What the Wagner Mutiny Means for China in Africa

As the Wagner revolt against the Kremlin unfolded last month, China seemed to pay little attention to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s faltering attempts to restrain the mercenaries, which laid bare the fractures in Moscow. Though Beijing eventually put out a public statement of support for the Russian president, it is biding its time—observing how firm Putin’s grip on power is. Indeed, the possibility of Moscow failing to rein in Russian mercenaries in areas where Chinese economic interests are present could create a fault line in the Chinese-Russian “no-limit friendship.”

The immediate peril lies in the potential ramifications of Wagner Group splinter factions, or a Wagner franchise under new management, which would compromise the security of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—and the safety of its overseas workers—in Africa and in other regions. To enhance the security measures for Chinese companies investing abroad, Beijing is ramping up regional threat assessments and offering security training to workers before deploying them overseas. However, despite Beijing’s efforts to strengthen security, the risks faced by Chinese workers and BRI investments are escalating at a faster pace.

China’s foreign direct investment in Africa, has been increasing steadily since 2003—surging from $75 million in 2003 to $5 billion in 2021. While Beijing is looking at security guarantees from Moscow, Chinese private security companies (PSCs) operating in Africa are bracing for impact. While the leading Chinese PSCs such as Haiwei, Huaxin Zhongan, Kunlun Lion Security, and FSG are operating in safer areas from Egypt to Kenya and Uganda, a multitude of small Chinese PSCs are expanding their footprint in much more complex environments without the proper capabilities to counter terrorist and criminal violence.

Regardless of the upcoming revision to the 2018 set of security regulations, when it comes to increasing China’s private security footprint abroad, the Chinese Communist Party will employ every means necessary to uphold Mao Zedong’s dictum of retaining absolute control over the gun. Beijing is facing a conundrum in reconciling that Maoist doctrine with contemporary reality: How to protect Chinese citizens abroad without outsourcing the security function to Wagner-like groups or evolving its own PSCs into to a Blackwater-style force? While Beijing is determined to get more involved in regional security and politics, most notably through President Xi Jinping’s Global Security Initiative, it is unclear when and how the initiative will gain traction.

In the case of Mali, the French Army ended the nearly nine-year counterterrorism Operation Barkhane, after a major falling-out with Malian authorities, prompting the Wagner Group to step in at Bamako’s request. In Beijing, the killing of three executives from the state-owned China Railway Construction Corp. in Bamako’s Radisson Blu Hotel in 2015 is still a vivid memory, and the recent slaughter in cold blood of nine Chinese miners in the Central African Republic is keeping Chinese consular officials nervous.

While the investigation in the latter case is still open, and the early suspicion fell on a rebel coalition, some accusations are also pointing at Wagner mercenaries operating in the area. Beijing may soon need to raise its own security presence and negotiate with Russian mercenaries—as highlighted by the recent news of the Wagner Group claiming to have successfully prevented an attack on Chinese miners near Bangui.

From Beijing’s standpoint, the outlook appears bleak as the frequency of violence against Chinese citizens in Africa continues to surge.

Since Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s exile to Belarus, the options for Wagner’s survival outside Ukraine could be summarized in three scenarios: Prigozhin retiring to Africa, a Wagner franchise continuing under new management, or the dissolution of the group into splinter cells. All three options spell disaster for Beijing. That’s because while mercenaries thrive on manageable chaos, the Belt and Road Initiative needs stability to prosper. No matter what, China stands to lose in each scenario.

Long before the fateful 36 hours of the armed mutiny, Prigozhin had mentioned in his Telegram channel his intentions to retire to Africa once his work in Ukraine was completed. Even if Prigozhin has already returned to Russia from his short-lived exile, this option remains viable, as Wagner’s fighters are dispatched to safeguard the survival of various local regimes, with Mali and the Central African Republic serving as prominent examples. Nevertheless, the seizing of Prigozhin’s disinformation and propaganda media empire by the Russian authorities in St. Petersburg and the mounting uncertainty regarding his financial assets raise crucial questions about mercenaries: How long are they on your side when money is not flowing?

As early as 2017, the Wagner Group provided security and logistical support to protect the Sudanese former President Omar al-Bashir in exchange for diamond mining concessions. The continued presence of Wagner in Darfur, arming the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces, is still paid by mining concessions.

In the Central African Republic, Russian military advisors and Wagner mercenaries protect the status quo, benefiting from access to large diamond and gold deposits. In 2019, the same business model was replicated in Mozambique, providing anti-insurgency forces in exchange for energy resource exploitation. On the same path, the Malian government contracted with the Wagner Group in 2021 to fight extremism in the Sahel.

Nevertheless, from Beijing’s standpoint, the outlook appears bleak as the frequency of violence against Chinese citizens in Africa continues to surge. Over the past few years, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, the number of casualties among Chinese nationals has reached a distressing count of 13 lives lost, accompanied by an equal number of abductions for ransom.

The possibility of Wagner forces remaining in Africa under new management is quite likely. While in Ukraine, fresh recruits with limited combat experience are thrown into the war’s meat grinder, in Africa, the composition of Wagner’s mercenaries contrasts starkly. A majority of them are seasoned veterans, boasting experience in Russia’s special forces.

In a similar vein, Putin cannot afford to alienate the Wagner fighters in Syria, as doing so would result in not only losing valuable resources but also relinquishing influence to Iran. In this respect, from Mali to the Central African Republic, the combat friction is limited, and the Wagner Group benefits from a lucrative combination: political instability, abundant natural resources, and low-intensity armed opposition. Consequently, the connections forged between Russian veterans operating in Africa and their former comrades from agencies such as the GRU or FSB enable Moscow to retain its puppet master role, ensuring an unbroken line of communication with local Wagner commanders.

It’s not by chance that Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov mentioned that the rebellion will not result in the Wagner Group pulling out of African countries where they are doing a good job. In this respect, Moscow still considers Africa to be a region where it can project power and profit from abundant natural resources; therefore, it will be unlikely that it will release the grip on lucrative deals and strategic geopolitical access points.

Once again, the situation presents a double-edged sword for Beijing. The Wagner Group stands as just one contender vying for security services. Africa has become a breeding ground for paramilitary outfits, mercenaries, and private military corporations, all boasting their heavily armed forces. Making the right choice amid this escalating competition is nothing short of a pressing imperative. The consequences of opting for unaccountable and untrained armed guards are dire, as they could pave the way for chaos, endangering the very fabric of local society and jeopardizing the BRI’s ambitious promise of a win-win for everyone.

The phenomenon of Wagner splintering into localized groups of heavily armed mercenaries, seeking monetary gain through chaos, is not unprecedented in Africa. The continent still bears the memory of highly trained mercenaries who wreaked havoc during the post-colonial wars, such as Executive Outcomes, which effectively shaped the destinies of Angola and Sierra Leone through the force of arms. In this regard, the situation will become even more intricate, as Beijing will need to negotiate separate agreements with local Wagner factions.

While Beijing counts more than 8,000 PSCs in mainland and several hundred registered companies abroad, the Chinese Communist Party controls the trigger. While there are several leading Chinese PSCs operating in Africa, there is, by design, no single, dominant force.

The Chinese private security sector is evolving, but Beijing is limiting the PSCs’ access to weapons, forcing them to rely on armed guards from local or international outfits. Over the past decade, several Chinese military experts have called for the professionalization and restructuring of the sector to mimic the Western private military model or even the Russian one.

Beijing retains a strong cultural aversion to mercenaries who are not subservient to the party—for fear that they could pose a threat to the state’s monopoly on violence.

Nevertheless, today, the private companies imbued with distinct “Chinese characteristics” find validation in having refused to embrace a Blackwater-esque approach or even a Wagner model. China’s reluctance to have skin in the game militarily lives on. Nevertheless, Beijing is still grappling with finding an effective solution to safeguard its overseas workers.

In the mid-2010s, the Chinese private security sector flirted with the model of the U.S. private military company Blackwater, with Blackwater founder Erik Prince setting up the Frontier Service Group (FSG), a joint venture in Hong Kong with the Chinese state conglomerate CITIC. As tensions escalated between China and the United States, the prominence of the Blackwater model in FSG and the overall Chinese private security sector began to wane.

In the meantime, various Russian private military companies were actively exploring opportunities to offer armed services for safeguarding the Belt and Road Initiative and defending Chinese vessels against pirates. However, Prigozhin’s recent actions in Moscow may have effectively brought an end to any potential future collaborations in this regard.

Chinese security companies with increased capabilities could fill the gap, but Beijing retains a strong cultural aversion to mercenaries who are not subservient to the party—for fear that they could pose a threat to the state’s monopoly on violence—and still seems reluctant to empower any Wagner-like force.

While the progressive deterioration of the U.S.-China relations is pushing Beijing and Moscow toward further strategic alignment, the difficulties in keeping mercenaries on a tight leash could spark unintended consequences in the region—from regional acts of violence to military coups. The importance of Wagner’s role is swiftly increasing among the issues discussed between Xi and Putin.