Why ‘Trump-proofing’ Nato is a priority

The purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato), its first secretary-general once remarked, is to “keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down”.

Lord’s Ismay’s aphorism has always been a useful way to describe the alliance. But as Nato leaders gather in Washington to mark the 75th anniversary of the alliance this week, it feels more relevant than ever.

The Russians are banging on Europe’s door in a way they have not for years. The Germans, no longer in need of keeping down, are now under pressure from allies to raise themselves to the occasion.

But it is keeping the Americans in that will be the unspoken priority.

“[Donald] Trump will be talked about a lot, despite the fact he is not at the summit, and that demonstrates the power he has over the alliance despite not being a head of state,” Ed Senior, a research fellow for European security at the Royal United Services Institute, told The Telegraph before setting off for the summit.

“We call it the strongest alliance in history, but if it can be undone by one person it shows it has serious vulnerabilities.”

Managing a second Trump term has been debated by European, Ukrainian, and other governments and think tankers for more than a year.

After Joe Biden’s dire debate performance at the beginning of the month, the prospect of a Trump presidency seems more likely than ever.

It is perfectly possible that by January, the United States, the keystone of the alliance system, will be led by an instinctive isolationist who is sympathetic to Russia, ambivalent about Ukraine, and hostile to Nato.

The worst-case scenario, based on comments by Trump and his closest advisers, would see him freeze US aid to Ukraine, leading to a Russian victory.

He would shift US troops and equipment to the Pacific, leaving European members exposed to Russian attack, and undermine confidence in the Article Five mutual defence clause by publically telling eastern flank nations that they must defend themselves.

When Jens Stoltenberg last year launched a plan to “Trump proof” [not his words] aid to Ukraine, that is largely what he was talking about.

The Trump-proofing plan, such as it is, looks like the following.

In June, Nato defence ministers agreed to a plan to set up a new command to coordinate the supply of arms, ammunition and training to Ukraine.

That plan, which will receive the formal green light in Washington this week, was cooked up after a six-month delay in American aid caused by Trump-allied members of Congress allowed Russia to seize the initiative on the battlefield.

In unvarnished terms, it is meant to reduce reliance on the US-led Ukraine Defence Contact Group, which has drummed up most Western aid for Ukraine since the war began.

But it has limits. The plan would still be dependent on the US, being headquartered at a US military base in Wiesbaden, Germany.

It is not clear that the remaining allies, including Britain, Canada, and the rest of the European members, could fill the financial void if American aid, which accounts for roughly half the support for Ukraine, were to vanish.

There is also technology that America supplies – notably Patriot air defence missiles – that other countries simply cannot provide at scale, if at all.

But filling an America-shaped financial and military hole is the simple bit.

Replicating the great enabling role played by US leadership is quite another question.

“It is not about replacing US capabilities and spending, it is about the alliance,” said Mr Arnold.

“Currently the alliance operates a 360-degree approach to security and that is only possible with US leadership.”

“If Nato as an organisation is to remain [without American leadership], it will have to take on a regionalised structure: groups of countries taking on more of a role on the northern flank, the southern flank, the eastern front on a more regional basis rather than alliance wide, because that’s what the military logic dictates, whatever the political logic.”

In economic, military, and logistical capacity, in political and diplomatic clout, in global reach, no one comes close to the US.

American presidents can set a direction of travel, cajole, persuade and bully allies into action. The country also acts as a kind of glue that allows the other disparate parts of the alliance to operate.

Countries working in concert cannot really replace those advantages even if they can match American spending dollar-to-dollar. Take away the American keystone, and Nato would have to adapt in radical ways.

The strongest non-American members –- Britain, France and Germany – are really peers in those things, so there would be no undisputed authority to offer direction.

Trump-proofing might better be termed future-proofing, because America is not alone.

Emmanuel Macron escaped the nightmare of a pro-Russian extreme Right-wing party taking power in France, but is severely weakened.

Olof Scholz leads an unpopular government that is likely to be replaced next year. The far-Right Alternative for Germany came second in the European parliamentary elections last month.

Meanwhile, Viktor Orban of Hungary has been in Kyiv, Moscow and Beijing pursuing his own “peace” policy at odds with almost every other Nato member.

Mr Orban’s freelancing has triggered fury in Brussels and doesn’t seem to have brought peace any closer – days after he met Vladmir Putin, Russian missiles destroyed a children’s hospital in Kyiv.

It will add to the sense of tension in Washington.

Many delegations in Washington this week are likely to look to Britain’s Keir Starmer – a pro-Nato, pro-European and pro-Ukraine centrist elected with a strong mandate – for leadership and stability.

There is something deep in the British psyche that relishes the idea of displacing America as the leader of the free world.

But daydreams are one thing. As an earlier Labour government realised, securing peace in Europe means keeping the Americans in.