Turn Ukraine Into a Bristling Porcupine

The Spanish American philosopher George Santanaya once remarked that “only the dead have seen the end of war.” In truth, however, all high-intensity wars eventually end, and Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine will end at some point, too. When this happens—whether as a result of victory or mutual exhaustion, whether the guns remain silent or some degree of fighting continues along a static front line—the West needs a game plan to deter future Russian aggression. It must make sure that this will not be a repeat of 2014, when Russia paused its invasion in Crimea and the Donbas while it prepared for a full-on war. This time, there must not be a follow-on war a few years down the road.

There seem to be four stable choices for Ukraine that won’t just pause the war. First, Ukraine could become a full NATO member protected by the alliance’s guarantee—enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty—to come to Ukraine’s defense if Russia attacks again in the future. Second, Ukraine could receive some kind of new NATO status, which de facto integrates its armed forces with NATO militaries without the collective defense clause under Article 5. Third, Ukraine could sign bilateral security guarantees with select countries that pledge to come to Kyiv’s aid in the event of war. And fourth, the West could turn Ukraine into a bristling porcupine, armed to the hilt with massive Western training and other support, so that it would be all but impossible for Russia to swallow.

It goes without saying that these options are not mutually exclusive. Helping rearm and train Ukraine will probably be part of any scenario. In the short term, however, only a clear, committed porcupine strategy is likely to be both politically feasible and truly capable of deterring Russia.

First, there is still no consensus among NATO member states on whether Ukraine should join the alliance; a premature push by some members will likely trigger vetoes by others. Second, a new NATO status of de facto integration into the alliance short of an Article 5 guarantee could be the worst of both worlds for Kyiv: It could trigger further Russian escalation while leaving Ukraine uncertain about the precise military support it would receive in case of war. Third, security guarantees by Western powers without a concrete military commitment would be a no-go for Ukraine for similar reasons. It has already been burned by the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Britain, France, Russia, and the United States pledged to guarantee Ukraine’s security and borders in return for Kyiv giving up nuclear weapons it had inherited from the Soviet Union. Who would believe the United States this time, let alone France or Germany, that they would intervene?

Consequently, the only practical policy to deter Russia once a cease-fire is in place is to help turn Ukraine into a formidable military porcupine with hardened, lethal quills. This should be accomplished by a core group of countries coordinated under a military assistance command under the auspices of the United States. For Ukraine, the porcupine strategy means keeping its economy on a war footing to produce arms, raise weapons technology to a NATO standard, and otherwise sustain a formidable military over the long term.

Only a clear, committed porcupine strategy is likely to be both politically feasible and truly capable of deterring Russia.

Last week, we got the first serious hint that the West may be moving toward a porcupine strategy for post-war Ukraine. Along with a massive, $3 billion package of immediate military aid, Germany announced a long-term program to supply more than $8.5 billion more over the next nine years. Meanwhile, German defense contractor Rheinmetall became the latest company to reach a long-term agreement with Ukraine. It will construct a major facility in Ukraine to build and service tanks and other military vehicles. It is already an important deterrence signal to Moscow that Berlin is supporting Ukraine militarily in the long term. Britain and France also announced deliveries or pledges of long-range attack drones, Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missiles, light tanks, armored vehicles, and air defense systems. Although these are for the current war, the fact that Ukraine is increasingly shifting to more advanced Western systems will help it transition to a Western-style military after the war.

An ideal porcupine strategy is built around the assumption that the defender’s sharp quills can inflict enough pain on the attacker to convince him that he will not attain his goals on the battlefield. That does not necessarily require the defender to be stronger than the attacker. Rather, it means helping Ukraine rearm and train in an agile, lighter way to make sure it can fight a flexible defensive military campaign against any future invading Russian force. It needs to be clear to the Russians that any attack would meet continuous ambushes, counterattacks, and hits by long-range artillery and missiles. Then, when the attacking Russians are already severely depleted, the bulk of Ukraine’s well-armed, well-trained force would push back or destroy the invaders. It is a porcupine strategy with a hammer blow at the end.

As the ongoing war demonstrates, a porcupine defense strategy for Ukraine needs to acknowledge that any future war is likely to be similarly dominated by large-scale land battles, mutual attrition, and the need for lots of firepower and protection from it. This needs to be reflected in a long-term rearmament plan for Ukraine. Therefore, in addition to man-portable anti-aircraft and anti-armor systems; loitering munitions; and cheap, expendable drones and other attritable platforms, Ukraine would need adequate numbers of main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored self-propelled howitzers.

To deter Russia from attacking again, some of the long-term priorities are the same ones Ukraine has now. First and foremost is firepower. Ukraine needs multiple launch rocket systems, howitzers, loitering munitions, as well as adequate stockpiles of guided and unguided munitions. Another priority—both now and long-term—is air defense systems of all types and ranges. Any Ukrainian defense strategy needs to be built around denying Ukrainian airspace to Russian bomber formations and other aircraft, as well as reducing the impact of missile and drone attacks.

In the medium- to long-term, a comprehensive air defense strategy will also require at least two squadrons of Western-made fighter aircraft capable of being armed with beyond-visual range air-to-air missiles, JDAM-bombs, and long-range, air-launched cruise missiles. These will help cover gaps in ground-based air defenses and provide ground formations with close air support. Last week’s decision by the United States and several European countries to supply F-16 fighter aircraft to Ukraine and train Ukrainian pilots is therefore not only good news for Kyiv in the current war, but a welcome step in a long-term air defense strategy. After firepower, ground-based air defense, and fighter jets, other priorities for long-term deterrence include main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and man-portable anti-tank guided missile systems.

The real secret sauce of Ukraine porcupine strategy in the medium term, however, won’t be specific hardware—it will be the ability to conduct combined arms operations at scale. Battle networks and management systems that link weapon systems with sensors such as a satellites, reconnaissance drones could provide Ukraine with an important asymmetrical advantage over Russia. More effective information-sharing would give Ukrainian military commanders superior situational awareness of the battlefield, which in turn would accelerate the pace of decisions and action. It is an old military adage: Whoever aims better and shoots faster will live longer. Battle networks enabling faster information-sharing could give Ukraine an asymmetric advantage by identifying targets faster on the battlefield, hitting them more precisely and quickly than the Russians, and using less ammunition in the process.

For the Ukrainians to gain these abilities over the Russians, it would require investments in new battle management systems, including machine-learning algorithms that could help quickly identify Russian targets and recommend a unit or weapon to engage them. It would also require sustained investments in new sensors, such as uncrewed aerial vehicles used for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance missions, as well as new satellite constellations. The Ukrainian armed forces would also need evaluate whether their almost complete dependency on commercial StarLink satellites for network connectivity makes sense; a more resilient alternative system is likely required in the medium to long term.

Some of these developments are already happening in Ukraine now—but only in a rudimentary and piecemeal fashion. Despite media reports of a concerted Western effort to support Ukraine with targeting and engagement, any such help with battle management has been limited. In addition to further investments in cyber defenses and electronic warfare capabilities, closing what military planners call the “kill chain”—the links from the detection of a target to the individual soldiers or weapons platforms on the battlefield—would mean a more concerted Western-supported effort to help Ukraine adopt novel operating and doctrinal concepts that exploit technology to improve speed and accuracy.

Finally, all military training needs to be geared toward one goal: to make the Ukrainian armed forces proficient at conducting combined arms operations at scale. A rigorous regime of training and military exercises inside and outside Ukraine, supported by partners, will be crucial in exploiting Ukraine’s asymmetrical advantage.

All of this would be beneficial to Western partners as well. Future warfighting concepts and doctrines, such as multi-domain operations, rest on the premise of information superiority and accelerated, technology-driven kill chains. Western militaries could therefore see their support for Ukraine as part of their own experimentation and learning phase to prepare for 21st-century warfare. Organizing broad, long-term support for Ukraine could also serve as a blueprint for future public-private partnerships between technology firms, defense contractors, and the military across the NATO alliance. If both Ukraine and Western militaries benefit in multiple ways, it would help justify some of the significant cost of supporting Ukraine. Fusing Western ideas for the future of warfare with practical input from what is now the world’s most experienced fighting force in high-intensity conventional warfare could prove tremendously helpful many ways. For example, it could help Western planners draft new operational concepts and doctrines. It could also help trigger necessary changes in force structure following a rigid and systematic joint review of lessons learned from the war in Ukraine.

Of course, the precise shape and form of future military assistance will depend on how the war in Ukraine ends. One thing is already sure: Whether Putin stays or not, Russia will rearm. Moscow will likely make the reconstitution of its military power a national priority, if history is any guide. Europe and the United States consequently need to take the necessary steps today in order to prepare for rapid and substantial military support for Ukraine once the hot phase of the war is over. Importantly, this includes expanding the production capacity of the European and U.S. defense industries, including by negotiating guaranteed multiyear contracts as soon as possible.

Other urgent requirements include the expansion of training facilities to accommodate large Ukrainian formations; more complex and frequent military exercises focused on high-intensity warfare; and a systematic effort to distill the war’s lessons, absorb them institutionally, and apply them during military training. It would also mean swifter adaptation of emerging technological capabilities, such as machine learning-supported battle-management systems, that would enable Ukraine to establish information and fire superiority over Russian forces. Finally, it would entail a broader effort to work with select contractors to help maintain a military-technological edge over Russia. This edge will be key in Ukraine’s and the West’s ability to maintain a tactical advantage on the future battlefield. The strongest deterrent against a future war in Eastern Europe will lie not only in Ukraine’s capacity to be a bristling porcupine, but also in all of Europe’s ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.