Negotiating With Russia Is Still a Bad Idea

Since the very outset of Russia’s war against Ukraine, there have been calls for the United States to negotiate with Russia. As the war has dragged on, the rationale for negotiations has morphed with each phase: Ukraine can’t possibly win, so the West needs to negotiate; Ukraine has guaranteed its survival but can’t hope for much more, so it’s time to talk; Ukraine is winning too fast, so let’s give Russian President Vladimir Putin an off-ramp in case he wants to blow up the world; the war is becoming too expensive, so send in the diplomats.

The latest version of the argument that Washington should negotiate an end to the war—or, more precisely, pressure Ukraine to capitulate—goes something like this: Americans, particularly those leaning toward the Republican Party, are growing wary of sending aid to Ukraine. On Capitol Hill, Republicans prevented Ukraine aid from being included in the continuing resolution passed on Sept. 30 that kept the U.S. government open. On the battlefield, the Ukrainian counteroffensive is proving to be a tougher and slower slog than many had hoped, and even Kyiv’s supporters now acknowledge that any victory will be at least one year away.

In the meantime, casualties have, by some counts, surpassed half a million killed and injured soldiers. Given these darkening clouds on both the political and military fronts, why not try to cut some sort of deal, potentially saving tens of thousands of lives and many billions of dollars?

Once you scratch below the surface, however, the case for negotiating with Russia quickly falls apart. Let’s start with the supposed shift in U.S. public opinion. Yes, some polls show declining support for Ukraine. The real question, though, concerns the reasons why some Americans appear to have changed their mind. Some may indeed be concerned about the cost, but analyses also suggest that the decline, particularly among Republicans, reflects general misgivings about U.S. President Joe Biden and his policies as an election season gets under way, rather than Ukraine’s cause on its own merits.

A Reagan Institute survey from June, for example, confirms this hypothesis. When pollsters told skeptical respondents that the United States “has spent roughly $24 billion on military aid to Ukraine, which is roughly 3% of the US military’s own budget” and that “Ukraine remains in control of roughly 83% of its territory and US intelligence believes the war has severely degraded Russia’s military power and its ability to threaten NATO allies,” this information raised support for Ukraine by 18 percent among self-identified Republicans and 12 percent among Democrats. Dwindling support for Ukraine may be more about bad messaging and lack of information than actual policy.

Support for Ukraine on Capitol Hill tells a similarly nuanced story. True, a group of Republicans in the House of Representatives managed to keep additional Ukraine aid out of the bill that kept government open. The Senate, however, is more mixed. Indeed, even at the height of the recent budget battle, a bipartisan group of Senate leaders—including Minority Leader Mitch McConnell—issued a joint statement supporting Ukraine and endorsing continuing support. Moreover, earlier that same week, the House approved $300 million in Ukraine aid while also voting down two other attempts to restrict sending aid to Ukraine by wide margins, including about half of the Republican members.

So even if there are divisions among legislators, it is not at all clear whether Congress would support negotiating with Russia. Indeed, while there are elements in the House that have pushed to stop Ukraine aid, multiple Republican senators have hammered the Biden administration from the other direction, arguing that it should be more aggressive and forthcoming about sending weapons to Ukraine.

Indeed, if one looks at the field of Republican presidential contenders, about as many criticize the Biden administration for not aiding Ukraine more aggressively as are in favor of negotiations. From a purely political perspective, there is no consensus policy that would unite the different factions on Capitol Hill.

The military rationale for negotiations is no more compelling. True, the Ukrainian counteroffensive has yet to yield the same dramatic breakthroughs that the battles of Kyiv, Kharkiv, or Kherson produced for Ukraine last year. Historians will debate whether the West’s decision to slow-roll weapon systems in the hopes of forestalling escalation was worth the corresponding time it gave the Russian army to entrench its positions. These setbacks notwithstanding, the counteroffensive—in the assessment of former U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley, as well as outside analyses—is making progress, albeit slowly.

Moreover, there are signs that Russia is fraying on the domestic front. After the Russian ruble temporarily stabilized following its post-invasion collapse, the currency has continued its long slide. The oil-rich country is now facing a fuel shortage and rationing supplies. Russia is now spending, by its own figures, roughly a third of its national budget on defense. Polling—notoriously difficult to do accurately in authoritarian countries, where information is tightly controlled and opposition punished—indicates that the Russian public is feeling the strain. And more members of the Russian elite are either ending up dead or seriously ill by mysterious circumstances. No one knows when the proverbial dam will break, but the pressure certainly seems to be mounting.

Finally, let’s turn to the supposed moral impetus for negotiations. There is no question that the human toll of the war is horrific, and every loss of life is tragedy. But Washington must remember that it’s the Ukrainians who are fighting and dying. Most Ukrainians have friends or relatives who have been injured and killed in the war, and they are not giving in. Some 84 percent of Ukrainians—an overwhelming majority by any standard—favor fighting on . The figure has barely budged since a year ago.

The notion that the West must somehow save Ukrainians from themselves by pushing for negotiations is as misguided as it is arrogant and self-righteous. And it makes false assumptions about Russia, ignoring its explicit and oft-repeated war aims. Russian officials and other public figures regularly call for the repeated annihilation of Ukraine as a sovereign country, and according to a United Nations Human Rights Council investigation, “the rhetoric transmitted in Russian state and other media may constitute incitement to genocide.” Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev similarly promised that the war will “continue until the complete destruction” of the Ukrainian government and that “there will be more new regions within Russia.” Russian military recruitment videos try to lure recruits with the promises of real estate in Kyiv and Odesa once a victorious Russia conquers the country.

There is also no indication that Russia’s appetites will be sated with control over Ukraine. Col.-Gen. Andrey Mordvichev, the commander of Russia’s Central Military District and the Russian Central Grouping of Forces in Ukraine, recently argued that the Ukraine war “will not stop here.” Whether Russia has the capability to press the offensive forward is a different question, but defeating Russia in Ukraine is best guarantee that Russia will never be able to realize its ambitions.

Ultimately, the case against negotiating with Russia has not changed for the past year and a half: There still is no bargaining space for a potential deal. Ukraine wants its country back, just as it wants accountability for Russian war crimes and reparations for the damage inflicted. Russia is still not budging on any of these issues. To the contrary, Putin celebrated the one year anniversary of the annexation of Ukraine’s four eastern provinces by lauding them for having “made their choice—to be with their Fatherland.” Accountability for Russian war crimes seems similarly unlikely, considering that Putin personally faces an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court for war crimes. Gloomy predictions for the Russian economy make reparations similarly implausible, even if there were political will.

Publicly pushing Ukraine to make a peace deal will not only fail, but also demonstrate the fragility of U.S. resolve. That would be a dangerous message to send, particularly in a world filled with aggressive, revisionist, authoritarian regimes. There are good reasons why other democracies in the crosshairs of larger neighbors—from Taiwan to the Baltic states—view the successful defense of Ukraine as vital for their own security.

The United States cannot unilaterally end a war that it is only indirectly involved in just because it seems politically convenient to do so. That may be a bitter pill for some to swallow, but pressuring Ukraine to capitulate would be far worse.