial support, and he has told other regional actors not to exercise restraint. He has said that Iran, while not making decisions for the “resistance groups,” will support them. And he has justified this support as “entirely rational, just, and based on humanitarian and Islamic principles.”

However, Iranian officials have also engaged in their own bluster and posturing at the same time. Iranian  Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi has boasted about Iran’s increased deterrence capability in the aftermath of the Hamas attack, saying that “a rational enemy will not enter an area where it knows it cannot succeed, and it will be forced to withdraw its threats. Our defensive structure is commendable with deterrence at its peak.”

Meanwhile, Mohammad Bagheri, the chief of staff of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has praised the Palestinian fighters for their struggle against Israel. He said they have gone from fighting with “stones and fists” to “missiles and anti-tank weapons,” seemingly hinting at Iran’s role in boosting their capabilities. He also said that Iran will continue to support them until they their rights are secured.

Along these same lines, Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior foreign policy advisor to Khamenei, has claimed that the Hamas attack has put Israel in “strategic distress” and called Israel “the most important project of the hegemonic system in the heart of the Islamic world.” He asserted that Israel is facing a strategic deadlock in decision-making and operations, and that its bombing of civilians in Gaza is a sign of weakness, not strength.

Iranian officials have been walking a tightrope between their ideological commitment to the Palestinian cause and their pragmatic calculations of regional interests and risks. Their statements expose the dilemmas and difficulties that Iran confronts in dealing with its friends and foes. But they also reflect their domestic concerns and calculations.


The Israel-Hamas war has triggered different responses from the Iranian public, who have various opinions on the Palestinian issue, the Islamic Republic’s role, and the West’s position. Some Iranians, mainly those who support opposition groups and figures outside Iran, express sympathy for Israel and blame the Islamic Republic and Hamas for the war. Many others have slammed the United States and Europe for what they say are their double standards and hypocrisy, such as turning a blind eye to Israel’s violations of international law and human rights.

The Iranian government has long tried to co-opt the Palestinian struggle as a means of legitimizing its own ideology and policies, both domestically and regionally. However, this strategy has faced increasing challenges in recent years, as many Iranians have grown disillusioned with their government’s interventions abroad and its repression at home.

The nationwide protest movement that erupted after the death of Mahsa Amini in custody last year was a clear sign of the widespread discontent and frustration of many Iranians with their political and economic situation. Many Iranians continue to voice their opposition to their government’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah, chanting, “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon—we sacrifice our lives for Iran.”

But the picture is not so simple among many pro-democracy activists, both inside and outside Iran. Many have quickly denounced the United States and Europe for their double standards. For instance, veteran human rights activist Emadeddin Baghi sharply censured the United States, saying that “their priority is politics and the instrumental use of democracy and human rights … they label any regime in opposition to them as terrorists and anti-democratic.”

Several letters from prominent Iranian civil society figures, activists, political prisoners, and human rights activists have also appeared. One, from a group of dissident religious intellectuals, criticized both the “Iranian government” and “Western governments,” stressing the importance of human rights and rejecting double standards. The signatories stated, “The ever-open and bleeding wound of the Palestinian occupation has hindered the spread of modern and conciliatory Islamic discourse.”

Another letter, which included activist Taghi Rahmani, the husband of imprisoned Nobel laureate Narges Mohammadi, condemned calls for war against Iran, warning it would destroy the country and weaken the legitimate struggle of the Iranian people for democracy and peace. A third letter from well-known Iranian writers, poets, and journalists condemned the Islamic Republic, Hamas, and Israel, advocating for a third approach grounded in “humanitarianism, equality, justice, and peace.”

Iran’s media outlets and publications have also expressed diverse views, though most are vehemently anti-Israel. For example, conservative analyst Hossein Rajaei, writing for Alef, argued that the issue of Israel has become the “Achilles’ heel of Western civilization, exposing the falsehood of their liberal claims.” He criticized Western governments for turning a blind eye toward Israel’s actions and supporting dictatorships in the Middle East, “knowing that no democracy in this region will tolerate Israel.”

On the other hand, the reformist newspaper Ham Mihan argued that the Hamas attack shattered the “stability illusion” in the Middle East that the United States relies on.

These diverse reactions illustrate the multifaceted nature of Iranian society’s response to the Hamas-Israel war—a response that ranges from government propaganda to genuine concern for human rights and peace.


The Middle East has witnessed a series of diplomatic breakthroughs in recent times, such as the Abraham Accords, last month’s Iran-U.S. prisoner swap, and the Saudi-Iran détente. These developments raised hopes for a more peaceful and stable region. However, the Hamas-Israel war has endangered these achievements. The brutal violence has already killed and injured tens of thousands of people and caused immense suffering and destruction.

What is clear is that Iran has already scored a victory. The conflagration in Gaza has halted—even if only temporarily—talks on normalizing relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which would have further isolated Iran in the region. Former IRGC intelligence chief Hossein Taeb said recently in this regard: “Islamic countries have separated their path from Israel. We do not want to say completely, but the old trend of understanding is no longer taking shape. … It [Israel] wanted to be a savior [for Arab states], but its own situation is like this.”

But is there a feasible political solution at this stage that could stop the fighting? Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian has suggested in his talks with Qatar and Hamas that there is one, saying it would involve a prisoner exchange between Hamas and Israel, an immediate halt of attacks, and the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza. But he puts the ball in the U.S. court, saying: “It is the American side that must decide whether it wants to escalate the war.”

The situation is precarious and volatile, as any mistake or provocation could spark a wider war that could involve Iran, the United States, and their allies and proxies. It is also not clear whether Iran can control its regional allies, who have their own red lines and interests. A full-scale Israeli ground invasion of Gaza could trigger a regional response, as warned by Iran and other armed groups, such as Hezbollah.

The international community cannot afford to ignore or neglect the question of the future of the Palestinian people, which is at the heart of the Middle East conflict. The war has shown that peace and stability cannot be achieved without addressing the rights and aspirations of the Palestinians.

Dialogue and diplomacy are the only viable ways to resolve the conflict and to prevent further escalation and suffering. The international community must act swiftly and decisively to end the violence and to revive the prospects for a just and comprehensive solution that respects the dignity and sovereignty of all peoples in the region.

Sina Toossi is a senior nonresident fellow at the Center for International Policy. Twitter: @SinaToossi

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