Chris Hondros/Getty Images Afghan Pashtun tribal elders in the village of Hazi Madad in Afghanistan’s Kandahar Province. 
In Washington, the debate over Afghanistan seems to center around two broad ideas: counterinsurgency versus counterterrorism. Should the United States add troops for a more population-centric strategy, as Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal advocates? Or should it use a less ground-heavy approach, disrupting Al Qaeda with Special Operation Forces and unmanned drones, as Vice President Joseph Biden argues?
There is, of course, no shortage of other ideas, many of them afloat in the blogosphere. Among the more provocative ones has been posted on Steven Pressfield’s blog, It’s the Tribes, Stupid, and it comes from an Army Special Forces major who has spent much time in both Afghanistan and Iraq training indigenous fighters.
The 45-page paper, “One Tribe at a Time” by Maj. Jim Gant, argues
that one way to undermine the insurgency is to return, in part, to the strategy that ousted the Taliban to begin with: Embed small, highly skilled and almost completely autonomous units with tribes across Afghanistan.
Much like the Green Berets who worked with the Northern Alliance to drive out the Taliban in 2001 and 2002, the units, which Major Gant calls Tribal Engagement Teams, would wear Afghan garb and live in Afghan villages for extended periods, training, equipping and fighting alongside tribal militias.
The goal would be to encourage what Major Gant sees as a natural antipathy between many tribes toward some of the more ideological, anti-American segments of the insurgency. Just as the Sunni tribesmen dubbed the Sons of Iraq turned against foreign al-Qaeda fighters in Iraq, Major Gant argues that Tribal Engagement Teams can counter al-Qaeda networks in Afghanistan by creating or strengthening indigenous fighting forces built upon local militias.
That kind of strategy has been discussed in Afghanistan, where critics argue that it would undermine the central government in Kabul and encourage warlordism. But as evidence that it can work, Major Gant cites his own experience as a Special Forces team leader who worked closely with a Pashtun tribe in Konar Province in 2003.
After gradually building the trust of village elders, including by supplying them with weapons, Major Gant said his team started receiving excellent intelligence on locally active insurgents, particularly the militant Islamist party of warlord Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, Hizb-i Islami Gulbaddin.
Expanding the strategy to other tribes along the mountainous borderland would help stem the free flow of fighters and supplies from Pakistan into Afghanistan, Major Gant argues. But it would require not just recruiting and training engagement teams, but also giving them free rein to fight and die alongside Afghan militias.
“The risk averse nature of our current method of operating would have to change,” he writes. “American soldiers would die. Some of them alone, with no support.”
Major Gant acknowledges that not every tribe would welcome American units, no matter how small. He also acknowledges that Afghan distrust of Americans may have grown significantly since 2003. But that can change when small units start embedding in villages, he asserts.
“This is what the tribes want: a commitment,” he said in an e-mail message. “Some skin, some blood, some risk.”
Given the conservative nature of the American military, Major Gant’s ideas would be something of a culture shock. It is also hard to see precisely how the tribal engagement approach work with the counterinsurgency strategy championed by General McChrystal, which emphasizes building the central government over bolstering local tribes, many of which look on Kabul with suspicion.
Major Gant says he will explain in a future paper how tribal engagement is “counterinsurgency at its best.” He also makes an alluring argument for opponents of General McChrystal’s troop-heavy approach: his “light footprint approach,” he writes, “will not only work, but will help to ease the need for larger and larger numbers of U.S. soldiers being deployed to Afghanistan.
Major Gant, who had wanted to return to Afghanistan but is instead heading back to Iraq, where he won a Silver Star, is taking questions on Mr. Pressfield’s blog. It’s not clear whether General McChrystal or Vice President Biden have read the paper. But there’s plenty of dialogue on the Web, including here and here.