The Putin-Prigozhin Fight Now Has a Syrian Battlefield

As Yevgeny Prigozhin marched on Moscow, the Kremlin was also concerned about stopping the mutiny from spreading across the vast foreign empire that his private military organization, the Wagner Group, had built. These efforts were focused on Syria, Russia’s foothold in the Mediterranean region and the original launchpad for Wagner. The group started its operations in Syria in 2015 and remains there to this day, allegedly to protect Syrian oil fields and phosphate mines for the Syrian regime. 

The Kremlin’s goal has apparently been to consolidate Wagner’s economic activities under new and pliable leadership and to convey the message abroad that Russian President Vladimir Putin is still in power, still in control, and can be relied on as a security provider. As the mutiny unfolded, at least four high-ranking Wagner mercenaries were rounded up by Russian military police and Syrian intelligence services at the Russian-operated Hmeimim air base in western Syria. Security at key Russian bases remains heightened in anticipation of trouble or an extended mutiny. 

Waiel Olwan, a researcher at the Istanbul-based Jusoor for Studies Center, told Foreign Policy that on June 23 at 10 p.m. local time, hours after the mutiny had begun, four Russian Wagner operatives were detained and brought to Hmeimim. (He said he knew their names but did not want to reveal them.) “The next day, the militia’s members in Deir Ezzor, Damascus, and Suwayda were also detained,” Olwan added. 

Rayan Maarouf, the editor of the local news network Suwayda 24, said that he suspected anyone from Suwayda was still detained, but according to the testimony of a Wagner fighter, some of the members had indeed been summoned but they were soon let go. Maarouf said something else struck him as odd. In the last week of every month, Wagner announces the payday for its recruits on Telegram—but this month it didn’t. He wondered if that was an aftermath of the mutiny. 

A senior official with the Syrian Democratic Council, an Arab-majority militia of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, spoke to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity and said Russian forces beefed up security at their bases in Deir Ezzor, the most oil-rich region of the country. “Wagner and Russian forces are indistinguishable here,” he said, “but we noticed that their base was put on high alert.”

On June 26, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin arrived in Damascus on an unscheduled visit. He reportedly asked the Syrian government not to let Wagner fighters leave the country. A statement from Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s office indicated that Wagner’s presence in the country was discussed in “light of recent events.” (In 2017, Evro Polis, a Russian shell company believed to be owned by Wagner and which is sanctioned by the United States and European Union, cut a five-year deal to receive 25 percent of the profits from several oil fields, but locals say Wagner has mixed in with the Russian forces and continued to guard oil facilities.) 

Vershinin, however, seemed equally focused on assuring the Syrian government that Putin was still in charge and useful for Assad’s plans to capture Idlib—the last rebel-held enclave bordering Turkey. As if to prove the point, Russian jets pounded a city in Idlib province, killing at least nine people, on June 25, a day after Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko mediated a deal between the Russian president and Prigozhin, bringing an end to the Russian crisis in the nick of time—Wagner troops were in 120 miles of Moscow. 

According to multiple sources on the ground in Syria, however, there were no obvious signs of an uprising in or near Russian bases, reflecting that either Prigozhin hadn’t thought through how he would deal with the international ramifications of his audacious move or it was all planned to a T. Either way, Russian experts who follow Russia’s policy in the Middle East believe that Wagner’s operations will continue, perhaps under a different name and different leadership.

Denis Mirgorod, an expert with the Russian International Affairs Council, said that while it was too soon to draw clear conclusions about Wagner’s future, it was ��obvious that such a structure, which has accumulated a wealth of experience in providing security services in various countries and regions of the world, cannot be abolished and removed from hot spots, including Syria, Libya, Sudan, [the Central African Republic], and Mali,” he told Foreign Policy. 

“The short-term military-political crisis in Russia should not affect the activities of the Wagner Group, which can continue to exist under a different guise.” 

Mirgorod said there was huge support among the Russian people for Wagner, who felt it was working for the security of the country, and suggested they wanted the government to find a solution that allowed Wagner to continue fighting in Ukraine, instead of dismantling it. 

“The Russian society hopes that the problem with the contracts of the Wagner Group employees will be resolved and that a mechanism for interaction between the regular Russian army and this PMC [private military company] will be developed,” he said. But it depends on Wagner’s fighters, he added. “Putin gave them security guarantees. They can easily make decisions.” 

The Russian president has sent Prigozhin into exile but given his fighters the option to either go back home to their families or sign up with the regular defense forces. “Today, you have the opportunity to continue serving Russia,” Putin said on June 26. “If you want, you can go to Belarus.”

Anas El Gomati, the founder and current director-general of the Tripoli-based Sadeq Institute, said Wagner can survive without Prigozhin. “Wagner is not structured like a pyramid with a reliance from the bottom on the leadership at the top. Wagner is a flat, autonomous network of state and nonstate actors who jointly operate in Libya. It can survive without Prigozhin,” Gomati said. 

Wagner was deployed in Libya to further Russia’s foreign-policy agenda but with an eye on conflict-ridden and democratically weak but resource-rich African countries. In 2020, the group supported warlord Khalifa Haftar in his military offensive to capture Tripoli from the internationally recognized Government of National Accord. Even though that campaign failed, Wagner continued to operate several air bases in the country not only to buttress Khalifa’s defenses but also as a springboard to operate elsewhere in Africa, such as in neighboring Sudan. 

Wagner suppressed pro-democracy protests and spread disinformation in Sudan, just as it had in the United States through its troll farm in the 2016 presidential election, and backed a military faction that allowed it to mine gold through a shell company. “They smuggle gold out of Sudan through Libya into the UAE to the tune of billions of dollars,” Gomati added. 

The UAE backed Haftar in the Libyan conflict and has emerged as one of Russia’s closest allies in the Middle East. According to the U.S. Defense Department, Wagner’s support for Haftar was paid for by the UAE. 

On June 27, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Industrial Resources General Trading, a Dubai-based company that provided financial support to Prigozhin in cash through its business dealings with Diamville—one of Prigozhin’s shell companies that purchased gold and diamonds from the Central African Republic. Treasury said Diamville “shipped diamonds mined in the CAR to buyers in the UAE.” 

“Putin could choke Prigozhin out of Wagner by requesting a freeze on his bank accounts and closing shell companies in the UAE and rerouting payments through alternative structures,” Gomati said. 

Wagner wove a web of contacts in the Middle East and North Africa and propped up shell companies to loot the resources not just for itself but also for the sanctions-hit Russian regime. It worked as a transnational criminal syndicate but also a state proxy. Experts believe the Kremlin is keen to consolidate its undertakings under a different leadership. 

“Theoretically, if Wagner’s current senior leadership does not show loyalty and is not ready for long-term work, then they will be replaced by others,” Mirgorod said.