Wednesday, July 24, 2024

Country Risk: My 2024 Data Update

After the 2008 market crisis, I resolved that I would be far more organized in my assessments and updating of equity risk premiums, in the United States and abroad, as I looked at the damage that can be inflicted on intrinsic value by significant shifts in risk premiums, i.e., my definition of a crisis. That precipitated my practice of estimating implied equity risk premiums for the S&P 500, at the start of every month, and following up of using those estimated premiums when valuing companies during that month. The 2008 crisis also gave rise to two risk premium papers that I have updated each year: the first looks at equity risk premiums, what they measure, how they vary across time and how best to estimate them, with the last update in March 2024. The second focuses on country risk and how it varies across geographies, with the focus again on determinants, measures and estimation, which I update mid-year each year. This post reflects my most recent update from July 2024 of country risk, and while you can read the entire paper here, I thought I would give you a mildly abridged version in this post.

Country Risk: Determinants

    At the risk of stating the obvious, investing and operating in some countries is much riskier than investing and operating in others, with variations in risk on  multiple dimensions. In the section below, I highlight the differences on four major dimensions - political structure, exposure to war/violence, extent of corruption and protections for legal and property rights, with the focus firmly on the economic risks rather than on social consequences.

a. Political Structure

    Would you rather invest/operate in a democracy than in an autocracy? From a business risk perspective, I would argue that there is a trade off, sometimes making the former more risky than the latter, and sometimes less so. The nature of a democracy is that a government will be less able to promise or deliver long term predictable/stable tax and regulatory law, since losing an election can cause shifts in policy. Consequently, operating and investing in a democratic country will generally come with more risk on a continuous basis, with the risk increasing with partisanship in the country. Autocratic governments are in a better position to promise and deliver stable and predictable business environments, with two caveats. The first is that when change comes in autocracies, it will be both unexpected and large, with wrenching and discontinuous shifts in economic policy. The second is that the absence of checks and balance (legal, legislative, public opinion) will also mean that policy changes can be capricious, often driven by factors that have little to do with business or public welfare. 

    Any attempt to measure political freedom comes with qualifiers, since the biases of the measuring service on what freedoms to elevate and which ones to ignore will play a role, but in the figure below, I report the Economist's Democracy Index, which is based upon five measures - electoral process and pluralism, government functioning, political participation, democratic social culture and civil liberties:

Democracy Index in 2023: Source: The Economist

Based upon the Economist's democracy measures, much of the world remains skewed towards authoritarianism, changing the risk exposures that investors and businesses face when operating in those parts of the world. 

b. War and Violence
    Operating a business becomes much more difficult, when surrounded by war and violence, from both within and outside the country. That difficulty also translates into higher costs, with those businesses that can buy protection or insurance doing so, and those that cannot suffering from damage and lost revenues. Drawing again on an external service, the Institute for Economics and Peace measures exposure to war and violence with a global peace index (with higher scores indicating more propensity towards violence):
Global Peace Index 2024: Source: Institute for Economics & Peace

While Africa and large swaths of Asia are exposed to violence, and Northern Europe and Canada remain peaceful, businesses in much of the world (including the United States) remain exposed to violence, at least according to this measure.

c. Corruption
    As I have argued in prior posts, corruption operates as an implicit tax on businesses, with the tax revenues accruing to middlemen or third parties, rather than the government. 
Corruption Index 2023: Source: Transparency International

Again, while you can argue with the scores and the rankings, it remains undeniable that businesses in much of the world face corruption (and its associated costs). While there are some who attribute it to culture, I believe that the overriding reasons for corruption are systems that are built around licensing and regulatory constraints, with poorly paid bureaucrats operating as the overseers 
    There are other insidious consequences to corruption. First, as corruption becomes brazen, as it is in some parts of the world, there is evidence that companies operating in those settings are more likely to evade paying taxes to the government, thus redirecting tax revenues from the government to private players. Second, companies that are able and willing to play the corruption game will be put at an advantage over companies that are unable or unwilling to do so, creating a version of Gresham's law in businesses, where the least honorable businesses win out at the expense of the most honorable and honest ones. 

d. Legal and Property Rights
    When operating a business or making an investment, you are reliant on a legal system to back up your ownership rights, and to the extent that it does not do so, your business and investment will be worth less. The Property Rights Alliance, an entity that attempts to measure the strength of property rights, by country, measured property rights (physical and intellectual) around the world, to come up with a composite measure of these rights, with higher values translating into more rights. Their most recent update, from 2023, is captured in the picture below:

Property Rights Index 2023: Source: The Property Rights Alliance

Again, there are wide differences in property rights across the world; they are strongest in the North America and Europe and weakest in Africa and Latin America. Within each of these regions, though, there are variations across countries; within Latin America, Chile and Uruguay rank in the top quartile of countries with stronger property rights, but Venezuela and Bolivia are towards the bottom of the list. In assessing protections of property rights, it is worth noting that it is not only the laws that protect them that need to be looked at, but also the timeliness of legal action. A court that takes decades to act on violations of property rights is almost as bad as a court that does not enforce those rights at all.
    One manifestation of property right violation is nationalization, and here again there remain parts of the world, especially with natural resource businesses, where the risks of expropriation have increased. A Sustainalytics report that looked at metal miners documented 165 incidents of resources nationalization between 2017 and 2021, impacting 87 mining companies, with 22 extreme cases, where local governments ending contracts with foreign miners. Maplecroft, a risk management company, mapped out the trendline on nationalization risk in natural resources in the figure below:

Source: Maplecroft

National security is the reason that some governments use to justify public ownership of key resources. For instance, in 2022, Mexico created a state-owned company, Litio Para Mexico, to have a monopoly on lithium mining in the country, and announced a plan to renegotiate previously granted concessions to private companies to extract the resource.

Country Risk: External factors
    Looking at the last section, you would not be faulted for believing that country risk exposure is self-determined, and that countries can become less risky by working on reducing corruption, increasing  legal protections for property rights, making themselves safer and working on more predictable economic policies.  That is true, but there are three factors that are largely out of their control that can still drive country risk upwards.

1. Commodity Dependence
    Some countries are dependent upon a specific commodity, product or service for their economic success. That dependence can create additional risk for investors and businesses, since a drop in the commodity’s price or demand for the product/service can create severe economic pain that spreads well beyond the companies immediately affected. Thus, if a country derives 50% of its economic output from iron ore, a drop in the price of iron ore will cause pain not only for mining companies but also for retailers, restaurants and consumer product companies in the country. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) measures the degree to which a country is dependent on commodities, by looking at the percentage of its export revenues come from a commodities, and the figure below captures their findings:
Proportion of revenues from commodities- 2019-2021; Source: UNCTAD

Why don’t countries that derive a disproportionate amount of their economy from a single source diversify their economies? That is easier said than done, for two reasons. First, while it is feasible for larger countries like Brazil, India, and China to try to broaden their economic bases, it is much more difficult for small countries like Peru or Angola to do the same. Like small companies, these small countries have to find a niche where they can specialize, and by definition, niches will lead to over dependence upon one or a few sources. Second, and this is especially the case with natural resource dependent countries, the wealth that can be created by exploiting the natural resource will usually be far greater than using resources elsewhere in the economy, which may explain the inability of economies in the Middle East to wean itself away from oil. 

II. Life Cycle dynamics
    As readers of this blog should be aware, I am fond of using the corporate life cycle structure to explain why companies behave (or misbehave) and how investment philosophies vary. At the risk of pushing that structure to its limits, I believe that countries also go through a life cycle, with different challenges and risks at each stage:

The link between life cycle and economic risk is worth emphasizing because it illustrates the limitations on the powers that countries have over their exposure to risk. A country that is still in the early stages of economic growth will generally have more risk exposure than a mature country, even if it is well governed and has a solid legal system. The old investment saying that gain usually comes with pain, also applies to operating and investing across the globe. While your risk averse side may lead you to direct your investments and operations to the safest parts of the world (say, Canada and Northern Europe), the highest growth is generally in the riskiest parts of the world.

3. Climate Change
    The globe is warming up, and no matter where you fall on the human versus nature debate, on causation, some countries are more exposed to global warming than others. That risk is not just to the health and wellbeing of those who live within the borders of these countries, but represents economic risks, manifesting as higher costs of maintaining day-to-day activity or less economic production.  To measure climate change, we turned to ResourceWatch, a global partnership of public, private and civil society organizations convened by the World Resources Institute. This institute measure climate change exposure with a climate risk index (CRI), measuring the extent to which countries have been affected by extreme weather events (meteorological, hydrological, and climatological), and their most recent measures (from 2021, with an update expected late in 2024) of global exposure to climate risk is in the figure below:
Climate Risk Index (CRI) in 2021: ResourceWatch

Note that higher scores on the index indicate more exposure to country risk, and much of Africa, Latin America and Asia are exposed. In fact, since this map was last updated in 2021, it is conceivable that climate risk exposure has increased across the globe and that even the green regions are at risk of slipping away into dangerous territory.

Country Life Cycle - Measures
    With that long lead in on the determinants of country risk, and the forces that can leave risk elevated, let us look at how best to measure country risk exposure. We will start with sovereign ratings, which are focused on country default risk, because they are the most widely used country risk proxies, before moving on to country risk scores, from public and private services, and closing with measures of risk premiums that equity investors in these countries should charge.

1. Sovereign Default Risk
    The ratings agencies that rate corporate bonds for default risk also rate countries, with sovereign ratings, with countries with higher (lower) perceived default risk receiving lower (higher) ratings. I know that ratings agencies are viewed with skepticism, and much of that skepticism is deserved, but it is undeniable that ratings and default risk are closely tied, especially over longer periods. The figure below summarizes sovereign ratings from Moody's in July 2024:
Moody's Sovereign Ratings in July 2023; Source: Moody's

If you compare these ratings to those that I reported in my last update, a year ago, you will notice that the ratings are stagnant for most countries, and when there is change, it is small. That remains my pet peeve with the rating agencies, which is not that they are biased or even wrong, but that they are slow to react to changes on the ground. For those searching for an alternative, there is the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) market, where you can market assessments of default risk. The figure below summarizes the spreads for the roughly 80 countries, where they are available:
Sovereign CDS Spreads on June 30, 2024: Source: Bloomberg

Sovereign CDS spreads reflect the pluses and minuses of a market-based measure, adjusting quickly to changes on the ground in a country, but sometimes overshooting as markets overreact. As you can see, the sovereign CDS market views India as safer than suggested by the ratings agencies, and for the first time, in my tracking, as safer than China (Sovereign CDS for India is 0.83% and for China is 1.05%, as of June 30, 2024).

2. Country Risk Scores
    Ubiquitous as sovereign ratings are, they represent a narrow measure of country risk, focused entirely on default risk. Thus, much of the Middle East looks safe, from a default risk perspective, but there are clearly political and economic risks that are not being captured. One antidote is to use a risk score that brings in these missed risks, and while there are many services that provide these scores, I use the ones supplied by Political Risk Services (PRS). PRS uses twenty two variables to measure country risk, whey then capture with a country risk score, from 0 to 100, with the riskiest countries having the lowest scores and the safest countries, the highest:

Country risk scores in July 2024: Political Risk Services

While I appreciate the effort that goes into these scores, I have issues with some of the scoring, as I am sure that you do. For instance, I find it incomprehensible that Libya and the United States share roughly the same PRS score, and that Saudi Arabia is safer than much of Europe. That said, I have tried other country risk scoring services (the Economist, The World Bank) and I find myself disagreeing with individual country scoring there as well.

3. Equity Risk Premiums
    Looking at operations and investing, through the eyes of equity investors, the risk that you care about is the equity risk premium, a composite measure that you then incorporate into expected returns. I don't claim to have prescience or even the best approach for estimating these equity risk premiums, but I have consistently followed the same approach for the last three decades. I start with the sovereign ratings, if available, and estimate default spreads based upon these ratings, and I then scale up these ratings for the fact that equities are riskier than government bonds. I then add these country risk premiums to my estimate of the implied equity risk premium for the S&P 500, to arrive at equity risk premiums, by country. 

For countries which have no sovereign ratings, I start with the country risk score from PRS for that country, find other (rated) countries with similar PRS scores, and extrapolate their ratings-based equity risk premiums. The final picture, at least as I see it in 2024, for equity risk premiums is below:

Download spreadsheet
You will undoubtedly disagree with the equity risk premiums that I attach to at least some of the countries on this list, and perhaps strongly disagree with my estimate for your native country, but you should perhaps take issue with Moody's or PRS, if that is so.

Country Risk in Decision Making

    At this point, your reaction to this discussion might be "so what?", since you may see little use for these concepts in practice, either as a business or as an investor. In this section, I will argue that understanding equity risk premiums, and how they vary across geographies, can be critical in both business and personal investing.

Country Risk in Business

    Most corporate finance classes and textbooks leave students with the proposition that the right hurdle rate to use in assessing business investments is the cost of capital, but create a host of confusion about what exactly that cost of capital measures. Contrary to popular wisdom, the cost of capital to use when assessing investment quality has little to do with the cost of raising financing for a company and more to do with coming up with an opportunity cost, i.e., a rate of return that the company can generate on investments of equivalent risk. Thus defined, you can see that the cost of capital that a company uses for an investment should reflect both the business risk as well as where in the world that investment is located. For a multinational consumer product company, such as Coca Cola, the cost of capital used to assess the quality of a Brazilian beverage project should be very different from the cost of capital estimated for a German beverage project, even if both are estimated in US dollars. The picture below captures the ingredients that go into a hurdle rate:

Thus, in computing costs of equity and capital for its Brazil and German projects, Coca Cola will be drawing on the equity risk premiums for Brazil (7.87%) and Germany (4.11%), leading to higher hurdle rates for the former.

    The implications for multi-business, multi-national companies is that there is no one corporate cost of capital that can be used in assessing investments, since it will vary both across businesses and across geographies. A company in five businesses and ten geographies, with have fifty different costs of capital, and while you complaint may that this is too complicated, ignoring it and using one corporate cost of capital will lead you to cross subsidization, with the safest businesses and geographies subsidizing the riskiest.

Country Risk in Investing

    As investors, we invest in companies, not projects, with those companies often having exposures in many countries. While it is possible to value a company in pieces, by valuing each its operations in each country, the absence of information at the country level often leads us to valuing the entire company, and when doing so, the risk exposure for that company comes from where it operates, not where it does business. Thus, when computing its cost of equity, you should look not only at its businesss risk, but what parts of the world it operates in:

In intrinsic valuation, this will imply that a company with more of its operations in risky countries will be worth less than a company with equivalent earnings, growth and cash flows with operations in safer countries. Thus, rather than look at where a company is incorporated and traded, we should be looking at where it operates, both in terms of production and revenues; Nvidia is a company incorporated and traded in the United States, but as a chip designed almost entirely dependent on TSMC for its chip manufacture, it is exposed to China risk.

    It is true that most investors price companies, rather than value them, and use pricing metrics (PE ratios, EV to EBITDA) to judge cheap or expensive. If our assessment of country risk hold, we should expect to see variations in these pricing metrics across geographies. We computed EV to EBITDA multiples, based upon aggregate enterprise value and EBITDA, by country, in July 2024, and the results are captured in the figure below:

Source: Raw data from S&P Capital IQ

The results are mixed. While some of the riskiest parts of the world trade at low multiples of EBITDA, a significant part of Europe also does, including France and Norway. In fact, India trades at the highest multiple of EBITDA of any country in the world, representing how growth expectations can trump risk concerns. 

Currency Effects

    You may find it odd that I have spent so much of this post talking about country risk, without bringing up currencies, but that was not an oversight. It is true that riskier countries often have more volatile currencies that depreciate over time, but this more a symptom of country risk, than a cause. As I will argue in this section, currency choice affects your growth, cash flow and discount rate estimates, but ultimately should have no effect on intrinsic value.    

    If you value a company in US dollars, rather than Indian rupees, should the numbers in your valuation be different? Of course, but the reason for the differences lies in the fact that different currencies bring different inflation expectations with them, and the key is to stay consistent:


If expected inflation is lower in US dollars than in rupees, the cost of capital that you should obtain for a company in US dollars will be lower than the cost of capital in rupees, with the difference reflecting the expected inflation differential. However, since your cash flows will also then have to be in US dollars, the expected growth that you should use should reflect the lower inflation rate in dollars, and if you stay consistent in your inflation estimates, the effects should cancel out. This is not just theory, but common sense. Currency is a measurement mechanism, and to claim that a company is undervalued in one currency (say, the rupee) while claiming that it is overvalued at the same time in another currency (say, the US dollar) makes no sense. To practitioners who will counter with examples, where the value is different, when you switch currencies, my response is that there is a currency view (that the rupee is under or over priced relative to the dollar) in your valuation in your valuation, and that view should not be bundled together with your company story in a valuation.

    As we noted in the last section, the place that currency enters your valuation is in the riskfree rate, and if my assertion about expected inflation is right, variations in riskfree rates can be attributed entirely to difference in expected inflation. At the start of July 2024, for instance, I estimated the riskfree rates in every currency, using the US treasury bond rate as my dollar riskfree rate, and the differential inflation between the currency in question and the US dollar:

My estimates are in the appendix to this post. In the same vein, inflation also enters into expected exchange rate calculations:

This is, of course, the purchasing power parity theorem, and while currencies can deviate from this in the short term, it remains the best way to ensure that your currency views do not hijack your valuation.

YouTube Video


My Country risk premium paper
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Friday, February 16, 2024

Catastrophic Risk: Investing and Business Implications

    In the context of valuing companies, and sharing those valuations, I do get suggestions from readers on companies that I should value next. While I don't have the time or the bandwidth to value all of the suggested companies, a reader from Iceland, a couple of weeks ago, made a suggestion on a company to value that I found intriguing. He suggested Blue Lagoon, a well-regarded Icelandic Spa with a history of profitability, that was finding its existence under threat, as a result of volcanic activity in Southwest Iceland. In another story that made the rounds in recent weeks, 23andMe, a genetics testing company that offers its customers genetic and health information, based upon saliva sample, found itself facing the brink, after a hacker claimed to have hacked the site and accessed the genetic information of millions of its customers. Stepping back a bit, one claim that climate change advocates have made not just about fossil fuel companies, but about all businesses, is that investors are underestimating the effects that climate change will have on economic systems and on value. These are three very different stories, but what they share in common is a fear, imminent or expected, of a catastrophic event that may put a company's business at risk. 

Deconstructing Risk

   While we may use statistical measures like volatility or correlation to measure risk in practice, risk is not a statistical abstraction. Its impact is not just financial, but emotional and physical, and it predates markets. The risks that our ancestors faced, in the early stages of humanity, were physical, coming from natural disasters and predators, and physical risks remained the dominant form of risk that humans were exposed to, almost until the Middle Ages. In fact, the separation of risk into physical and financial risk took form just a few hundred years ago, when trade between Europe and Asia required ships to survive storms, disease and pirates to make it to their destinations; shipowners, ensconced in London and Lisbon, bore the financial risk, but the sailors bore the physical risk. It is no coincidence that the insurance business, as we know it, traces its history back to those days as well.

    I have no particular insights to offer on physical risk, other than to note that while taking on physical risks for some has become a leisure activity, I have no desire to climb Mount Everest or jump out of an aircraft. Much of the risk that I think about is related to risks that businesses face, how that risk affects their decision-making and how much it affects their value. If you start enumerating every risk a business is exposed to, you will find yourself being overwhelmed by that list, and it is for that reason that I categorize risk into the groupings that I described in an earlier post on risk. I want to focus in this post on the third distinction I drew on risk, where I grouped risk into discrete risk and continuous risk, with the later affecting businesses all the time and the former showing up infrequently, but often having much larger impact. Another, albeit closely related, distinction is between incremental risk, i.e., risk that can change earnings, growth, and thus value, by material amounts, and catastrophic risk, which is risk that can put a company's survival at risk, or alter its trajectory dramatically.

    There are a multitude of factors that can give rise to catastrophic risk, and it is worth highlighting them, and examining the variations that you will observe across different catastrophic risk. Put simply, a  volcanic eruption, a global pandemic, a hack of a company's database and the death of a key CEO are all catastrophic events, but they differ on three dimensions:

  1. Source: I started this post with a mention of a volcano eruption in Iceland put an Icelandic business at risk, and natural disasters can still be a major factor determining the success or failure of businesses. It is true that there are insurance products available to protect against some of these risks, at least in some parts of the world, and that may allow companies in Florida (California) to live through the risks from hurricanes (earthquakes), albeit at a cost.  Human beings add to nature's catastrophes with wars and terrorism wreaking havoc not just on human lives, but also on businesses that are in their crosshairs. As I noted in my post on country risk, it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to build and preserve a business, when you operate in a part of the world where violence surrounds you. In some cases, a change in regulatory or tax law can put the business model for a company or many company at risk. I confess that the line between whether nature or man is to blame for some catastrophes is a gray one and to illustrate, consider the COVID crisis in 2020. Even if you believe you know the origins of COVID (a lab leak or a natural zoonotic spillover), it is undeniable that the choices made by governments and people exacerbated its consequences. 
  2. Locus of Damage: Some catastrophes created limited damage, perhaps isolated to a single business, but others can create damage that extends across a sector geographies or the entire economy. The reason that the volcano eruptions in Iceland are not creating market tremors is because the damage is likely to be isolated to the businesses, like Blue Lagoon, in the path of the lava, and more generally to Iceland, an astonishingly beautiful country, but one with a small economic footprint. An earthquake in California will affect a far bigger swath of companies, partly because the state is home to the fifth largest economy in the world, and the pandemic in 2020 caused an economic shutdown that had consequences across all business, and was catastrophic for the hospitality and travel businesses.
  3. Likelihood: There is a third dimension on which catastrophic risks can vary, and that is in terms of likelihood of occurrence. Most catastrophic risks are low-probability events, but those low probabilities can become high likelihood events, with the passage of time. Going back to the stories that I started this post with, Iceland has always had volcanos, as have other parts of the world, and until recently, the likelihood that those volcanos would become active was low. In a similar vein, pandemics have always been with us, with a history of wreaking havoc, but in the last few decades, with the advance of medical science, we assumed that they would stay contained. In both cases, the probabilities shifted dramatically, and with it, the expected consequences.

Business owners can try to insulate themselves from catastrophic risk, but as we will see in the next sections those protections may not exist, and even if they do, they may not be complete. In fact, as the probabilities of catastrophic risk increase, it will become more and more difficult to protect yourself against the risk.

Dealing with catastrophic risk

    It is undeniable that catastrophic risk affects the values of businesses, and their market pricing, and it is worth examining how it plays out in each domain. I will start this section with what, at least for me, I is familiar ground, and look at how to incorporate the presence of catastrophic risk, when valuing businesses and markets. I will close the section by looking at the equally interesting question of how markets price catastrophic risk, and why pricing and value can diverge (again).

Catastrophic Risk and Intrinsic Value

    Much as we like to dress up intrinsic value with models and inputs, the truth is that intrinsic valuation at its core is built around a simple proposition: the value of an asset or business is the present value of the expected cash flows on it:

That equation gives rise to what I term the "It Proposition", which is that for "it" to have value, "it" has to affect either the expected cashflows or the risk of an asset or business. This simplistic proposition has served me well when looking at everything from the value of intangibles, as you can see in this post that I had on Birkenstock, to the emptiness at the heart of the claim that ESG is good for value, in this post. Using that framework to analyze catastrophic risk, in all of its forms, its effects can show in almost every input into intrinsic value:


Looking at this picture, your first reaction might be confusion, since the practical question you will face when you value Blue Lagoon, in the face of a volcanic eruption, and 23andMe, after a data hack, is which of the different paths to incorporating catastrophic risks into value you should adopt. To address this, I created a flowchart that looks at catastrophic risk on two dimensions, with the first built around whether you can buy insurance or protection that insulates the company against its impact and the other around whether it is risk that is specific to a business or one that can spill over and affect many businesses.


As you can see from this flowchart, your adjustments to intrinsic value, to reflect catastrophic risk will vary, depending upon the risk in question, whether it is insurable and whether it will affect one/few companies or many/all companies. 

A.  Insurable Risk: Some catastrophic risks can be insured against, and even if firms choose not to avail themselves of that insurance, the presence of the insurance option can ease the intrinsic valuation process. 
  • Intrinsic Value Effect: If the catastrophic risk is fully insurable, as is sometimes the case, your intrinsic valuation became simpler, since all you have to do is bring in the insurance cost into your expenses, lowering income and cash flows, leave discount rates untouched, and let the valuation play out. Note that you can do this, even if the company does not actually buy the insurance, but you will need to find out the cost of that foregone insurance and incorporate it yourself. 
  • Pluses: Simplicity and specificity, because all this approach needs is a line item in the income statement (which will either exist already, if the company is buying insurance, or can be estimated). 
  • Minuses: You may not be able to insure against some risks, either because they are uncommon (and actuaries are unable to estimate probabilities well enough, to set premiums) or imminent (the likelihood of the event happening is so high, that the premiums become unaffordable). Thus, Blue Lagoon (the Icelandic spa that is threatened by a volcanic eruption) might have been able to buy insurance against volcanic eruption a few years ago, but will not be able to do so now, because the risk is imminent. Even when risks are insurable, there is a second potential problem. The insurance may pay off, in the event of the catastrophic event, but it may not offer complete protection. Thus, using Blue Lagoon again as an example, and assuming that the company had the foresight to buy insurance against volcanic eruptions a few years ago, all the insurance may do is rebuild the spa, but it will not compensate the company for lost revenues, as customers are scared away by the fear of  volcanic eruptions. In short, while there are exceptions, much of insurance insures assets rather than cash flow streams.
  • Applications: When valuing businesses in developed markets, we tend to assume that these businesses have insured themselves against most catastrophic risks and ignore them in valuation consequently. Thus, you see many small Florida-based resorts valued, with no consideration given to hurricanes that they will be exposed to, because you assume that they are fully insured. In the spirit of the “trust, but verity” proposition, you should probably check if that is true, and then follow up by examining how complete the insurance coverage is.
2. Uninsurable Risk, Going-concern, Company-specific: When a catastrophic risk is uninsurable, the follow up questions may lead us to decide that while the risk will do substantial damage, the injured firms will continue in existence. In addition, if the risk affects only one or a few firms, rather than wide swathes of the market, there are intrinsic value implications.
  • Intrinsic Value Effect: If the catastrophic risk is not insurable, but the business will survive its occurrence even in a vastly diminished state, you should consider doing two going-concern valuations, one with the assumption that there is no catastrophe and one without, and then attaching a probability to the catastrophic event occurring. 
    Expected Value with Catastrophe = Value without Catastrophe (1 – Probability of Catastrophe) + Value with Catastrophe (Probability of Catastrophe)
    In these intrinsic valuations, much of the change created by the catastrophe will be in the cash flows, with little or no change to costs of capital, at least in companies where investors are well diversified.

  • Pluses: By separating the catastrophic risk scenario from the more benign outcomes, you make the problem more tractable, since trying to adjust expected cash flows and discount rates for widely divergent outcomes is difficult to do.
  • Minuses: Estimating the probability of the catastrophe may require specific skills that you do not have, but consulting those who do have those skills can help, drawing on meteorologists for hurricane prediction and on seismologists for earthquakes. In addition, working through the effect on value of the business, if the catastrophe occurs, will stretch your estimation skills, but what options do you have?
  • Applications: This approach comes into play for many different catastrophic risks that businesses face, including the loss of a key employee, in a personal-service business, and I used it in my post on valuing key persons in businesses. You can also use it to assess the effect on value of a loss of a big contract for a small company, where that contract accounts for a significant portion of total revenues. It can also be used to value a company whose business models is built upon the presence or absence of a regulation or law, in which case a change in that regulation or law can change value. 

3. Uninsurable Risk. Failure Risk, Company-specific: When a risk is uninsurable and its manifestation can cause a company to fail, it poses a challenge for intrinsic value, which is, at its core, designed to value going concerns. Attempts to increase the discount rate, to bring in catastrophic risk, or applying an arbitrary discount on value almost never work.
  • Intrinsic Value Effect: If the catastrophic risk is not insurable, and the business will not survive, if the risk unfolds, the approach parallels the previous one, with the difference being that that the failure value of the business, i.e, what you will generate in cash flows, if it fails, replaces the intrinsic valuation, with catastrophic risk built in:
    Expected Value with Catastrophe = Value without Catastrophe (1 – Probability of Catastrophe) + Failure Value (Probability of Catastrophe)
    The failure value will come from liquidation the assets, or what is left of them, after the catastrophe.
  • Pluses: As with the previous approach, separating the going concern from the failure values can help in the estimation process. Trying to estimate cash flows, growth rates and cost of capital for a company across both scenarios (going concern and failure) is difficult to do, and it is easy to double count risk or miscount it. It is fanciful to assume that you can leave the expected cash flows as is, and then adjust the cost of capital upwards to reflect the default risk, because discount rates are blunt instruments, designed more to capture going-concern risk than failure risk. 
  • Minuses: As in the last approach, you still have to estimate a probability that a catastrophe will occur, and in addition, and there can be challenges in estimating the value of a business, if the company fails in the face of catastrophic risk.
  • Applications: This is the approach that I use to value highly levered., cyclical or commodity companies, that can deliver solid operating and equity values in periods where they operate as going concerns, but face distress or bankruptcy, in the face of a severe recession. And for a business like the Blue Lagoon, it may be the only pathway left to estimate the value, with the volcano active, and erupting, and it may very well be true that the failure value can be zero.
4 & 5 Uninsurable Risk. Going Concern or Failure, Market or Sector wide: If a risk can affect many or most firms, it does have a secondary impact on the returns investors expect to make, pushing up costs of capital.
  • Intrinsic Value Effect: The calculations for cashflows are identical to those done when the risks are company-specific, with cash flows estimated with and without the catastrophic risk, but since these risks are sector-wide or market-wide, there will also be an effect on discount rates. Investors will either see more relative risk (or beta) in these companies, if the risks affect an entire sector, or in equity risk premiums, if they are market-wide. Note that these higher discount rates apply in both scenarios.
  • Pluses: The risk that is being built into costs of equity is the risk that cannot be diversified away and there are pathways to estimating changes in relative risk or equity risk premiums. 
  • Minuses: The conventional approaches to estimating betas, where you run a regression of past stock returns against the market, and equity risk premiums, where you trust in historical risk premiums and history, will not work at delivering the adjustments that you need to make.
  • Applications: My argument for using implied equity risk premiums is that they are dynamic and forward-looking. Thus, during COVID, when the entire market was exposed to the economic effects of the pandemic, the implied ERP for the market jumped in the first six weeks of the pandemic, when the concerns about the after effects were greatest, and then subsided in the months after, as the fear waned:

    In a different vein, one reason that I compute betas by industry grouping, and update them every year, is in the hope that risks that cut across a sector show up as changes in the industry averages. In 2009, for instance, when banks were faced with significant regulatory changes brought about in response to the 2008 crisis, the average beta for banks jumped from 0.71 at the end of 2007 to 0.85 two years later.
Catastrophic Risk and Pricing
    The intrinsic value approach assumes that we, as business owners and investors, look at catastrophic risk rationally, and make our assessments based upon how it will play out in cashflows, growth and risk. In truth, is worth remembering key insights from psychology, on how we, as human beings, deal with threats (financial and physical) that we view as existential.
  • The first response is denial, an unwillingness to think about catastrophic risks. As someone who lives in a home close to one of California's big earthquake faults, and two blocks from the Pacific Ocean, I can attest to this response, and offer the defense that in its absence, I would wither away from anxiety and fear. 
  • The second is panic, when the catastrophic risk becomes imminent, where the response is to flee, leaving much of what you have behind. 
When looking at how the market prices in the expectation of a catstrophe occurring and its consequences, both these human emotions play out, as the overpricing of businesses that face catastrophic risk, when it is low probability and distant, and the underpricing of these same businesses when catastrophic risk looms large. 

    To see this process at work, consider again how the market initially reacted to the COVID crisis in terms of repricing companies that were at the heart of the crisis. Between February 14, 2020 and March 23, 2020, when fear peaked, the sectors most exposed to the pandemic (hospitality, airlines) saw a decimation in their market prices, during that period:


With catastrophic risk that are company-specific, you see the same phenomenon play out. The market capitalization of many young pharmaceutical company have been wiped out by the failure of blockbuster drug, in trials. PG&E, the utility company that provides power to large portions of California saw its stock price halved after wildfires swept through California, and investors worried about the culpability of the company in starting them. 
    The most fascinating twist on how markets deal with risks that are existential is their pricing of fossil fuel companies over the last two decades, as concerns about climate change have taken center stage, with fossil fuels becoming the arch villain. The expectation that many impact investors had, at least early in this game, was that relentless pressure from regulators and backlash from consumers and investors would reduce the demand for oil, reducing the profitability and expected lives of fossil fuel companies.  To examine whether markets reflect this view, I looked at the pricing of fossil fuel stocks in the aggregate, starting in 2000 and going through 2023:

In the graph to the left, I chart out the total market value for all fossil fuel companies, and note a not unsurprising link to oil prices. In fact, the one surprise is that fossil fuel stocks did not see surges in market capitalization between 2011 and 2014, even as oil prices surged.  While fossil fuel pricing multiples have gone up and down, I have computed the average on both in the 2000-2010 period and again in the 2011-2023 period. If the latter period is the one of enlightenment, at least on climate change, with warnings of climate change accompanied by trillions of dollars invested in combating it, it is striking how little impact it has had on how markets, and investors in the aggregate, view fossil fuel companies. In fact, there is evidence that the business pressure on fossil fuel companies has become less over time, with fossil fuel stocks rebounding in the last three years, and fossil fuel companies increasing investments and acquisitions in the fossil fuel space. 
    Impact investors would point to this as evidence of the market being in denial, and they may be right, but market participants may point back at impact investing, and argue that the markets may be reflecting an unpleasant reality which is that despite all of the talk of climate change being an existential problem, we are just as dependent on fossil fuels today, as we were a decade or two decades ago:

Don’t get me wrong! It is possible, perhaps even likely, that investors are not pricing in climate change not just in fossil fuel stocks, and that there is pain awaiting them down the road. It is also possible that at least in this case, that the market's assessment that doomsday is not imminent and that humanity will survive climate change, as it has other existential crises in the past. 
    
Mr. Market versus Mad Max Thunderdome
    The question posed about fossil fuel investors and whether they are pricing in the risks of gclimated change can be generalized to a whole host of other questions about investor behavior. Should buyers be paying hundreds of millions of dollars for a Manhattan office building, when all of New York may be underwater in a few decades? Lest I be accused of pointing fingers, what will happen to the value of my house that is currently two blocks from the beach, given the prediction of rising oceans. The painful truth is that if doomsday events (nuclear war, mega asteroid hitting the earth, the earth getting too hot for human existence) manifest, it is survival that becomes front and center, not how much money you have in your portfolio. Thus, ignoring Armageddon scenarios when valuing businesses and assets may be completely rational, and taking investors to task for not pricing assets correctly will do little to alter their trajectory! There is a lesson here for policy makers and advocates, which is that preaching that the planet is headed for the apocalypse, even if you believe it is true, will induce behavior that will make it more likely to happen, not less.
    On a different note, you probably know that I am deeply skeptical about sustainability, at least as preached from the Harvard Business School pulpit. It remains ill-defined, morphing into whatever its proponents want it to mean. The catastrophic risk discussion presents perhaps a version of sustainability that is defensible. To the extent that all businesses are exposed to catastrophic risks, some company-level and some having broader effects, there are actions that businesses can take to, if not protect to themselves, at least cushion the impact of these risks. A personal-service business, headed by an aging key person, will be well served designing a succession plan for someone to step in when the key person leaves (by his or her choice or an act of God). No global company was ready for COVID in 2020, but some were able to adapt much faster than others because they were built to be adaptable. Embedded in this discussion are also the limits to sustainability, since the notion of sustaining  a business at any cost is absurd. Building in adaptability and safeguards against catastrophic risk makes sense only if the costs of doing so are less than the potential benefits, a simple but powerful lesson that many sustainability advocates seem to ignore, when they make grandiose prescriptions for what businesses should and should not do to avoid the apocalypse.

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Thursday, February 8, 2024

The Seven Samurai: How Big Tech Rescued the Market in 2023!

I was planning to finish my last two data updates for 2024, but decided to take a break and look at the seven stocks (Apple, Amazon, Alphabet, Meta, Microsoft, Nvidia and Tesla) which carried the market in 2023. While I will use the "Magnificent Seven" moniker attached by these companies by investors and the media, my preference would have been to call them the Seven Samurai. After all, like their namesakes in that legendary Kurosawa movie, who saved a village and its inhabitants from destruction, these seven stocks saved investors from having back-to-back disastrous years in the stock market.

The What?

    It is worth remembering that the Magnificent Seven (Mag Seven) had their beginnings in the FANG (Facebook, Amazon, Netflix and Google) stocks, in the middle of the last decade, which morphed into the FANGAM (with the addition of Apple and Microsoft to the group) and then to the Mag Seven, with the removal of Netflix from the mix, and the addition of Tesla and Nvidia to the group. There is clearly hindsight bias in play here, since bringing in the best performing stocks of a period into a group can always create groups that have supernormal historical returns. That bias notwithstanding, these seven companies have been extraordinary investments, not just in 2023, but over the last decade, and there are lessons that we can learn from looking at the past.

    First, let's look at the performance of these seven stocks in 2023, when their collective market capitalization increased by a staggering $5.1 trillion during the course of the year. In a group of standout stocks, Nvidia and Meta were the best performers, with the former more than and the later almost tripling in value over the period. In terms of dollar value added, Microsoft and Apple each added a trillion dollars to their market capitalizations, during the year.


To understand how much these stocks meant for overall market performance, recognize that these seven companies accounted for more than 50% of the increase in market capitalization of the the entire US equity market (which included 6658 listed companies in 2023). With them, US equities had price appreciation of 23.25% for the year, but without them, the year would have been an average one, with returns on 12.6%.

    While these seven stocks had an exceptional year in 2023, their outperformance stretches back for a much longer period. In the graph below, I look at the cumulated market capitalization of the Mag Seven stocks, and the market capitalization of all of the remaining US stocks from 2012 to 2023:


Over the eleven-year period, the cumulative market capitalization of the seven companies has risen from $1.1 trillion in 2012 to $12 trillion in 2023, rising from 7.97% of overall US market cap in 2012 to 24.51% of overall market cap at the end of 2023.  To put these numbers in perspective, the Mag Seven companies now have a market capitalization larger than that of all listed stocks in China, the second largest market in the world in market capitalization terms.

    Another way to see how much owning or not owning these stocks meant for investors, I estimated the cumulated value of $100 invested in December 2012 in a market-cap weighted index of US stocks at the end of 2023, first in US equities , and then in US equities, without the Mag Seven stocks:

It is striking that removing seven stocks from a portfolio of 6658 US stocks, investing between 2012 and 2023, creates a 17.97% shortfall in the end value. In effect, this would suggest that any portfolio that did not include any of these seven stocks during the last decade would have faced a very steep, perhaps even insurmountable, climb to beat the market. That may go a long way in explaining why both value and small cap premium have essentially disappeared over this period.
    In all of the breathless coverage of the Mag Seven (and FANG and FANGAM) before it, there seems to be the implicit belief that their market dominance is unprecedented, but it is  not. In fact, equity markets have almost always owed their success to their biggest winners, and Henrik Bessimbinder highlighted this reality by documenting that of the $47 trillion in increase in market capitalization between 1926 and 2019, five companies accounted for 22% of the increase in market value.  I will wager that at the end of the next decade, looking back, we will find that a few companies accounted for the bulk of the rise in market capitalization during the decade, and another acronym will be created. 

The Why?

    When stocks soar as much as the Mag Seven stocks have in recent years, they evoke two responses. One is obviously regret on the part of those who did not partake in the rise, or sold too soon. The other is skepticism, and a sense that a correction is overdue, leading to what I call knee-jerk contrarianism, where your argument that these stocks are over priced is that they have gone up too much in the past. With these stocks, in particular, that reaction would have been costly over much of the last decade, since  other than in 2022, these stocks have found ways to deliver positive surprises. In this section, we will look at the plausible explanations for the Mag Seven outperformance in 2023, starting with a correction/momentum story, where 2023 just represented a reversal of the losses in 2022, moving on to a profitability narrative, where the market performance of these companies can be related to superior profitability and operating performance, and concluding with an examination of whether the top-heavy performance (where a few large companies account for the bulk of market performance can explained by winner-take-all economics,

1. Correction/Momentum Story: One explanation for the Mag Seven's market performance in 2023 is that they were coming off a catastrophic year in 2022, where they collectively lost $4.8 trillion in market cap, and that 2023 represented a correction back to a level only slightly above the value at the end of 2021. There is some truth to this statement, but to see whether it alone can explain the Mag Seven 2023 performance, I broke all US stocks into deciles, based upon 2022 stock price performance, with the bottom decile including the stocks that went down the most in 2022 and the top decile the stocks that went up the most in 2022, and looked at returns in 2023:

As you can see in the first comparison, the worst performing stocks in 2022 saw their market capitalizations increase by 35% in 2023, while the best performing stocks saw little change in market capitalization. Since all of the MAG 7 stocks fell into the bottom decile, I compared the performance of those stocks against the rest of the stocks in that decile, and th difference is start. While Mag Seven stocks saw their market capitalizations increase by 74%, the rest of the stocks in the bottom decile had only a 19% increase in market cap. In short, a portion of the Mag Seven stock performance in 2023  can be explained by a correction story, aided and abetted by strong momentum, but it is not the whole story.

2. Operating Performance/Profitability Narrative: While it is easy to attribute rising stock prices entirely to mood and momentum, the truth is that momentum has its roots in truth. Put differently, there are some good business reasons why the Mag Seven dominated markets in 2023:
  • Pricing power and Economic Resilience: Coming into 2023, market and the Mag Seven stocks were battered, down sharply in 2022, largely because of rising inflation and concerns about an economic downturn. There were real concerns about whether the big tech companies that had dominated markets for  the prior decade had pricing power and how well they would weather a recession. During the course of 2023, the Mag Seven set those fears to rest at least for the moment on both dimensions, increasing prices (with the exception of Tesla) on their products/services and delivering growth. In fact, if you are a Netflix subscriber or Amazon Prime member (and I would be surprised if any reader has neither, indicating their ubiquity), you saw prices increase on both services, and my guess is that you did not cancel your subscription/membership. With Alphabet and Meta, which make their money on online advertising, the rates for that advertising, measures in costs per click, rose through much of the year, and as an active Apple customer, I can guarantee that Apple has been passing through inflation into their prices all year.
  • Money Machines: The pricing power and product demand resilience exhibited by these companies have manifested as strong earnings for the companies. In fact, both Alphabet and Meta have laid off thousands of employees, without denting revenues, and their profits in 2023 reflect the cost savings: 

  • Safety Buffers: As interest rates, for both governments and corporates, has risen sharply over the last two years, it is prudent for investors to worry about companies with large debt burdens, since old debt on the books, at low rates, will have to get refinanced at higher rates. With the Mag Seven, those concerns are on the back burner, because these companies have debt loads so low that they are almost non-existent. In fact, six of the seven firms in the Mag Seven grouping have cash balances that exceed their debt loads, giving them negative net debt levels.

Put simply, there are good business reasons for why the seven companies in the Mag Seven have been elevated to superstar status. 

3. Winner take all economics: It is undeniable that as the global economy has shifted away from its manufacturing base in the last century to a technology base, it has unleashed more "winner-take-all (or most" dynamics in many industries. In advertising, which was a splintered business where even the biggest players (newspapers, broadcasting companies) commanded small market shares of the overall market, Alphabet and Meta have acquired dominant market shares of online advertising, driven by easy scaling and network benefits (where advertising flows to the platforms with the most customers). Over the last two decades, Amazon has set in motion similar dynamics in retail and Microsoft's stranglehold on application and business software has been in existence even longer. In fact, it is the two newcomers into this group, Nvidia and Tesla, where questions remain about what the end game will look like, in terms of market share. Historically, neither the chip nor car businesses have been winner-take-all businesses, but investors are clearly pricing in the possibility that the changing economics of AI chips and electric cars could alter these businesses. 

This may seem like a cop out, but I think all three factors contributed to the success of the Mag Seven stocks in 2023. There was clearly a bounce back effect, as these firms recovered from a savage beatdown in 2022, but that bounce back occurred only because they were able to deliver strong profits and solid cash flows. And looking across the decade, I don't think it is debatable that investors have not only bought into the dominant player story (coming from the winner-take-all economics), but have also anointed these seven companies as leaders in the race to dominance in each of their businesses.

The What Next?

   At the risk of stating the obvious, investing is always about the future, and a company's past market history, no matter how glorious, has little or no effect on whether it is a good investment today. I have long argued that investors need to separate what they think about the quality of a company (great, good or awful) from its quality as an investment (cheap or expensive). In fact, investing is about finding mismatches between what you think of a company and what investors have already priced in:

I think that most of you will agree that the seven companies in the Mag Seven all qualify as very good to awesome, as businesses, and the last section provides backing, but the question that remains is whether our perceptions are shared by other investors, and already priced in.

    The tool that most investors use in making this assessment is pricing, and specifically, pricing multiples. In the table below, I compute pricing metrics for the Mag Seven, and compare them to that of the S&P 500:

Trailing 12-month operating metrics used
On every pricing metric, the Mag Seven stocks trade at a premium over the rest of the stocks in the S&P 500, and therein lies the weakest link in pricing. That premium can be justified by pointing to higher growth and margins at the Mag Seven stocks, but that is followed by a great deal of hand waving, since how much of a premium is up for grabs. Concocting growth-adjusted pricing multiples like PEG ratios is one solution, but the PEG ratio is an absolutely abysmal measuring of pricing, making assumptions about PE and growth that are untenable. The pricing game becomes even more unstable, when analysts replace current with forward earnings, with bias entering at every step.

    I know that some of you don't buy into intrinsic valuation and note quite correctly that there are lots of assumptions that you have to make about growth, profitability and risk to arrive at a value and that no matter how hard you try, you will be wrong. I agree, but I remain a believer that intrinsic valuation is the only tool that I have for assessing whether the market is incorporating what I see in a company (awful to awesome). I have valued every company in the Mag Seven multiple times over the last decade, and based my judgments on investing in these companies on a comparison of my value estimates and price. With the operating numbers (revenues, earnings) coming in for the 2023 calendar year, I have updated my valuations, and here are my summary estimates:

InputAlphabetAmazonAppleMicrosoftMetaNvidiaTesla
Expected CAGR Revenue (next 5 years)8.00%12.00%7.50%15.00%12.00%32.20%31.10%
Target Operating Margin30.00%14.00%36.00%45.00%40.00%40.00%13.07%
Cost of Capital8.84%8.60%8.64%9.23%8.83%8.84%9.17%
Value per share$138.14$155.72$176.79$355.88$445.10$436.34$183.75
Price per share$145.00$169.15$188.00$405.49$456.08$680.00$185.07
% Under or Over Valued4.97%8.62%6.34%13.94%2.47%55.84%0.72%
Internal Rate of Return8.41%7.85%7.89%8.06%8.53%7.18%9.16%
Full Valuation (Excel)LinkLinkLinkLinkLinkLinkLink

* NVidia and Tesla were valued as the sum of the valuations of their different businesses. The growth and margins reported are for the consolidated company.

First, while all of the companies in the Mag Seven have values that exceed their prices, Tesla and Meta look close to fairly valued, at current prices, Alphabet, Apple and Amazon are within striking distance of value, and Microsoft and Nvidia look over valued, with the latter especially so. It may be coincidence, but these are the two companies that have benefited most directly from the AI buzz, and my findings of over valuation may just reflect my lack of imagination on how big AI can get as a business. Just to be clear, though, I have built in substantial value from AI in my valuation of Nvidia, and given Microsoft significantly higher growth because of it, but it is plausible that I have not done enough.  If intrinsic value is not your cup of tea, you can look at the internal rates of return that you would earn on these companies, at current market prices, and with my expected cash flows. For perspective, the median cost of capital for a US company at the start of 2024 was 8.60%, and while only Tesla delivers an expected return higher than that number, the test, with the exception of Nvidia, are close.

    I own all seven of these companies, which may strike you as contradictory, but with the exception of Tesla that I bought just last week, my acquisitions of the other seven companies occurred well in the past, and reflected my judgments that they were undervalued (at the time). To the question of whether I should be selling, which would be consistent with my current assessment that these stocks are overvalued, I hesitate for three reasons: The first is that my assessments of value come with error, and for at least five of the companies, the price is well within my range of value.  The second is that I will have to pay a capital gains tax that will amount to close to 30%, with state taxes included. The third is psychological, since selling everything or nothing would leave me with regrets either way. Last summer, when I valued Nvidia in this post, I found it over valued at a price of $450, and sold half my holdings, choosing to hold the other half. Now that the price has hit $680, I plan to repeat that process, and sell half of my remaining holdings.

Conclusion

    As I noted at the start of this post, the benefit of hindsight allows us to pick the biggest winners in the market, bundle them together in a group and then argue that the market would be lost without them. That is true, but it is neither original nor unique to this market. The Mag Seven stocks have had a great run, but their pricing now reflects, in my view, the fact that they are great companies, with business models that deliver growth, at scale, with profitability. If you have never owned any of these companies, your portfolio will reflect that choice, and jumping on to the bandwagon now will not bring back lost gains. You should bide your time, since in my experience, even the very best companies deliver disappointments, and that markets over react to these disappointments, simply because expectations have been set so high. It is at those times that you will find that the price is right!

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Intrinsic Valuations

  1. Alphabet in February 2024
  2. Amazon in February 2024
  3. Apple in February 2024
  4. Microsoft in February 2024
  5. Meta in February 2024
  6. NVidia in February 2024
  7. Tesla in February 2024