holding that legislators lacked standing to challenge presidential actions they alleged violated the War Powers Resolution

holding that thirty-one congressmen did not have standing based on a vote nullification theory to challenge the President's use of force in Yugoslavia without seeking congressional approval

finding that no "judicially discoverable and manageable standards" exist for application of the Constitution's war powers clause or the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 et seq.

concluding that, because the plaintiffs' claims under the War Powers Clause and the War Powers Resolution "implicat[ed] the political question doctrine," their claims were "not justiciable" in that case, and were, moreover, "generally unsuited to judicial resolution"

In Campbell, the legislators also advanced a vote nullification argument premised on the Supreme Court's holding in Coleman. Campbell, 203 F.3d at 22.

In Campbell, thirty-one individual Members of Congress "filed suit claiming that the President violated the War Powers Resolution and the War Powers Clause of the Constitution by directing U.S. forces’ participation" in a NATO campaign in Yugoslavia.

warning against "conflat[ing] standing with the merits"

questioning the existence of “a coherent test for judges to apply to the question what constitutes war”

In Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C.Cir.2000), the court held that a number of congressmen lacked standing to challenge U.S. participation in the NATO campaign in Yugoslavia.

arguing that challenge to air campaign in Yugoslavia would not pose a political question

arguing that courts lack manageable standards to adjudicate such cases

warning against "conflat[ing] standing with the merits"

noting that "there always remains the possibility of impeachment should a President act in disregard of Congress' authority"

noting that where "Congress has a broad range of legislative authority it can use to stop a President's" action, Congress cannot mount a challenge to that action pursuant to Raines

characterizing Coleman as "a very narrow possible . . . exception to Raines"

characterizing Coleman as "a very narrow possible ... exception to Raines "

emphasizing Raines ' general focus on "the political self-help available to congressmen" and noting that Raines explicitly rejected argument that "legislators should not be required to turn to politics instead of the courts for their remedy"

emphasizing Raines' general focus on "the political self-help available to congressmen" and noting that Raines explicitly rejected argument that "legislators should not be required to turn to politics instead of the courts for their remedy"

stating Congressional plaintiffs do not "have standing anytime a President allegedly acts in excess of statutory authority"

In Campbell, the Circuit highlighted three potential legislative remedies to stop the prosecution of U.S. military action in Yugoslavia as ordered by President Clinton: (1) passing a law to forbid the use of U.S. forces in the Yugoslav campaign, (2) utilizing the Congressional appropriations authority, and (3) impeachment.

relying on Raines to reject the “constitutional argument that the President ha[d] acted illegally—in excess of his authority—because he waged war in the constitutional sense without a congressional delegation”

noting that "[w]hile we may be required to decide jurisdictional issues before disposing of a case on the merits, we are not required to decide jurisdictional questions in any particular order"

noting that "[w]hile we may be required to decide jurisdictional issues before disposing of a case on the merits, we are not required to decide jurisdictional questions in any particular order"

noting that "[w]hile we may be required to decide jurisdictional issues before disposing of a case on the merits, we are not required to decide jurisdictional questions in any particular order"

relying upon Raines and determining members of Congress did not have standing to challenge the President's alleged violation of the War Powers Resolution and the War Powers Clause of United States Constitution as Congress had legislative authority to stop the executive's use of military force in Yugoslav campaign