60 results sorted by ID

Possible spell-corrected query: sse
2024/1145 (PDF) Last updated: 2024-07-14
A Practical and Scalable Implementation of the Vernam Cipher, under Shannon Conditions, using Quantum Noise
Adrian Neal
Secret-key cryptography

The one-time pad cipher is renowned for its theoretical perfect security, yet its practical deployment is primarily hindered by the key-size and distribution challenge. This paper introduces a novel approach to key distribution called q-stream, designed to make symmetric-key cryptography, and the one-time pad cipher in particular, a viable option for contemporary secure communications, and specifically, post-quantum cryptography, leveraging quantum noise and combinatorics to ensure secure...

2023/264 (PDF) Last updated: 2023-04-06
Public Key Encryption with Secure Key Leasing
Shweta Agrawal, Fuyuki Kitagawa, Ryo Nishimaki, Shota Yamada, Takashi Yamakawa
Public-key cryptography

We introduce the notion of public key encryption with secure key leasing (PKE-SKL). Our notion supports the leasing of decryption keys so that a leased key achieves the decryption functionality but comes with the guarantee that if the quantum decryption key returned by a user passes a validity test, then the user has lost the ability to decrypt. Our notion is similar in spirit to the notion of secure software leasing (SSL) introduced by Ananth and La Placa (Eurocrypt 2021) but captures...

2022/553 (PDF) Last updated: 2022-05-10
Secure Storage with Deduplication
John Best, Wayne Hineman, Steven Hetzler, Guerney Hunt, Charanjit S. Jutla
Secret-key cryptography

We describe a new secure storage scheme that facilitates deduplication. The scheme is also proved secure in the universal-composability model. It is a single server scheme, and the basic scheme does not prevent against off-line dictionary attacks if the server is compromised. However, if a global secret key is shared amongst users of the organization, and this key is never stored at the server, we also get protection against off-line dictionary attacks even if the server is compromised. The...

2022/286 (PDF) Last updated: 2022-03-07
Provably Secure Identity-Based Remote Password Registration
Csanád Bertók, Andrea Huszti, Szabolcs Kovács, Norbert Oláh
Cryptographic protocols

One of the most significant challenges is the secure user authentication. If it becomes breached, confidentiality and integrity of the data or services may be compromised. The most widespread solution for entity authentication is the password-based scheme. It is easy to use and deploy. During password registration typically users create or activate their account along with their password through their verification email, and service providers are authenticated based on their SSL/TLS...

2022/220 (PDF) Last updated: 2022-02-25
Cache-22: A Highly Deployable End-To-End Encrypted Cache System with Post-Quantum Security
Keita Emura, Shiho Moriai, Takuma Nakajima, Masato Yoshimi
Cryptographic protocols

Cache systems are crucial for reducing communication overhead on the Internet. The importance of communication privacy is being increasingly and widely recognized; therefore, we anticipate that nearly all end-to-end communication will be encrypted via secure sockets layer/transport layer security (SSL/TLS) in the near future. Herein we consider a catch-22 situation, wherein the cache server checks whether content has been cached or not, i.e., the cache server needs to observe it, thereby...

2021/646 (PDF) Last updated: 2021-05-20
Optimization of Advanced Encryption Standard on Graphics Processing Units
Cihangir Tezcan
Secret-key cryptography

Graphics processing units (GPUs) are specially designed for parallel applications and perform parallel operations much faster than central processing units (CPUs). In this work, we focus on the performance of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) on GPUs. We present optimizations which remove bank conflicts in shared memory accesses and provide 878.6 Gbps throughput for AES-128 encryption on an RTX 2070 Super, which is equivalent to 4.1 Gbps per Watt. Our optimizations provide more than...

2020/1314 (PDF) Last updated: 2022-02-21
Secure Software Leasing from Standard Assumptions
Fuyuki Kitagawa, Ryo Nishimaki, Takashi Yamakawa
Foundations

Secure software leasing (SSL) is a quantum cryptographic primitive that enables an authority to lease software to a user by encoding it into a quantum state. SSL prevents users from generating authenticated pirated copies of leased software, where authenticated copies indicate those run on legitimate platforms. Although SSL is a relaxed variant of quantum copy protection that prevents users from generating any copy of leased softwares, it is still meaningful and attractive. Recently, Ananth...

2020/079 (PDF) Last updated: 2020-11-20
Exploring HTTPS Security Inconsistencies: A Cross-Regional Perspective
Eman Salem Alashwali, Pawel Szalachowski, Andrew Martin
Applications

If two or more identical HTTPS clients, located at different geographic locations (regions), make an HTTPS request to the same domain (e.g. example.com), on the same day, will they receive the same HTTPS security guarantees in response? Our results give evidence that this is not always the case. We conduct scans for the top 250000 most visited domains on the Internet, from clients located at five different regions: Australia, Brazil, India, the UK, and the US. Our scans gather data from both...

2019/1141 (PDF) Last updated: 2020-03-29
KORGAN: An Efficient PKI Architecture Based on PBFT Through Dynamic Threshold Signatures
Murat Yasin Kubilay, Mehmet Sabir Kiraz, Haci Ali Mantar
Public-key cryptography

During the last decade, several misbehaving Certificate Authorities (CA) have issued fraudulent TLS certificates allowing MITM kinds of attacks which result in serious security incidents. In order to avoid such incidents, Yakubov et al. recently proposed a new PKI architecture where CAs issue, revoke, and validate X.509 certificates on a public blockchain. However, in their proposal TLS clients are subject to MITM kinds of attacks and certificate transparency is not fully provided. In this...

2019/1099 (PDF) Last updated: 2019-09-29
On the Feasibility of Fine-Grained TLS Security Configurations in Web Browsers Based on the Requested Domain Name
Eman Salem Alashwali, Kasper Rasmussen
Applications

Most modern web browsers today sacrifice optimal TLS security for backward compatibility. They apply coarse-grained TLS configurations that support (by default) legacy versions of the protocol that have known design weaknesses, and weak ciphersuites that provide fewer security guarantees (e.g. non Forward Secrecy), and silently fall back to them if the server selects to. This introduces various risks including downgrade attacks such as the POODLE attack that exploits the browsers silent...

2019/1083 (PDF) Last updated: 2019-09-24
What's in a Downgrade? A Taxonomy of Downgrade Attacks in the TLS Protocol and Application Protocols Using TLS
Eman Salem Alashwali, Kasper Rasmussen
Foundations

A number of important real-world protocols including the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol have the ability to negotiate various security-related choices such as the protocol version and the cryptographic algorithms to be used in a particular session. Furthermore, some insecure application-layer protocols such as the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) negotiate the use of TLS itself on top of the application protocol to secure the communication channel. These protocols are often...

2019/941 (PDF) Last updated: 2019-08-18
Does "www." Mean Better Transport Layer Security?
Eman Salem Alashwali, Pawel Szalachowski, Andrew Martin
Applications

Experience shows that most researchers and developers tend to treat plain-domains (those that are not prefixed with “www” sub-domains, e.g. “example.com”) as synonyms for their equivalent www-domains (those that are prefixed with “www” sub-domains, e.g. “www.example.com”). In this paper, we analyse datasets of nearly two million plain-domains against their equivalent www-domains to answer the following question: Do plain-domains and their equivalent www-domains differ in TLS security...

2019/821 (PDF) Last updated: 2019-07-16
Towards Forward Secure Internet Traffic
Eman Salem Alashwali, Pawel Szalachowski, Andrew Martin
Cryptographic protocols

Forward Secrecy (FS) is a security property in key-exchange algorithms which guarantees that a compromise in the secrecy of a long-term private-key does not compromise the secrecy of past session keys. With a growing awareness of long-term mass surveillance programs by governments and others, FS has become widely regarded as a highly desirable property. This is particularly true in the TLS protocol, which is used to secure Internet communication. In this paper, we investigate FS in pre-TLS...

2019/579 (PDF) Last updated: 2019-05-28
BlockQuick: Super-Light Client Protocol for Blockchain Validation on Constrained Devices
Dominic Letz
Cryptographic protocols

Today server authentication is largely handled through Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) in both the private and the public sector. PKI is established as the defacto standard for Internet communication through the world wide web, and its usage in HTTPS, SSL/TLS (Web PKI). However, in its application to Internet of Things (IoT) devices, using Web PKI infrastructure for server authentication has several shortcomings, including issues with validity periods, identity, revocation practice, and...

2019/180 (PDF) Last updated: 2019-02-26
Disco: Modern Session Encryption
David Wong
Cryptographic protocols

At Real World Crypto 2017, Joan Daemen won the Levchin Prize and announced that he believed permutation-based crypto was the future of symmetric cryptography. At the same conference Mike Hamburg introduced Strobe, a symmetric protocol framework capable of protecting sessions as well as building symmetric cryptographic primitives for the single cost of Joan Daemen’s permutation Keccak. The next year, at Real World Crypto 2018 Trevor Perrin came to talk about the Noise protocol framework, a...

2019/028 (PDF) Last updated: 2019-01-15
nQUIC: Noise-Based QUIC Packet Protection
Mathias Hall-Andersen, David Wong, Nick Sullivan, Alishah Chator
Cryptographic protocols

We present nQUIC, a variant of QUIC-TLS that uses the Noise protocol framework for its key exchange and basis of its packet protector with no semantic transport changes. nQUIC is designed for deployment in systems and for applications that assert trust in raw public keys rather than PKI-based certificate chains. It uses a fixed key exchange algorithm, compromising agility for implementation and verification ease. nQUIC provides mandatory server and optional client authentication, resistance...

2018/1232 (PDF) Last updated: 2018-12-31
Certificate Transparency Using Blockchain
D S V Madala, Mahabir Prasad Jhanwar, Anupam Chattopadhyay
Applications

The security of web communication via the SSL/TLS protocols relies on safe distributions of public keys associated with web domains in the form of $\mathsf{X.509}$ certificates. Certificate authorities (CAs) are trusted third parties that issue these certificates. However, the CA ecosystem is fragile and prone to compromises. Starting with Google's Certificate Transparency project, a number of research works have recently looked at adding transparency for better CA accountability,...

2018/1071 (PDF) Last updated: 2019-04-29
CertLedger: A New PKI Model with Certificate Transparency Based on Blockchain
Murat Yasin Kubilay, Mehmet Sabir Kiraz, Haci Ali Mantar

In conventional PKI, CAs are assumed to be fully trusted. However, in practice, CAs' absolute responsibility for providing trustworthiness caused major security and privacy issues. To prevent such issues, Google introduced the concept of Certificate Transparency (CT) in 2013. Later, several new PKI models (e.g., AKI, ARPKI, and DTKI) are proposed to reduce the level of trust to the CAs. However, all of these proposals are still vulnerable to split-world attacks if the adversary is capable...

2018/1021 (PDF) Last updated: 2020-10-26
Multi-Client Functional Encryption with Repetition for Inner Product
Jérémy Chotard, Edouard Dufour-Sans, Romain Gay, Duong Hieu Phan, David Pointcheval

Recently, Chotard et al. proposed a variant of functional encryption for Inner Product, where several parties can independently encrypt inputs, for a specific time-period or label, such that functional decryption keys exactly reveal the aggregations for the specific functions they are associated with. This was introduced as Multi-Client Functional Encryption (MCFE). In addition, they formalized a Decentralized version (DMCFE), where all the clients must agree and contribute to generate the...

2018/093 (PDF) Last updated: 2018-01-28
Statistical Attacks on Cookie Masking for RC4
Kenneth G. Paterson, Jacob C. N. Schuldt
Implementation

Levillain et al. (AsiaCCS 2015) proposed two cookie masking methods, TLS Scramble and MCookies, to counter a class of attacks on SSL/TLS in which the attacker is able to exploit its ability to obtain many encryptions of a target HTTP cookie. In particular, the masking methods potentially make it viable to continue to use the RC4 algorithm in SSL/TLS. In this paper, we provide a detailed analysis of TLS Scramble and MCookies when used in conjunction with RC4 in SSL/TLS. We show that, in fact,...

2017/546 (PDF) Last updated: 2017-06-08
X509CLOUD - FRAMEWORK FOR A UBIQUITOUS PKI
Hitesh Tewari, Arthur Hughes, Stefan Weber, Tomas Barry
Applications

The SSL protocol has been widely used for verifying digital identities and to secure Internet traffic since the early days of the web. Although X.509 certificates have been in existence for more than two decades, individual user uptake has been low due to the high cost of issuance and maintenance of such certs. This has led to a situation whereby users are able to verify the identity of an organization or e-commerce retailer via their digital certificate, but organizations have to rely on...

2017/234 (PDF) Last updated: 2019-04-04
Automatically Detecting the Misuse of Secrets: Foundations, Design Principles, and Applications
Kevin Milner, Cas Cremers, Jiangshan Yu, Mark Ryan
Cryptographic protocols

We develop foundations and several constructions for security protocols that can automatically detect, without false positives, if a secret (such as a key or password) has been misused. Such constructions can be used, e.g., to automatically shut down compromised services, or to automatically revoke misused secrets to minimize the effects of compromise. Our threat model includes malicious agents, (temporarily or permanently) compromised agents, and clones. Previous works have studied...

2017/020 (PDF) Last updated: 2017-01-11
concerto: A Methodology Towards Reproducible Analyses of TLS Datasets
Olivier Levillain, Maxence Tury, Nicolas Vivet

Over the years, SSL/TLS has become an essential part of Internet security. As such, it should offer robust and state-of-the-art security, in particular for HTTPS, its first application. Theoretically, the protocol allows for a trade-off between secure algorithms and decent performance. Yet in practice, servers do not always support the latest version of the protocol, nor do they all enforce strong cryptographic algorithms. To assess the quality of HTTPS and other TLS deployment at large,...

2016/1017 (PDF) Last updated: 2017-07-28
Post-Quantum Key Exchange for the Internet and the Open Quantum Safe Project
Douglas Stebila, Michele Mosca
Implementation

Designing public key cryptosystems that resist attacks by quantum computers is an important area of current cryptographic research and standardization. To retain confidentiality of today's communications against future quantum computers, applications and protocols must begin exploring the use of quantum-resistant key exchange and encryption. In this paper, we explore post-quantum cryptography in general and key exchange specifically. We review two protocols for quantum-resistant key...

2016/958 (PDF) Last updated: 2016-10-04
SafeDeflate: compression without leaking secrets
Michał Zieliński
Cryptographic protocols

CRIME and BREACH attacks on TLS/SSL leverage the fact that compression ratio is not hidden by encryption to recover content of secrets. We introduce SafeDeflate---a modification of a standard Deflate algorithm which compression ratio does not leak information about secret tokens. The modification is compatible with existing Deflate and gzip decompressors. We introduce a model in which attacker can obtain ciphertexts of arbitrary compressed plaintext containing secret values. Then we prove...

2016/126 (PDF) Last updated: 2016-02-14
Server Notaries: A Complementary Approach to the Web PKI Trust Model
Emre Yüce, Ali Aydın Selçuk
Applications

SSL/TLS is the de facto protocol for providing secure communication over the Internet. It relies on the Web PKI model for authentication and secure key exchange. Despite its relatively successful past, the number of Web PKI incidents observed have increased recently. These incidents revealed the risks of forged certificates issued by certificate authorities without the consent of the domain owners. Several solutions have been proposed to solve this problem, but no solution has yet received...

2015/1169 (PDF) Last updated: 2015-12-05
Strength in Numbers: Threshold ECDSA to Protect Keys in the Cloud
Marc Green, Thomas Eisenbarth

Side-channel attacks utilize information leakage in the implementation of an otherwise secure cryptographic algorithm to extract secret information. For example, adversaries can extract the secret key used in a cryptographic algorithm by observing cache-timing data. Threshold cryptography enables the division of private keys into shares, distributed among several nodes; the knowledge of a subset of shares does not leak information about the private key, thereby defending against memory...

2014/724 (PDF) Last updated: 2014-12-30
Protecting Encrypted Cookies from Compression Side-Channel Attacks
Janaka Alawatugoda, Douglas Stebila, Colin Boyd
Cryptographic protocols

Compression is desirable for network applications as it saves bandwidth; however, when data is compressed before being encrypted, the amount of compression leaks information about the amount of redundancy in the plaintext. This side channel has led to successful CRIME and BREACH attacks on web traffic protected by the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The general guidance in light of these attacks has been to disable compression, preserving confidentiality but sacrificing bandwidth....

2014/589 (PDF) Last updated: 2014-09-30
Authenticated Key Exchange from Ideal Lattices
Jiang Zhang, Zhenfeng Zhang, Jintai Ding, Michael Snook, Özgür Dagdelen

Authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols, such as IKE and SSL/TLS, have been widely used to ensure secure communication over the Internet. We present in this paper a practical and provably secure AKE protocol from ideal lattices, which is conceptually simple and has similarities to the Diffie-Hellman based protocols such as HMQV (CRYPTO 2005) and OAKE (CCS 2013). Our protocol does not rely on other cryptographic primitives---in particular, it does not use signatures---simplifying the...

2013/623 (PDF) Last updated: 2013-09-28
Off-Path Hacking: The Illusion of Challenge-Response Authentication
Yossi Gilad, Amir Herzberg, Haya Shulman
Cryptographic protocols

Everyone is concerned about Internet security, yet most traffic is not cryptographically protected. Typical justification is that most attackers are off-path and cannot intercept traffic; hence, intuitively, challenge-response defenses should suffice to ensure authenticity. Often, the challenges re-use existing header fields to protect widelydeployed protocols such as TCP and DNS. We argue that this practice may often give an illusion of security. We review recent off-path TCP injection and...

2013/502 (PDF) Last updated: 2013-08-15
Proving TLS-attack related open biases of RC4
Santanu Sarkar, Sourav Sen Gupta, Goutam Paul, Subhamoy Maitra
Secret-key cryptography

After a series of works on RC4 cryptanalysis in last few years (published in flagship cryptology conferences and journals), the most significant (and also very recent) attack on the cipher has been the discovery of vulnerabilities in the SSL/TLS protocol, by AlFardan, Bernstein, Paterson, Poettering and Schuldt. They ran extensive computations to identify significant short-term single-byte keystream biases of RC4, and utilized that knowledge in the attack. The biases identified by AlFardan...

2013/367 (PDF) Last updated: 2013-06-17
On the Security of TLS-DH and TLS-RSA in the Standard Model
Florian Kohlar, Sven Schäge, Jörg Schwenk
Cryptographic protocols

TLS is the most important cryptographic protocol in the Internet. At CRYPTO 2012, Jager et al. presented the first proof of the unmodified TLS with ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange (TLS-DHE) for mutual authentication. Since TLS cannot be proven secure under the classical definition of authenticated key exchange (AKE), they introduce a new security model called authenticated and confidential channel establishment (ACCE) that captures the security properties expected from TLS in practice....

2013/275 (PDF) Last updated: 2017-01-31
The Potential of an Individualized Set of trusted CAs: Defending against CA Failures in the Web PKI (Extended Version)
Johannes Braun, Gregor Rynkowski

The security of most Internet applications relies on underlying public key infrastructures (PKIs) and thus on an ecosystem of certification authorities (CAs). The pool of PKIs responsible for the issuance and the maintenance of SSL certificates, called the Web PKI, has grown extremely large and complex. Herein, each CA is a single point of failure, leading to an attack surface, the size of which is hardly assessable. This paper approaches the issue if and how the attack surface can be...

2013/049 (PDF) Last updated: 2013-02-01
Lessons Learned From Previous SSL/TLS Attacks - A Brief Chronology Of Attacks And Weaknesses
Christopher Meyer, Jörg Schwenk

Since its introduction in 1994 the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol (later renamed to Transport Layer Security (TLS)) evolved to the de facto standard for securing the transport layer. SSL/TLS can be used for ensuring data confidentiality, integrity and authenticity during transport. A main feature of the protocol is its flexibility. Modes of operation and security aims can easily be configured through different cipher suites. During its evolutionary development process several flaws were...

2012/354 (PDF) Last updated: 2012-06-22
Hash Combiners for Second Pre-Image Resistance, Target Collision Resistance and Pre-Image Resistance have Long Output
Arno Mittelbach
Foundations

A $(k,l)$ hash-function combiner for property $P$ is a construction that, given access to $l$ hash functions, yields a single cryptographic hash function which has property $P$ as long as at least $k$ out of the $l$ hash functions have that property. Hash function combiners are used to hedge against the failure of one or more of the individual components. One example of the application of hash function combiners are the previous versions of the TLS and SSL protocols...

2012/148 (PDF) Last updated: 2012-08-07
Replacing Username/Password with Software-Only Two-Factor Authentication
Michael Scott
Cryptographic protocols

It is basically a solved problem for a server to authenticate itself to a client using standard methods of Public Key cryptography. The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) supports the SSL protocol which in turn enables this functionality. The single-point-of-failure in PKI, and hence the focus of attacks, is the Certification Authority. However this entity is commonly off-line, well defended, and not easily got at. For a client to authenticate itself to the server is much more problematical....

2011/633 (PDF) Last updated: 2012-03-06
Practical realisation and elimination of an ECC-related software bug attack
B. B. Brumley, M. Barbosa, D. Page, F. Vercauteren
Cryptographic protocols

We analyse and exploit implementation features in OpenSSL version 0.9.8g which permit an attack against ECDH-based functionality. The attack, although more general, can recover the entire (static) private key from an associated SSL server via $633$ adaptive queries when the NIST curve P-256 is used. One can view it as a software-oriented analogue of the bug attack concept due to Biham et al. and, consequently, as the first bug attack to be successfully applied against a real-world system. ...

2011/526 (PDF) (PS) Last updated: 2011-09-26
Universally Composable Security Analysis of OAuth v2.0
Suresh Chari, Charanjit Jutla, Arnab Roy

This paper defines an ideal functionality for delegation of web access to a third-party where the authentication mechanism is password-based. We give a universally-composable (UC) realization of this ideal functionality assuming the availability of an SSL-like ideal functionality. We also show that this implementation can be further refined to give a browser based implementation whenever the browser supports https redirection. This implementation matches the 'Authorization Code' mode of...

2011/406 (PDF) Last updated: 2011-08-11
Composition Theorems Without Pre-Established Session Identifiers
Ralf Kuesters, Max Tuengerthal
Cryptographic protocols

Canetti's universal composition theorem and the joint state composition theorems by Canetti and Rabin are useful and widely employed tools for the modular design and analysis of cryptographic protocols. However, these theorems assume that parties participating in a protocol session have pre-established a unique session ID (SID). While the use of such SIDs is a good design principle, existing protocols, in particular real-world security protocols, typically do not use pre-established SIDs, at...

2011/239 (PDF) Last updated: 2011-06-28
Efficient Software Implementations of Modular Exponentiation
Shay Gueron

RSA computations have a significant effect on the workloads of SSL/TLS servers, and therefore their software implementations on general purpose processors are an important target for optimization. We concentrate here on 512-bit modular exponentiation, used for 1024-bit RSA. We propose optimizations in two directions. At the primitives’ level, we study and improve the performance of an “Almost” Montgomery Multiplication. At the exponentiation level, we propose a method to reduce the cost of...

2011/219 (PDF) Last updated: 2013-02-20
On the Security of TLS-DHE in the Standard Model
Tibor Jager, Florian Kohlar, Sven Schäge, Jörg Schwenk
Cryptographic protocols

TLS is the most important cryptographic protocol in use today. However, up to now there is no complete cryptographic security proof in the standard model, nor in any other model. We give the first such proof for the core cryptographic protocol of TLS ciphersuites based on ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange (TLS-DHE), which include the cipher suite TLS DHE DSS WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA mandatory in TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1. It is impossible to prove security of the TLS Handshake in any classical...

2011/169 (PDF) Last updated: 2011-04-04
Identity-Based Cryptography for Cloud Security
Hongwei Li, Yuanshun Dai, Bo Yang
Public-key cryptography

Cloud computing is a style of computing in which dynamically scalable and commonly virtualized resources are provided as a service over the Internet. This paper, first presents a novel Hierarchical Architecture for Cloud Computing (HACC). Then, Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) and Identity-Based Signature (IBS) for HACC are proposed. Finally, an Authentication Protocol for Cloud Computing (APCC) is presented. Performance analysis indicates that APCC is more efficient and lightweight than SSL...

2010/384 (PDF) Last updated: 2010-07-31
Practical consequences of the aberration of narrow-pipe hash designs from ideal random functions
Danilo Gligoroski, Vlastimil Klima

In a recent note to the NIST hash-forum list, the following observation was presented: narrow-pipe hash functions differ significantly from ideal random functions $H:\{0,1\}^{N} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$ that map bit strings from a big domain where $N=n+m,\ m\geq n$ ($n=256$ or $n=512$). Namely, for an ideal random function with a big domain space $\{0,1\}^{N}$ and a finite co-domain space $Y=\{0,1\}^n$, for every element $y \in Y$, the probability $Pr\{H^{-1}(y) = \varnothing\} \approx...

2010/295 (PDF) Last updated: 2010-10-11
Ideal Key Derivation and Encryption in Simulation-based Security
Ralf Kuesters, Max Tuengerthal
Cryptographic protocols

Many real-world protocols, such as SSL/TLS, SSH, IPsec, IEEE 802.11i, DNSSEC, and Kerberos, derive new keys from other keys. To be able to analyze such protocols in a composable way, in this paper we extend an ideal functionality for symmetric and public-key encryption proposed in previous work by a mechanism for key derivation. We also equip this functionality with message authentication codes (MACs) and ideal nonce generation. We show that the resulting ideal functionality can be realized...

2008/251 (PDF) Last updated: 2008-07-03
Universally Composable Security Analysis of TLS---Secure Sessions with Handshake and Record Layer Protocols
Sebastian Gajek, Mark Manulis, Olivier Pereira, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Jörg Schwenk
Cryptographic protocols

We present a security analysis of the complete TLS protocol in the Universal Composable security framework. This analysis evaluates the composition of key exchange functionalities realized by the TLS handshake with the message transmission of the TLS record layer to emulate secure communication sessions and is based on the adaption of the secure channel model from Canetti and Krawczyk to the setting where peer identities are not necessarily known prior the protocol invocation and may remain...

2007/419 (PDF) Last updated: 2007-11-06
Cryptanalysis of the Random Number Generator of the Windows Operating System
Leo Dorrendorf, Zvi Gutterman, Benny Pinkas
Implementation

The pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) used by the Windows operating system is the most commonly used PRNG. The pseudo-randomness of the output of this generator is crucial for the security of almost any application running in Windows. Nevertheless, its exact algorithm was never published. We examined the binary code of a distribution of Windows 2000, which is still the second most popular operating system after Windows XP. (This investigation was done without any help from Microsoft.)...

2007/061 (PDF) Last updated: 2007-11-22
Accelerating SSL using the Vector processors in IBM's Cell Broadband Engine for Sony's Playstation 3
Neil Costigan, Michael Scott
Implementation

Recently the major performance chip manufacturers have turned to multi-core technology as a more cost effective alternative to ever increasing clock speeds. IBM have introduced the Cell Broadband Engine (Cell) as their next generation CPU to feed the insatiable appetite modern multimedia and number crunching applications have for processing power. The Cell is the technology at the heart of Sonys Playstation 3. The Cell contains a number of specialist synergistic processor units (SPUs)...

2006/212 (PDF) Last updated: 2006-06-26
Reverse SSL: Improved Server Performance and DoS Resistance for SSL Handshakes
Kemal BICAKCI, Bruno Crispo, Andrew S. Tanenbaum
Cryptographic protocols

Common occurrence of server overload and the threat of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks makes highly desirable to improve the performance and DoS resistance of SSL handshakes. In this paper, we tackle these two related problems by proposing reverse SSL, an extension in which the server is relieved from the heavy public key decryption operation and authenticated by means of a digital signature instead. On the server side, reverse SSL employs online/offline signatures to minimize the online...

2006/136 (PDF) Last updated: 2006-04-18
A Challenging but Feasible Blockwise-Adaptive Chosen-Plaintext Attack on SSL
Gregory V. Bard
Implementation

This paper introduces a chosen-plaintext vulnerability in the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Trasport Layer Security (TLS) protocols which enables recovery of low entropy strings such as can be guessed from a likely set of 2--1000 options. SSL and TLS are widely used for securing communication over the Internet. When utilizing block ciphers for encryption, the SSL and TLS standards mandate the use of the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode of encryption which requires an initialization vector...

2006/086 (PDF) Last updated: 2006-03-07
Analysis of the Linux Random Number Generator
Zvi Gutterman, Benny Pinkas, Tzachy Reinman

Linux is the most popular open source project. The Linux random number generator is part of the kernel of all Linux distributions and is based on generating randomness from entropy of operating system events. The output of this generator is used for almost every security protocol, including TLS/SSL key generation, choosing TCP sequence numbers, and file system and email encryption. Although the generator is part of an open source project, its source code (about $2500$ lines of code) is...

2005/189 (PDF) Last updated: 2005-07-06
A Weak-Randomizer Attack on RSA-OAEP with e = 3
Daniel R. L. Brown
Public-key cryptography

Coppersmith's heuristic algorithm for finding small roots of bivariate modular equations can be applied against low-exponent RSA-OAEP if its randomizer is weak. An adversary that knows the randomizer can recover the entire plaintext message, provided it is short enough for Coppersmith's algorithm to work. In practice, messages are symmetric cipher keys and these are potentially short enough for certain sets of key sizes. Weak randomizers could arise in constrained smart cards or in...

2005/037 (PDF) (PS) Last updated: 2005-02-23
Improving Secure Server Performance by Re-balancing SSL/TLS Handshakes
Claude Castelluccia, Einar Mykletun, Gene Tsudik
Public-key cryptography

Much of today's distributed computing takes place in a client/server model. Despite advances in fault tolerance -- in particular, replication and load distribution -- server overload remains to be a major problem. In the Web context, one of the main overload factors is the direct consequence of expensive Public Key operations performed by servers as part of each SSL handshake. Since most SSL-enabled servers use RSA, the burden of performing many costly decryption operations can be very...

2004/314 (PDF) Last updated: 2004-11-17
A Technical Comparison of IPSec and SSL
AbdelNasir Alshamsi, Takamichi Saito
Cryptographic protocols

IPSec (IP Security) and SSL (Secure Socket Layer) have been the most robust and most potential tools available for securing communications over the Internet. Both IPSec and SSL have advantages and shortcomings. Yet no paper has been found comparing the two protocols in terms of characteristic and functionality. Our objective is to present an analysis of security and performance properties for IPSec and SSL.

2004/155 (PDF) Last updated: 2006-09-03
Security and Identification Indicators for Browsers against Spoofing and Phishing Attacks
Amir Herzberg, Ahmad Gbara
Applications

In spite of the use of standard web security measures (SSL/TLS), users enter sensitive information such as passwords into scam web sites. Such scam sites cause substantial damages to individuals and corporations. In this work, we analyze these attacks, and find they often exploit usability failures of browsers. We developed and describe TrustBar, a browser extension for improved secure identification indicators. Users can assign a name/logo to a secure site, presented by TrustBar when the...

2004/111 (PDF) (PS) Last updated: 2004-05-12
The Vulnerability of SSL to Chosen Plaintext Attack
Gregory V. Bard
Cryptographic protocols

The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol is widely used for securing communication over the Internet. When utilizing block ciphers for encryption, the SSL standard mandates the use of the cipher block chaining (CBC) mode of encryption which requires an initialization vector (IV) in order to encrypt. Although the initial IV used by SSL is a (pseudo)random string which is generated and shared during the initial handshake phase, subsequent IVs used by SSL are chosen in a deterministic,...

2003/203 (PDF) (PS) Last updated: 2004-08-13
Novel Efficient Implementations of Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptosystems using Degenerate Divisors
Masanobu Katagi, Izuru Kitamura, Toru Akishita, Tsuyoshi Takagi

It has recently been reported that the performance of hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems (HECC) is competitive to that of elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC). However, it is expected that HECC still can be improved due to their mathematically rich structure. We consider here the application of degenerate divisors of HECC to scalar multiplication. We investigate the operations of the degenerate divisors in the Harley algorithm and the Cantor algorithm of genus 2. The timings of these...

2003/052 (PDF) Last updated: 2003-08-29
Attacking RSA-based Sessions in SSL/TLS
Vlastimil Klima, Ondrej Pokorny, Tomas Rosa

In this paper we present a practically feasible attack on RSA-based sessions in SSL/TLS protocols. These protocols incorporate the PKCS#1 (v. 1.5) encoding method for the RSA encryption of a premaster-secret value. The premaster-secret is the only secret value that is used for deriving all the particular session keys. Therefore, an attacker who can recover the premaster-secret can decrypt the whole captured SSL/TLS session. We show that incorporating a version number check over PKCS#1...

2002/071 (PDF) Last updated: 2002-08-28
Further Results and Considerations on Side Channel Attacks on RSA
Vlastimil Klima, Tomas Rosa
Public-key cryptography

This paper contains three parts. In the first part we present a new side channel attack on plaintext encrypted by EME-OAEP PKCS#1 v.2.1. In contrast with Manger´s attack, we attack that part of the plaintext, which is shielded by the OAEP method. In the second part we show that Bleichenbacher’s and Manger’s attack on the RSA encryption scheme PKCS#1 v.1.5 and EME-OAEP PKCS#1 v.2.1 can be converted to an attack on the RSA signature scheme with any message encoding (not only PKCS). This is a...

2002/027 (PDF) (PS) Last updated: 2002-03-10
Efficient and Non-Malleable Proofs of Plaintext Knowledge and Applications
Jonathan Katz
Cryptographic protocols

We describe very efficient protocols for non-malleable (interactive) proofs of plaintext knowledge for the RSA, Rabin, Paillier, and El-Gamal encryption schemes whose security can be proven in the standard model. We also highlight some important applications of these protocols, where we take care to ensure that our protocols remain secure when run in an asynchronous, concurrent environment: --- Chosen-ciphertext-secure, interactive encryption: In some settings where both parties are on-line...

2001/045 (PS) Last updated: 2001-06-06
The order of encryption and authentication for protecting communications (Or: how secure is SSL?)
Hugo Krawczyk

We study the question of how to generically compose {\em symmetric} encryption and authentication when building ``secure channels'' for the protection of communications over insecure networks. We show that any secure channels protocol designed to work with any combination of secure encryption (against chosen plaintext attacks) and secure MAC must use the encrypt-then-authenticate method. We demonstrate this by showing that the other common methods of composing encryption and authentication,...

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