Discoveries in science often center on making distinctions that had previously gone unnoticed-resulting in a clearer understanding of the processes involved and their implications. For example, in the field of dietary medicine, the role of cholesterol has been clarified by separately considering the fat's high and low density forms. Where previously cholesterol in general had been identified as a risk factor for heart disease, scientists now distinguish between risky and more benign forms of this serum fat-and notions of risk indicators have shifted accordingly. In the field of emotion, shame and guilt represent another example of how research can highlight apparently subtle differences that, upon closer study, lead to a new understanding of their differential role in healthy adjustment and behavior.

Historically, psychologists and laymen alike have not made a clear distinction between shame and guilt. Shame and guilt are generally mentioned in the same breath as “moral emotions” that inhibit socially undesirable behavior and foster moral conduct (eg, Damon, 1988; Eisenberg, 1986; Harris, 1989; Schulman & Mekler, 1985). Although shame and guilt are assumed to serve adaptive functions at the societal level, clinicians have long identified these emotions as potentially problematic for the individual. That is, shame and guilt have been cited as key components of a range of psychological disorders, including depression, anxiety, obsessional neuroses, bipolar illness, schizophrenia, masochism, substance abuse, and eating disorders (Bradshaw, 1988; Fossum & Mason, 1986; Freud, 1909/1955, 1917/1957, 1924/1961, Goldberg, 1991; Kohut, 1971; AP Morrison, 1989; NK Morrison, 1987; Potter-Efron, 1989; Rodin, Silberstein, & Striegel-Moore, 1985). Often, the term “guilt” is used as a catch-all phrase to refer to aspects of both emotions. Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in shame in the popular and clinical literature, with a