RPKI Signed Object for Trust Anchor Key
draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal-16

Network Working Group                                        C. Martinez
Internet-Draft                                                    LACNIC
Intended status: Standards Track                           G. Michaelson
Expires: 17 November 2024                                    T. Harrison
                                                                   APNIC
                                                          T. Bruijnzeels
                                                                RIPE NCC
                                                              R. Austein
                                                    Dragon Research Labs
                                                             16 May 2024

                RPKI Signed Object for Trust Anchor Key
                    draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal-16

Abstract

   A Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) is used by Relying Parties (RPs) in the
   Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to locate and validate a
   Trust Anchor (TA) Certification Authority (CA) certificate used in
   RPKI validation.  This document defines an RPKI signed object for a
   Trust Anchor Key (TAK), that can be used by a TA to signal the
   location(s) of the accompanying CA certificate for the current public
   key to RPs, as well as the successor public key and the location(s)
   of its CA certificate.  This object helps to support planned key
   rollovers without impacting RPKI validation.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 17 November 2024.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  TAK Object Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  The TAK Object Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  The TAK Object eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.2.1.  TAKey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.2.2.  TAK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  TAK Object Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  TAK Object Generation and Publication . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Relying Party Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  Manual update of TA public key details  . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Maintaining Multiple TA Key Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  Performing TA Key Rolls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.1.  Phase 1: Add a TAK for Key Pair 'A' . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.2.  Phase 2: Add a Key Pair 'B' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.3.  Phase 3: Update TAL to point to 'B' . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.4.  Phase 4: Remove Key Pair 'A'  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  Using TAK objects to distribute TAL data  . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     9.1.  Relying Party Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     9.2.  Alternate Transition Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   10. Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     10.1.  Acceptance Timers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     11.1.  Previous Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     11.2.  TA Compromise  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     11.3.  Alternate Transition Models  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     12.1.  Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     12.2.  Signed Object  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     12.3.  File Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     12.4.  Module Identifier  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     12.5.  Registration of Media Type application/
            rpki-signed-tal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   13. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     13.1.  APNIC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     13.2.  rpki-client  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

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     13.3.  rpki-rs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   14. Revision History  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   15. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   16. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     16.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     16.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23

1.  Requirements Notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Overview

   A Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) [RFC8630] is used by Relying Parties
   (RPs) in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to locate and
   validate Trust Anchor (TA) Certification Authority (CA) certificates
   used in RPKI validation.  However, until now, there has been no in-
   band way of notifying RPs of updates to a TAL.  In-band notification
   means that TA operators can be more confident of RPs being aware of
   key rollover operations.

   This document defines a new RPKI signed object that can be used to
   document the location(s) of the TA CA certificate for the current TA
   public key, as well as the value of the successor public key and the
   location(s) of its TA CA certificate.  This allows RPs to be notified
   automatically of such changes, and enables TAs to stage a successor
   public key so that planned key rollovers can be performed without
   risking the invalidation of the RPKI tree under the TA.  We call this
   object the Trust Anchor Key (TAK) object.

   When RPs are first bootstrapped, they use a TAL to discover the
   public key and location(s) of the CA certificate for a TA.  The RP
   can then retrieve and validate the CA certificate, and subsequently
   validate the manifest [RFC9286] and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
   published by that TA (section 5 of [RFC6487]).  However, before
   processing any other objects, it will first validate the TAK object,
   if present.  If the TAK object lists only the current public key,
   then the RP continues processing as it would in the absence of a TAK
   object.  If the TAK object includes a successor public key, the RP
   starts a 30-day acceptance timer for that key, and then continues
   standard top-down validation with the current public key.  If, during
   the following validation runs up until the expiry of the acceptance

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   timer, the RP has not observed any changes to the public keys and
   certificate URLs listed in the TAK object, then the RP will fetch the
   successor public key, update its local state with that public key and
   its associated certification location(s), and continue processing
   using that public key.

   The primary motivation for this work is being able to migrate from a
   Hardware Security Module (HSM) produced by one vendor to one produced
   by another, where the first vendor does not support exporting private
   keys for use by the second.  There may be other scenarios in which
   key rollover is useful, though.

3.  TAK Object Definition

   The TAK object makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed
   objects [RFC6488], which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
   [RFC5652] wrapper for the content as well as a generic validation
   procedure for RPKI signed objects.  Therefore, to complete the
   specification of the TAK object (see Section 4 of [RFC6488]), this
   document defines:

   *  The OID (in Section 3.1) that identifies the signed object as
      being a TAK.  (This OID appears within the eContentType in the
      encapContentInfo object, as well as the content-type signed
      attribute in the signerInfo object.)

   *  The ASN.1 syntax for the TAK eContent, in Section 3.2.

   *  The additional steps required to validate a TAK, in Section 3.3.

3.1.  The TAK Object Content Type

   This document specifies an OID for the TAK object as follows:

      id-ct-signedTAL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
         { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
           smime(16) ct(1) 50 }

   This OID MUST appear in both the eContentType in the encapContentInfo
   object and the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo object
   (see [RFC6488]).

3.2.  The TAK Object eContent

   The content of a TAK object is ASN.1 encoded using the Distinguished
   Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690], and is defined per the module in
   Appendix A.

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3.2.1.  TAKey

   This structure defines a TA public key, similar to that from
   [RFC8630].  It contains a sequence of zero or more comments, one or
   more certificate URIs, and a SubjectPublicKeyInfo.

   *  comments: This field is semantically equivalent to the comment
      section defined in section 2.2 of [RFC8630].  Each comment is
      human-readable informational UTF-8 text [RFC3629], conforming to
      the restrictions defined in Section 2 of [RFC5198].  The leading
      "#" character that is used to denote a comment in [RFC8630] is
      omitted here.

   *  certificateURIs: This field is semantically equivalent to the URI
      section defined in section 2.2 of [RFC8630].  It MUST contain at
      least one CertificateURI element.  Each CertificateURI element
      contains the IA5String representation of either an rsync URI
      [RFC5781], or an HTTPS URI [RFC9110].

   *  subjectPublicKeyInfo: This field contains a SubjectPublicKeyInfo
      (section 4.1.2.7 of [RFC5280]) in DER format [X.690].

3.2.2.  TAK

   *  version: The version number of the TAK object MUST be 0.

   *  current: This field contains the TA public key of the repository
      in which the TAK object is published.

   *  predecessor: This field contains the TA public key that was in use
      for this TA immediately prior to the current TA public key, if
      applicable.

   *  successor: This field contains the TA public key to be used in
      place of the current public key, if applicable, after expiry of
      the relevant acceptance timer.

3.3.  TAK Object Validation

   To determine whether a TAK object is valid, the RP MUST perform the
   following checks in addition to those specified in [RFC6488]:

   *  The eContentType OID matches the OID described in Section 3.1.

   *  The TAK object appears as the product of a TA CA certificate (i.e.
      the TA CA certificate is itself the issuer of the End-Entity (EE)
      certificate of the TAK object).

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   *  The TA CA has published only one TAK object in its repository for
      this public key, and this object appears on the manifest as the
      only entry using the ".tak" extension (see [RFC6481]).

   *  The EE certificate of this TAK object describes its Internet
      Number Resources (INRs) using the "inherit" attribute.

   *  The decoded TAK content conforms to the format defined in
      Section 3.2.

   *  The SubjectPublicKeyInfo value of the current TA public key in the
      TAK object matches that of the TA CA certificate used to issue the
      EE certificate of the TAK object.

   If any of these checks does not succeed, the RP MUST ignore the TAK
   object and proceed as though it were not listed on the manifest.

   The RP is not required to compare its current set of certificateURIs
   for the current public key with those listed in the TAK object.  The
   RP MAY alert the user that these sets of certificateURIs do not
   match, with a view to the user manually updating the set of
   certificateURIs in their configuration.  The RP MUST NOT
   automatically update its configuration to use these certificateURIs
   in the event of inconsistency, though, because the migration of users
   to new certificateURIs should happen by way of the successor public
   key process.

4.  TAK Object Generation and Publication

   A non-normative guideline for naming this object is that the filename
   chosen for the TAK object in the publication repository be a value
   derived from the public key part of the entity's key pair, using the
   algorithm described for CRLs in section 2.2 of [RFC6481] for
   generation of filenames.  The filename extension of ".tak" MUST be
   used to denote the object as a TAK.

   In order to generate a TAK object, the TA MUST perform the following
   actions:

   *  The TA MUST generate a one-time-use EE certificate for the TAK.

   *  This EE certificate MUST have a unique key pair.

   *  This EE certificate MUST have a Subject Information Access (SIA)
      [RFC6487] extension access description field with an accessMethod
      OID value of id-ad-signedObject, where the associated
      accessLocation references the publication point of the TAK as an
      object URL.

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   *  As described in [RFC6487], the EE certificate used for this object
      must include an [RFC3779] extension.  However, because the
      resource set is irrelevant to this object type, this certificate
      MUST describe its Internet Number Resources (INRs) using the
      "inherit" attribute, rather than explicitly describing a resource
      set.

   *  This EE certificate MUST have a "notBefore" time that matches or
      predates the moment that the TAK will be published.

   *  This EE certificate MUST have a "notAfter" time that reflects the
      intended duration for which this TAK will be published.  If the EE
      certificate for a TAK object is expired, it MUST no longer be
      published, but it MAY be replaced by a newly generated TAK object
      with equivalent content and an updated "notAfter" time.

   *  The current TA public key for the TAK MUST match that of the TA CA
      certificate under which the TAK was issued.

   In distribution contexts that support media types, the "application/
   rpki-signed-tal" media type can be used for TAK objects.

5.  Relying Party Use

   Relying Parties MUST keep a record of the current public key for each
   configured TA, as well as the URI(s) where the CA certificate for
   this public key may be retrieved.  This record is typically
   bootstrapped by the use of a pre-configured (and unsigned) TAL file
   [RFC8630].

   When performing top-down validation, RPs MUST first validate and
   process the TAK object for its current known public key, by
   performing the following steps:

   *  A CA certificate is retrieved and validated from the known URIs as
      described in sections 3 and 4 of [RFC8630].

   *  The manifest and CRL for this certificate are then validated as
      described in [RFC6487] and [RFC9286].

   *  The TAK object, if present, is validated as described in
      Section 3.3.

   If the TAK object includes a successor public key, then the RP must
   verify the successor public key by doing the following:

   *  performing top-down validation using the successor public key, in
      order to validate the TAK object for the successor TA;

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   *  ensuring that a valid TAK object exists for the successor TA;

   *  ensuring that the successor TAK object's current public key
      matches the initial TAK object's successor public key; and

   *  ensuring that the successor TAK object's predecessor public key
      matches the initial TAK object's current public key.

   If any of these steps fails, then the successor public key has failed
   verification.

   If the successor public key passes verification, and the RP has not
   seen that successor public key on the previous successful validation
   run for this TA, then the RP:

   *  sets an acceptance timer of 30 days for this successor public key
      for this TA;

   *  cancels the existing acceptance timer for this TA (if applicable);
      and

   *  continues standard top-down validation as described in [RFC6487]
      using the current public key.

   If the successor public key passes verification, and the RP has seen
   that successor public key on the previous successful validation run
   for this TA:

   *  if the relevant acceptance timer has not expired, the RP continues
      standard top-down validation using the current public key;

   *  otherwise, the RP updates its current known public key details for
      this TA to be those of the successor public key, and then begins
      top-down validation again using the successor public key.

   If the successor public key does not pass verification, or if the TAK
   object does not include a successor public key, the RP cancels the
   existing acceptance timer for this TA (if applicable).

   An RP MUST NOT use a successor public key for top-down validation
   outside of the process described above, except for the purpose of
   testing that the new public key is working correctly.  This allows a
   TA to publish a successor public key for a period of time, allowing
   RPs to test it, while still being able to rely on RPs using the
   current public key for their production RPKI operations.

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   A successor public key may have the same SubjectPublicKeyInfo value
   as the current public key: this will be the case where a TA is
   updating the certificateURIs for that public key.

5.1.  Manual update of TA public key details

   A Relying Party may opt not to support the automatic transition of TA
   public key data, as defined in the previous section.  An alternative
   approach is for the Relying Party to alert the user when a new
   successor public key is seen, and also when the relevant acceptance
   timer has expired.  The user can then manually transition to the new
   TA public key data.  This process ensures that the benefits of the
   acceptance timer period are still realised, as compared with TA
   public key update based on a TAL distributed out-of-band by a TA.

6.  Maintaining Multiple TA Key Pairs

   Although an RP that can process TAK objects will only ever use one
   public key for validation (either the current public key, or the
   successor public key, once the relevant acceptance timer has
   expired), an RP that cannot process TAK objects will continue to use
   the public key details per its TAL (or equivalent manual
   configuration) indefinitely.  As a result, even when a TA is using a
   TAK object in order to migrate clients to a new public key, the TA
   may have to maintain the previous key pair for a period of time
   alongside the new key pair in order to ensure continuity of service
   for older clients.

   For each TA key pair that a TA maintains, the signed material for
   these key pairs MUST be published under different directories in the
   context of the 'id-ad-caRepository' and 'id-ad-rpkiManifest' Subject
   Information Access descriptions contained on the CA certificates
   [RFC6487].  Publishing objects under the same directory is
   potentially confusing for RPs, and could lead to object invalidity in
   the event of file name collisions.

   Also, the CA certificates for each maintained key pair, and the
   content published for each key pair, MUST be equivalent (except for
   the TAK object).  In other words, for the purposes of RPKI
   validation, it MUST NOT make a difference which of the public keys is
   used as a starting point.

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   This means that the IP and Autonomous System (AS) resources contained
   on all current CA certificates for the maintained TA key pairs MUST
   be the same.  Furthermore, for any delegation of IP and AS resources
   to a child, the TA MUST have an equivalent CA certificate published
   under each of its key pairs.  Any updates in delegations MUST be
   reflected under each of its key pairs.  A TA SHOULD NOT publish any
   other objects besides a CRL, a Manifest, a single TAK object, and any
   number of CA certificates for delegation to child CAs.

   If a TA uses a single remote publication server for its key pairs,
   per [RFC8181], then it MUST include all <publish/> and <withdraw/>
   Protocol Data Units (PDUs) for the products of each of its key pairs
   in a single query, in order to reduce the risk of RPs seeing
   inconsistent data in the TA's RPKI repositories.

   If a TA uses multiple publication servers, then the content for
   different key pairs will be out of sync at times.  The TA SHOULD
   ensure that the duration of these moments is limited to the shortest
   possible time.  Furthermore, the following should be observed:

   *  In cases where a CA certificate is revoked, or replaced by a
      certificate with a reduced set of resources, these changes will
      not take effect fully until all the relevant repository
      publication points have been updated.  Given that TA private key
      operations are normally performed infrequently, this is unlikely
      to be a problem: if the revocation or shrinking of an issued CA
      certificate is staged for days/weeks, then experiencing a delay of
      several minutes for the repository publication points to be
      updated is relatively insignificant.

   *  In cases where a CA certificate is replaced by a certificate with
      an extended set of resources, the TA MUST inform the receiving CA
      only after all of its repository publication points have been
      updated.  This ensures that the receiving CA will not issue any
      products that could be invalid if an RP uses a TA public key just
      before the CA certificate was due to be updated.

   Finally, note that the publication locations of CA certificates for
   delegations to child CAs under each key pair will be different, and
   therefore the Authority Information Access 'id-ad-caIssuers' values
   (section 4.8.7 of [RFC6487]) on certificates issued by the child CAs
   may not be as expected when performing top-down validation, depending
   on the TA public key that is used.  However, these values are not
   critical to top-down validation, so RPs performing such validation
   MUST NOT reject a certificate simply because this value is not as
   expected.

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7.  Performing TA Key Rolls

   In this section we describe how present-day RPKI TAs that use only
   one key pair, and that do not use TAK objects, can use a TAK object
   to perform a planned key rollover.

7.1.  Phase 1: Add a TAK for Key Pair 'A'

   Before adding a successor public key, a TA may want to confirm that
   it can maintain a TAK object for its current key pair only.  We will
   refer to this key pair as key pair 'A' throughout this section.

7.2.  Phase 2: Add a Key Pair 'B'

   The TA can now generate a new key pair, called 'B'.  The private key
   of this key pair MUST now be used to create a new CA certificate for
   the associated public key, and to issue equivalent CA certificates
   for delegations to child CAs, as described in Section 6.

   At this point, the TA can also construct a new TAL file [RFC8630] for
   the public key of key pair 'B', and test locally that the validation
   outcome for the new public key is equivalent to that of the other
   current public key(s).

   When the TA is certain that the content for both public keys is
   equivalent, and wants to initiate the migration from 'A' to 'B', it
   issues a new TAK object under key pair 'A', with the public key from
   that key pair as the current public key for that object, the public
   key from key pair 'B' as the successor public key, and no predecessor
   public key.  It also issues a TAK object under key pair 'B', with the
   public key from that key pair as the current public key for that
   object, the public key from key pair 'A' as the predecessor public
   key, and no successor public key.

   Once this has happened, RP clients will start seeing the new public
   key and setting acceptance timers accordingly.

7.3.  Phase 3: Update TAL to point to 'B'

   At about the time that the TA expects clients to start setting the
   public key from key pair 'B' as the current public key, the TA must
   release a new TAL file for that public key.  It SHOULD use a
   different set of URIs in the TAL compared to the TAK file, so that
   the TA can learn the proportion of RPs that can successfully validate
   and use the updated TAK objects.

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   To support RPs that do not take account of TAK objects, the TA should
   continue operating key pair 'A' for a period of time after the
   expected migration of clients to the public key from 'B'.  The length
   of that period of time is a local policy matter for that TA: it might
   operate the key pair until no clients are attempting to validate
   using the associated public key, for example.

7.4.  Phase 4: Remove Key Pair 'A'

   The TA SHOULD now remove all content from the repository used by key
   pair 'A', and destroy the private key for that key pair.  RPs
   attempting to rely on a TAL for the public key from key pair 'A' from
   this point will not be able to perform RPKI validation for the TA,
   and will have to update their local state manually, by way of a new
   TAL file.

8.  Using TAK objects to distribute TAL data

   Relying Parties must be configured with RPKI Trust Anchor data in
   order to function correctly.  This Trust Anchor data is typically
   distributed in the Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) format defined in RFC
   8630.  A TAK object can also serve as a format for distribution of
   this data, though, because the TAKey data stored in the TAK object
   contains the same data that would appear in a TAL for the associated
   Trust Anchor.

   Relying Parties may support conversion of TAK objects into TAL files.
   Relying Parties that support conversion MUST validate the TAK object
   using the process from section 3.3.  One exception to the standard
   validation process in this context is that a Relying Party MAY treat
   a TAK object as valid, even though it is associated with a Trust
   Anchor that the Relying Party is not currently configured to trust.
   If the Relying Party is relying on this exception when converting a
   given TAK object, the Relying Party MUST communicate that fact to the
   user.

   When converting a TAK object, a Relying Party MUST default to
   producing a TAL file based on the 'current' TAKey in the TAK object,
   though it MAY optionally support producing TAL files based on the
   'predecessor' and 'successor' TAKeys.

   When converting a TAK object, a Relying Party MUST include in the TAL
   file any comments from the corresponding TAKey.

   If TAK object validation fails, then the Relying Party MUST NOT
   produce a TAL file based on the TAK object.

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   Users should be aware that TAK objects distributed out-of-band have
   similar security properties to TAL files (i.e. there is no
   authentication).  In particular, TAK objects that are not signed by
   TAs with which the Relying Party is currently configured should only
   be used if the source that distributes them is one the user trusts to
   distribute TAL files.

   If a Relying Party is not transitioning to new Trust Anchor data
   using the automatic process described in section 5 or the partially-
   manual process described in section 5.1, then the user will have to
   rely on an out-of-band mechanism for validating and updating the
   Trust Anchor data for the Relying Party.  Users in this situation
   should take similar care when updating a trust anchor using a TAK
   object file as when using a TAL file to update TA data.

9.  Deployment Considerations

9.1.  Relying Party Support

   Publishing TAK objects while RPs do not support this standard will
   result in those RPs rejecting these objects.  It is not expected that
   this will result in the invalidation of any other object under a
   Trust Anchor.

   Some RPs may purposefully not support this mechanism: for example,
   they may be implemented or configured such that they are unable to
   update local current public key data.  TA operators should take this
   into consideration when planning key rollover.  However, these RPs
   would ideally still notify their operators of planned key rollovers,
   so that the operator could update the relevant configuration
   manually.

9.2.  Alternate Transition Models

   Alternate models of TAL update exist and are complementary to this
   mechanism.  For example, TAs can liaise directly with RP software
   developers to include updated and reissued TAL files in new code
   releases, and use existing code update mechanisms in the RP community
   to distribute the changes.

   Additionally, these non-TA channels for distributing TAL data may
   themselves rely on monitoring for TAK objects and then updating the
   TAL data in their distributions or packages accordingly.  In this
   way, TAK objects may be useful even for RPs that don't implement in-
   band support for the protocol.

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   Non-TA channels for distributing TAL data should ensure, so far as is
   possible, that their update mechanisms take account of any changes
   that a user has made to their local TA public key configuration.  For
   example, if a new public key is published for a TA, but the non-TA
   channel's mechanism is able to detect that a user had removed the
   TA's previous public key from their local TA public key configuration
   such that the user no longer relies on it, then the mechanism should
   not by default add the new public key to the user's TA public key
   configuration.

10.  Operational Considerations

10.1.  Acceptance Timers

   Acceptance timers are used in TAK objects in order to permit RPs to
   test that the new public key is working correctly.  This in turn
   means that the TA operator will be able to gain confidence in the
   correct functioning of the new public key before RPs are relying on
   that in their production RPKI operations.  If a successor public key
   is not working correctly, a TA may remove that public key from the
   current TAK object.

   A TA that removes a successor public key from a TAK object SHOULD NOT
   add the same successor public key back into the TAK object for that
   TA.  This is because there may be an RP that has fetched the TAK
   object while the successor public key was listed in it, and has
   started an acceptance timer accordingly, but has not fetched the TAK
   object during the period when the successor public key was not listed
   in it.  If the unchanged successor public key is added back into the
   TA, such an RP will transition to using the new TA public key more
   quickly than other RPs, which may, in turn, make debugging and
   similar more complicated.  A simple way of addressing this problem in
   a situation where the TA operator doesn't want to reissue the
   SubjectPublicKeyInfo content for the successor public key that was
   withdrawn is to update the URL set for the successor public key,
   since RPs must take that URL set into account for the purposes of
   initiating and cancelling acceptance timers.

11.  Security Considerations

11.1.  Previous Keys

   A TA needs to consider the length of time for which it will maintain
   previously-current key pairs and their associated repositories.  An
   RP that is seeded with old TAL data will run for 30 days using the
   previous public key before migrating to the next public key, due to
   the acceptance timer requirements, and this 30-day delay applies to
   each new key pair that has been issued since the old TAL data was

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   initially published.  It may be better in these instances for the TA
   to send error responses when receiving requests for the old
   publication URLs, so that the RP reports an error to its operator and
   the operator seeds it with up-to-date TAL data immediately.

   Once a TA has decided not to maintain a previously-current key pair
   and its associated repository, the TA SHOULD destroy the associated
   private key.  The TA SHOULD also reuse the TA CA certificate URLs
   from the previous TAL data for the next TAL that it generates.  These
   measures will help to mitigate the risk of an adversary gaining
   access to the private key and its associated publication points in
   order to send invalid/incorrect data to RPs seeded with the TAL data
   for the corresponding public key.

11.2.  TA Compromise

   TAK objects do not offer protection against compromise of the current
   TA private key or the successor TA private key.  TA private key
   compromise in general is out of scope for this document.

   While it is possible for a malicious actor to use TAK objects to
   cause RPs to transition from the current TA public key to a successor
   TA public key, such action is predicated on the malicious actor
   having compromised the current TA private key in the first place, so
   TAK objects do not alter the security considerations relevant to this
   scenario.

11.3.  Alternate Transition Models

   Section 9.2 describes other ways in which a TA may transition from
   one key pair to another.  Transition by way of an in-band process
   reliant on TAK objects is not mandatory for TAs or RPs, though the
   fact that the TAK objects are verifiable by way of the currently-
   trusted TA public key is a benefit compared with existing out-of-band
   mechanisms for TA public key distribution.

   There will be a period of time where both the current public key and
   the successor public key are available for use, and RPs that are
   initialised at different points of the transition process, or from
   different out-of-band sources, may be using either the current public
   key or the successor public key.  TAs are required to ensure so far
   as is possible that for the purposes of RPKI validation, it makes no
   difference which public key is used.

12.  IANA Considerations

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12.1.  Content Type

   IANA is asked to register an object identifier for one content type
   in the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
   (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows:

          Decimal | Description                    | References
          --------+--------------------------------+---------------
          50      | id-ct-signedTAL                | [section 3.1]

   *  Description: id-ct-signedTAL

   *  OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.50

   *  Specification: [section 3.1]

12.2.  Signed Object

   IANA is asked to add the following to the "RPKI Signed Objects"
   registry:

        Name             | OID                        | Reference
        -----------------+----------------------------+---------------
        Trust Anchor Key | 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.50 | [section 3.1]

   IANA is also asked to add the following note to the "RPKI Signed
   Objects" registry:

   |  Objects of the types listed in this registry, as well as RPKI
   |  resource certificates and CRLs, are expected to be validated using
   |  the RPKI.

12.3.  File Extension

   IANA is asked to add an item for the Signed TAL file extension to the
   "RPKI Repository Name Schemes" created by [RFC6481] as follows:

       Filename Extension  | RPKI Object              | Reference
       --------------------+--------------------------+----------------
        .tak               | Trust Anchor Key         | [this document]

12.4.  Module Identifier

   IANA is asked to register an object identifier for one module
   identifier in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier
   (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry as follows:

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          Decimal | Description                    | References
          --------+--------------------------------+---------------
          74      | RPKISignedTrustAnchorList-2021 | [this document]

   *  Description: RPKISignedTrustAnchorList-2021

   *  OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0.74

   *  Specification: [this document]

12.5.  Registration of Media Type application/rpki-signed-tal

   IANA is asked to register the media type "application/rpki-signed-
   tal" in the "Media Types" registry as follows:

   Type name:  application

   Subtype name:  rpki-signed-tal

   Required parameters:  N/A

   Optional parameters:  N/A

   Encoding considerations:  binary

   Security considerations:  Carries an RPKI Signed TAL.  This media
      type contains no active content.  See the Security Considerations
      section of RFC XXXX for further information.

   Interoperability considerations:  N/A

   Published specification:  RFC XXXX

   Applications that use this media type:  RPKI operators

   Fragment identifier considerations:  N/A

   Additional information:  Content:  This media type is for a signed
         object, as defined in RFC 6488, which contains trust anchor key
         material as defined in RFC XXXX.

                            Magic number(s):  N/A

                            File extension(s):  .tak

                            Macintosh file type code(s):  N/A

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   Person & email address to contact for further information:
   iesg@ietf.org

   Intended usage:  COMMON

   Restrictions on usage:  N/A

   Author:  sidrops WG

   Change controller:  IESG

13.  Implementation Status

   NOTE: Please remove this section and the reference to RFC 7942 prior
   to publication as an RFC.

   This section records the status of known implementations of the
   protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
   Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
   The description of implementations in this section is intended to
   assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
   RFCs.  Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
   here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.  Furthermore, no effort
   has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
   supplied by IETF contributors.  This is not intended as, and must not
   be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
   features.  Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
   exist.

   According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups
   to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
   running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
   and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
   It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
   they see fit".

13.1.  APNIC

   *  Responsible Organization: Asia-Pacific Network Information Centre

   *  Location: https://github.com/APNIC-net/rpki-signed-tal-demo

   *  Description: A proof-of-concept for relying party TAK usage.

   *  Level of Maturity: This is a proof-of-concept implementation.

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   *  Coverage: This implementation includes all of the features
      described in version 16 of this specification, except for writing
      TAL files based on TAK data.  The repository includes a link to
      various test TALs that can be used for testing TAK scenarios, too.

   *  Contact Information: Tom Harrison, tomh@apnic.net

13.2.  rpki-client

   *  Responsible Organization: Job Snijders, the OpenBSD project

   *  Location: https://www.rpki-client.org

   *  Description: A relying party implementation which can validate
      TAKs.

   *  Level of Maturity: Mature.  Trust Anchor operators are encouraged
      to use rpki-client as part of smoke testing to help ensure high
      levels of standards compliance when introducing changes, and use
      rpki-client in a continuous monitoring fashion to help maintain
      high levels of operational excellence.

   *  Coverage: This implementation includes all features except TAK
      acceptance timers.

   *  Contact information: Job Snijders, job@fastly.com

13.3.  rpki-rs

   *  Responsible Organization: Tim Bruijnzeels, tim@ripe.net

   *  Location: https://github.com/NLnetLabs/rpki-rs/tree/signed-tal

   *  Description: Library support for encoding and decoding TAK
      objects.

   *  Level of Maturity: This is a proof-of-concept implementation.

   *  Coverage: This implementation includes support for encoding and
      decoding TAK objects.

   *  Contact information: Tim Bruijnzeels, tim@ripe.net

14.  Revision History

   03 - Last draft under Tim's authorship.

   04 - First draft with George's authorship.  No substantive revisions.

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   05 - First draft with Tom's authorship.  No substantive revisions.

   06 - Rob Kisteleki's critique.

   07 - Switch to two-key model.

   08 - Keepalive.

   09 - Acceptance timers, predecessor keys, no long-lived CRL/MFT.

   10 - Using TAK objects for distribution of TAL data.

   11 - Manual update guidance, additional security considerations,
   identifier updates.

   12 - TAK object comments.

   13 - Removal of compromise text, extra RP support text, key
   destruction text, media type registration, signed object registry
   note.

   14 - Keepalive.

   15 - Additional implementation notes and editorial updates.

   16 - Updates from Secdir and IESG reviews.

15.  Acknowledgments

   The authors wish to thank Martin Hoffmann for a thorough review of
   the document, Russ Housley for multiple reviews of the ASN.1
   definitions and for providing a new module for the TAK object, Job
   Snijders for the extensive suggestions around TAK object structure/
   distribution and rpki-client implementation work, and Ties de Kock
   for text/suggestions around TAK/TAL distribution and general security
   considerations.

16.  References

16.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

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   [RFC3629]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
              10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
              2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.

   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.

   [RFC5198]  Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network
              Interchange", RFC 5198, DOI 10.17487/RFC5198, March 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5198>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC5781]  Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI
              Scheme", RFC 5781, DOI 10.17487/RFC5781, February 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5781>.

   [RFC6481]  Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
              Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.

   [RFC6487]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
              X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.

   [RFC6488]  Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
              Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8181]  Weiler, S., Sonalker, A., and R. Austein, "A Publication
              Protocol for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", RFC 8181, DOI 10.17487/RFC8181, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8181>.

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   [RFC8630]  Huston, G., Weiler, S., Michaelson, G., Kent, S., and T.
              Bruijnzeels, "Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
              Trust Anchor Locator", RFC 8630, DOI 10.17487/RFC8630,
              August 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8630>.

   [RFC9110]  Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
              Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110>.

   [RFC9286]  Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
              "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", RFC 9286, DOI 10.17487/RFC9286, June 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9286>.

   [X.690]    ITU-T Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002,
              "Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
              Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
              Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
              (DER)", 2002.

16.2.  Informative References

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC7942]  Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
              Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
              RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.

Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module

   This appendix includes the ASN.1 module for the TAK object.

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   <CODE BEGINS>
   RPKISignedTrustAnchorList-2021
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
         pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) 74 }

   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
   BEGIN

   IMPORTS

   CONTENT-TYPE
       FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009 -- in [RFC5911]
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
         pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41) }

   SubjectPublicKeyInfo
       FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 -- in [RFC5912]
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
         id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) } ;

   ct-signedTAL CONTENT-TYPE ::=
       { TYPE TAK IDENTIFIED BY
         id-ct-signedTAL }

   id-ct-signedTAL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
       us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) ct(1) 50 }

   CertificateURI ::= IA5String

   TAKey ::= SEQUENCE {
       comments  SEQUENCE SIZE (0..MAX) OF UTF8String,
       certificateURIs  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateURI,
       subjectPublicKeyInfo  SubjectPublicKeyInfo
   }

   TAK ::= SEQUENCE {
       version     INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
       current     TAKey,
       predecessor [0] TAKey OPTIONAL,
       successor   [1] TAKey OPTIONAL
   }

   END
   <CODE ENDS>

Authors' Addresses

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   Carlos Martinez
   LACNIC
   Rambla Mexico 6125
   11400 Montevideo
   Uruguay
   Email: carlos@lacnic.net
   URI:   https://www.lacnic.net/

   George G. Michaelson
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
   6 Cordelia St
   South Brisbane QLD 4101
   Australia
   Email: ggm@apnic.net

   Tom Harrison
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
   6 Cordelia St
   South Brisbane QLD 4101
   Australia
   Email: tomh@apnic.net

   Tim Bruijnzeels
   RIPE NCC
   Stationsplein 11
   Amsterdam
   Netherlands
   Email: tim@ripe.net
   URI:   https://www.ripe.net/

   Rob Austein
   Dragon Research Labs
   Email: sra@hactrn.net

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